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IMPOSED TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
STUART S. MALAWER*
This study discusses and analyzes the rule against imposed treaties.
The rule declares invalid any treaty which is imposed by the threat or use
of aggressive military force against a contracting state.1 As such, the
rule functions as an exception to pacta sunt servanda.
The rule against imposed treaties is based upon the principle of
sovereign equality, its derivative rule of state consent, and the prohibi-
tion against the use of force in international relations. It is a rule of
customary international law based upon the Charter of the United
Nations, and having antecedents in the early twentieth century. The rule
exists exclusive of any particular international instrument and,
moreover, it is not stated clearly in any such instrument. Generally, the
rule against imposed treaties requires actual state consent, and refuses to
recognize legal fiction as a basis of contracting sufficient to result in
valid treaty obligations. The impetus for the development of this rule has
come from several sources, including the public pronouncements of the
communist and third world states which have favored an even broader
rule, and from United States foreign policy in the early twentieth
century. 2
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I. This article does not discuss the rule of treaty law which denies validity to
treaties concluded as a result of the threat or use of force against the individual negotiator.
This principle has long been recognized in international law. 2 H. GROTIuS, DE JURE BELLI
Ac PACis LIBRI TRES 804-05 (1st ed. 1625, F. Kelsey transl. 1646) in CLASSICS INT'L L. (J.
Scott ed. 1925) [hereinafter cited as GROTIUS].
2. L. ADAMS, THEORY, LAW AND POLICY OF CONTEMPORARY JAPANESE TREATIES
184 (1974) states:
In the contemporary literature of international law, the concept of unequal
treaties is seldom discussed by Western scholars and is primarily emphasized as
an important principle of international law by communist scholars.
Id. The Indian scholar Anand has stated recently:
5
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Research on the law relating to imposed treaties has been occa-
sional and too casual.' While jurists and scholars have analyzed widely
the law of war as it relates to the validity of resort to force, these same
jurists and scholars have avoided any detailed analysis of the effect of
the use of force in the conclusion of treaties. Some writers have
discussed the general topic of invalidity of treaties,4 others have
analyzed the formal rules governing the expression of state consent, 5
and several have studied unequal treaties in the context of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 6 A few have discussed, in
passing, the threat or use of military force as a specific ground for
invalidating a treaty, 7 but none has extensively analyzed imposed
treaties and the rule against them. 8 Moreover, the lack of a detailed
The reasons for the present resentment against traditional international law
spring from their past history and subjugation. . . . The new states are
determined to annul the former law of domination as expressed in the colonial
system and unequal treaties.
Anand, Role of International Adjudication, in THE FUTURE OFTHE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE 1, 7 (L. Gross ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Anandi. See also Resolution on
Unequal Treaties, CONFtRENCE DES JURISTES AFRO-ASIATIQUES 233 (1957).
3. F. NOZARI, UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971).
This occasional and causal treatment of the subject . . . is due . . . and
maybe most important, to the fact that application of force until recently has
been a legitimate means in international relations.
Id. at 15. Another legal scholar has written recently: "International lawyers since then
[ 1928] have wrestled with the problem of whether treaties imposed by countries who have
used force in breach of their treaty engagements are valid." J. GRENVILLE, THE MAJOR
INTERNATIONAL TREATIES 1914-1973, 14 (1974).
4. Rozakis, The Law ofInvalidity of Treaties, 16 ARCHiv DES V6LKERRECHTS 151
(1974); Elreedy, The Main Features of the Concept of Invalidity in the Vienna Convention
on Treaties, 27 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 13 (1971); Dhokalia, Nullity
or Invalidity of Treaties, 9 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 177 (1969).
5. Bolintineanu, Expression of Consent to be Bound by a Treaty in the Light of the
1969 Vienna Convention, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 672 (1974).
6. Murphy, Economic Duress and Unequal Treaties, II VA. J. INT'L L. 51(1970);
Stone, De Victoribus: The International Law Commission and Imposed Treaties of Peace,
8 VA. J. INT'L L. 356(1968); Detter, The Problem of Unequal Treaties, 15 INT'L COMP. L.Q.
1069 (1966).
7. Varma, Unequal Treaties in Modern International Law, 7 EASTERN J. INT'L L. 43
(1975), this study treats both the concept of unequal treaties and the rule prohibiting
imposed treaties; F. NOZARI, UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971); Mar-
kovi6, Les Traites Inegaux en Droit International, 17 JUGOSLOVENSKA REVIJA ZA
MEDUNARODNO PRAvO 264 (1970). As to unequal treaties Markovi6 stated:
[I]l est peut-8tre un des plus controvers6s, mais il est d'autant plus important
que la communaut6 internationale et les relations internationales contem-
poraines exigent de fagon de plus en plus pressante qu'on y apporte une
solution.
Id.
8. Cf. Przetacznik, The Validity of Treaties Concluded Under Coercion, 15 INDIAN
J. INT'L L. 173, 191, 193 (1975) (did not define adequately either "coercion" or "nullity");
Sandorski, The Influence of Coercion on the Invalidity of International Treaties, RUCH
PRAWNICZY EKONOMICZNY I SOCJOLOGICZNY 1 (1972) (in Polish with a summary in
English).
The question of coercion is much more complex in the case of duress
applied not to an individual negotiator but to a state as a whole. In classical
Vol. 7
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juridical examination of the general subject of duress in concluding
treaties has been decried in recent years.
9
Recent developments in international treaty relations, international
jurisprudence and international legislation, as well as the continuing
threat of new warfare, have made research into the topic more relevant
and necessary. For example, the 1973 German-Czechoslovakian Trea-
ty, 10 the 1973 International Court of Justice Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case 11 and the 1974 General Assembly Resolution on Defining Aggres-
sion 12 have provided new and significant data for meaningful analysis of
the rule against imposed treaties.
This study traces and analyzes the juridical development of the rule
from the early twentieth century when the rule did not exist, to the
present when very few deny its existence in some form. The research
here presented discloses a tension in the development of the rule, a
tension that favors a broader formulation of the rule in order to outlaw
the use of economic force. This tension is still present today.
On the juridical level, the acceptance of the newer rule has brought
treaty law into harmony with the law of war. Until recently, an anomaly
existed within certain rules of international law formulated during the
twentieth century. In general, a state is allowed to use military force
only in self-defense. This principle was codified in 1945, in article 51 of
the Charter of the United Nations. However, there was no explicit
formulation of a corresponding rule of treaty law which declared treaties
void should they be concluded under military duress, that is, should a
state become the victim of aggressive military action. An express
statement of such a rule was proffered to the international community
only in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.
The older rule of treaty law, as it existed in the nineteenth century,
international law treaties concluded under coercion aimed against a state
became and remained binding upon this state. From ancient times the strongest
states favourized [sic] the use of force for the settlement of international
disputes. . . .Within the last 50 .years this opinion at first came under attack
and finally was overturned.
Id. at 13.
9. As recently as 1973 and 1974, a leading international lawyer on the law of
self-defense, I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLESOF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 594 (2d ed. 1973),
as well as an expert on treaties, L. ADAMS, THEORY, LAW AND POLICY OF CONTEMPORARY
JAPANESE TREATIES 184 (1974), have noted the absence of juridical treatment of the
subject.
10. Czechoslovakia-Federal Republic of Germany: Treaty Establishing Normal
Relations Between the Two Countries, done December 11, 1973, 13 INT'L LEGAL MATE-
RIALS 19 (1975).
ii. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland v. Iceland), [1973] I.C.J. 4 (jurisdiction).
12. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31 at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
1977
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declared as lawful those treaties concluded as the result of the threat or
use of any military force against contracting states. This rule was
supported by writers, jurisprudence and state practice of that era. A few
authors during the inter-war era of the twentieth century indicated a
desire to change the traditional rule of treaty law, and international
jurisprudence showed some discontent with the existing rule; the treaty
practice of several states, as well as international legislation, revealed
even greater discontent with the existing rule. However, it was not until
the drafting of the United Nations Charter that a new rule came into
existence. Although established in the Charter, the new rule was not free
of controversy or confusion.
The older rule contained an inherent paradox by rendering unlaw-
ful any attempt to violate a prior peace treaty, yet recognizing a treaty as
legally valid if such a treaty should be violated successfully. An
imposed treaty was viewed also as a political justification for entering
into "just wars." Although the rationale of the traditional rule was that
it provided a means of concluding hostilities, the older rule of law
contributed to the periodic renewal of warfare whenever the military
balance of power shifted, and a state sought to overthrow a prior
unfavorable imposed treaty.
The emphasis of policy in the nineteenth century was on fostering
the conclusion of hostilities. The emphasis today stresses the need for
actual state consent, and for preventing the outbreak of renewed
hostilities by making known beforehand that imposed treaties are not
legally valid.
During the drafting of the Charter there was no specific discussion
of the use of imposed treaties as a means of preventing the outbreak of
hostilities, of ending hostilities, or of managing interstate conflict.
However, when the newer rule is construed, as it must be, in light of the
United Nations Charter, it allows the international organization great
freedom of action when the United Nations acts to counter threats to or
breaches of the peace. This freedom is as great as that of states in the
nineteenth century which relied upon the rules of law authorizing the use
of any force and recognizing the legality of all treaties. Thus, the
Security Council under some circumstances, such as when less powerful
states do not have the political protection of one of the leading powers, is
legally authorized, even if only implicitly, to impose treaties on the less
powerful states.
In deciding which international actors may lawfully impose a treaty
and under what conditions, it is useful to employ the following
categories: 1) the Security Council of the United Nations; 2) an
Vol. 7
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aggressor state; 3) the "victorious victim" of aggression; and 4)
third-states (including regional organizations), that is, ones not engaged
in the military conflict. It will be seen that both the Security Council and
the "victorious victim" may impose a treaty, with the right of the
Security Council being broader than that of the victim state. The
aggressor state, or states not engaged in the military conflict, however,
are not lawfully permitted to impose a treaty.
It should be noted that this study is not an analysis of the broad
concept of "unequal" treaties. Although the concept of unequal treaties
is not new to international law, 13 the term "unequal" has not been
clearly defined. It is often understood to denote treaf -s falling into at
least one of the following categories: 1) treaties containing formally
equal treaty provisions, but in practice, unequal obligations which may
occur as a result of unforeseen developments; 2) treaties containing
formally unequal obligations, regardless of the actual effect of the
treaty; 3) and 4) are identical to 1) and 2), except with either economic or
military force threatened or used in order to conclude such agreements;
5) treaties not otherwise unequal, concluded through the use of
economic force alone; 6) treaties not otherwise unequal, concluded
through military force alone.
In practice, treaties in categories 1) and 2), unequal treaties
concluded without the threat or use of some form of force, have not
existed often. The minimum element in categories 3) through 6) is the
threat or use of force. It is the last and most basic of these categories that
this study investigates: the threat or use of military force in concluding
treaties. Accordingly, the term "imposed treaties" is defined herein as
treaties concluded by the threat or use of illegal, that is, aggressive,
military force against states. The term "unequal treaties" is defined as
those treaties enumerated in the preceding paragraph, other than those
defined as "imposed treaties." The distinction between these two types
of treaties is significant, for this investigation concludes that economic
force alone is not a factor which is juridically recognized as sufficient to
vitiate a state's consent in treaty relations. One may conclude by
implication that other forms of unequal treaties also are not illegal under
the currently existing rules of international law.
An imposed treaty is defined herein not only as a treaty ending
hostilities as described above, but also as any international agreement
concluded as the result of the aggressive use of military force. 14 For
13. Varma, Unequal Treaties in Modern InternationalLaw, 7 EASTERN J. INT'L L. 56
(1975).
14. Schwarzenberger, Peace Treaties Before international Courts and Tribunals, 8
INDIAN J. INT'L L. I (1968). "In law, no difference exists between peace treaties and any
other type of consensual engagement. The same rules govern them all." !d. at I.
9
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example, if State A threatens to use military force against State B in
order to coerce State B's consent to a tariff, trade, commodity or
concession agreement favorable to State A, this is an imposed treaty. In
most historical instances, however, imposed treaties have taken the
form of peace treaties.
The determination of the existence and the extent of the rule against
imposed treaties is vital to any national decision-maker concerned with
determining the legal nature of international agreements and the role
they may play in managing interstate conflict. Once the rule is accu-
rately delineated, guidelines may be deduced for concluding valid
treaties. Such guidelines could assist a national decision-maker in
selecting acceptable and effective techniques in concluding treaties.
Also of a practical significance, this study provides both domestic and
international courts and tribunals with a detailed analysis of the exist-
ence and extent of an essential rule of law that ought to be applied in
determining the validity of treaties under international law and, thus, in
assessing their applicability as either international or domestic treaty
obligations.
The approach of this analysis is to examine authors, state practice,
international legislation, and codification efforts in the twentieth cen-
tury in order to determine, in the context of managing interstate conflict,
the content of the rule against imposed treaties. Emphasis is given to
actual state practice, especially treaty practice, and to the attempts of the
international community to codify such a rule in multilateral declara-
tions and agreements.' 5 This is essentially a positivistic approach which
expands the sources of international law as they are enumerated in
article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.
16
The general purpose of this work is to analyze and to evaluate the
15. 1 J. Verzijl, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 400 (1968).
This deep chasm, which undeniably exists between the positive law of
nations of former centuries and the theories of writers on that law necessitates
special caution in the selection, the use and the weighing of sources consulted.
Id. at 406.
Verzijl pleaded for more independent and systematic research on topics in the history
of international law, by relying on sources other than writings of other publicists. As stated
by Verzijl:
A general objection against the comprehensive works already existing is
this-and how could it be otherwise?-that they lean too much on the writings
or elaboration of sources by others and that they seldom show signs of an
independent and systematic research in the available immediate sources.
Id. at 407.
16. This study does not discuss common law or civil law rules of duress in contract
law. The differences in structure of the domestic and international law system are so
significant, that such an examination would not be particularly relevant to the topic under
examination. For a recent article on duress in the private law of one municipal law system
see Beatson, Duress as a Vitiating Factor in Contract, 33 CAMB. L.J. 97 (1974).
Vol. 7
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development in the twentieth century of the rule against imposed
treaties. Based upon the sources examined, the specific aims are to
determine the definition of the term "force", to examine the attempts of
states to equate economic and political force to military force as a factor
vitiating state consent, and to determine the probable efficacy of the
newer rule in terms of one of its purposes, that is, precluding the
outbreak of renewed hostilities. While this research may be viewed as a
case study of dissatisfied states in international law, or as an historical
study in the development of a rule of treaty law, the author's primary
intent is to present an analysis of the development of a new rule of
customary international law relating to treaty-making in the context of
existing international society. 17
This study concludes with a suggestion that existing international
instruments be amended in order to reflect the rule more accurately. The
conclusion also offers a suggestion which would develop the rule further
to increase its effectiveness as a means of managing interstate conflict.
I. CLASSICAL AND TRADITIONAL WRITERS
Because there are not many directly relevant and significant
writings from the years preceding the twentieth century on the topic of
international law and imposed treaties, only a short discussion of these
writings and a summary is presented at this point.
Although several writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies discussed the juridicial nature of imposed treaties, only a few
nineteenth century writers did so. The treatment of the topic of imposed
treaties by these earlier writers was also more extensive than that of the
nineteenth century writers.
A. Seventeenth and Eighteenth Century Writers
The writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries discussed
17. Some newer works have rejected the usefulness of the "old-new state" distinc-
tion for the study of international law. Syatauw, Old and New States-A Misleading
Distinction for Future International Law and International Relations, LE DROIT INTERNA-
TIONAL DEMAIN 67 (1974); Kim, The Asian State Practice and International Legal Order,
13 KOREAN J. INT'L L. 29 (1968) (in Korean with English summary). See also Keith, Asian
Attitudes to International Law, 3 AUSTL. Y.B. INT'L L. I (1967). New nations have
"demanded that international law be adapted to meet the new needs of international
society." AFRICAN INTERNATIONAL LEGAL HISTORY i (A. Mensah-Brown ed. 1975). Anand
has written:
[Traditional international law] sanctified colonialism and accepted the unequal
treaties forced upon weaker states as valid and legal. It is this law and these
rights, acquired during the colonial and imperialist age, which are being ques-
tioned today.
Anand, supra note 2, at 7.
11
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both the development of a rule of the law of war regulating the resort to
force, and a rule of the law of treaties regulating the use of force in
concluding treaties. They discussed imposed treaties, without using this
term, as a specific form of unequal treaties, as well as the interpretation
of those peace treaties which may be classified as imposed treaties.
Hugo Grotius. Hugo Grotius, the Dutch humanist, in 1625,
discussed unequal treaties in DE JuRE BELLI Ac PACIS LIBRI TRES. 8
Although Grotius contended that unjust wars are unlawful, he neverthe-
less argued that treaties resulting from all wars are valid. 19
Grotius stated that the injustice of waging war should not be a
factor in determining the validity of a peace treaty. Rather, it should be a
factor only in interpreting such a treaty .2° He argued that, generally, the
more favorable a treaty condition is, the more broadly it should be
construed. Grotius never questioned the validity of imposed peace
treaties whether or not they resulted from an unjust war.
21
Samuel Pufendorf. In the LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS, 22 Pufen-
dorf, the German legal scholar, assessed the view in 1672, that all
compacts made with an enemy are required to be observed. 23 However,
while he stated that all imposed peace treaties are to be observed, he also
asserted that treaties between states that continued a state of war are not
to be observed.
24
Pufendorf adhered to the view that pacts which actually ended
hostilities should not be subject to a plea of duress which would deny the
18. GROTIUS, supra note 1, at 804-05.
19. Id. at 809. J. TOOKE, THE JUST WAR IN AQUINAS AND GROTIUS (1965) stated
Grotius' views as follows:
Moreover at the end of a war the rights of the parties depend on military
victory, not in the least upon whose cause had been just.
Id. at 231. Y. MELZER, CONCFPTS OF JUST WAR 17 n.7 (1975) argues that the existence of
the shift from distinguishing wars as "just and unjust" to "legal and illegal" was not
evident prior to the sixteenth century. Even as late as the first half of the twentieth century
the existence of the shift was not clear.
20. Id.
21. 1 C. PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF ANCIENT GREECE
AND ROME (1911) stated the following:
[W]ith the rapid extension of [the Roman] empire and absorption of foreign
countries, the basis of equality gave way very often to the relationship of
sovereign and dependent, strict reciprocity of treaty stipulations being replaced
by a dictatorial insistence of stated conditions; so that in the end. . . the formal
expression of the bilateral character of treaties came to be eliminated.
Id. at 411.
22. S. PUFENDORF, LAWOF NATURE AND NATIONS (4th ed. B. Kennett transl. 1729).
23. Id. at 849.
24. Id. Barbeyrac's editorial note to Pufendorf's text rejected this view.
I am of [the] opinion that these sorts of compacts ought to be as religiously
observed as any other. His reasons prove nothing because they prove too much.
Id. at n.2 (author's updating of the language).
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validity of such pacts. 25 He argued that such treaties are lawful since
both parties are put on a plane of equality as regards the justice of the
war. 26 In addition, he thought that the excuse of the unjust creation of
fear ought not to be recognized. Otherwise, there could be no end to
wars, which were assuredly frequent enough.27
Emmerich de Vattel. More than most writers of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, the Swiss jurist, Vattel, discussed the topics of
imposed treaties, treaties of peace and the interpretation of such
treaties.28
Although Vattel did not use the words "imposed" or "forced"
treaties, his writings clearly lend themselves to the use of such terms.
For example, he stated the following: "When a Nation is forced to
submit to another it may lawfully renounce its former treaties, if that is
demanded of it by the power which had compelled it to make the unequal
alliance.' '29
Vattel recognized that some treaties imposed by force may not be
contrary to the laws of nature.3 For example, imposing unequal terms
on a weaker state for the stronger state's own safety is not contrary to the
natural law of nations. Vattel also contended that a treaty may be
imposed upon a state as a penalty to punish it for being an unjust
aggressor or to render it incapable of easily doing harm in the future. 3
1
This is more than merely imposing a treaty in order to recreate the status
quo.
It is stated in later portions of this article that the modern rule
against imposed treaties does not allow the imposition of a treaty on an
aggressor as a penalty. 32 However, the rule permits a treaty to be
imposed in reference to a state's aggression. Whether the imposition of a
25. S. PUFENDORF, ELMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LIBRI Duo (1672
ed. W. Oldfather transl. 1929) in CLASSICS INT'L L. (J. Scott ed. 1931).
26. Id. at 95.
27. Id. at 2. C. WOLFF, Jus GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM (1764
ed. J. Drake transl.) in CLASSICS INT'L L. 522-23 (J. Scott ed. 1934) also declared that all
treaties must be observed. "A treaty of peace is not invalid because it had been extorted by
warlike force or by fear." Id. at 522.
28. 3 E. VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS-THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW-
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT ANDTOTHE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS (1758 ed. C.
Fenwick transl.) in CLASSICS OF INT'L L. 165 (1916) [hereinafter cited as VATrEL].
29. Id. at 168 (emphasis added). See generally F. RUDDY, INTERNATIONAL LAW INTHE
ENLIGHTENMENT (1975): "Treaties and alliances conducted on an unequal basis were
valid . I..- Id  at 199. "Vattel concluded that peace concluded with an unjust conqueror
or usurper was valid." Id. at 262.
30. VATrEL, supra note 28, at 169.
31. Id.
32. See text accompanying note 1014 infra.
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treaty is permissible in order to render the aggressor incapable of easily
doing harm in the future is still an open question.
Vattel discussed treaties of peace as a particular type of treaty.
33
Like other writers, Vattel believed that the right to make peace went
with the power to make war; individual states were the final arbiters in
the exercise of such rights. He indicated that the urgent need for the
termination of unfortunate wars provided the justification of the rule of
law recognizing the validity of a peace treaty. 34 Moreover, Vattel
specifically recognized the legal rights of an "unjust conqueror." 35 The
unjust conqueror becomes possessed of all the powers of government,
including the power to negotiate peace treaties with other nations. 36
Like the other writers of this period of classical international law
scholarship, Vattel saw the overriding reason for recognizing imposed
peace treaties as the necessity to end existing hostilities. In a broad
sense, although Vattel did not explicitly view it as such, the need to end
hostilities and to preclude further killing and horror is a paramount
principle of justice.
Because of the necessity of maintaining the existence of a defeated
state, Vattel justified the principle of treaty law which allowed imposed
treaties. Yet, he also justified it from an international community
perspective. He declared that if the rule were otherwise, it would
undermine the general principle of treaty observance.
To authorize [a rule invalidating imposed treaties] would
amount to an attack upon the common safety and welfare of
Nations; the principle would be condemned as abhorrent by
the same reasons which made the faithful observance of
treaties a universally sacred duty. . . . Besides the plea
would be almost always disgraceful and absurd. 3
7
Vattel did not regard the consent of the defeated state either as a
juridical fiction or as real but vitiated by the duress that had been brought
to bear against the state. He believed it to be real and actual consent even
though it was brought about by duress.
Since the nation has consented to [treaties of peace] it
must look upon them as an advantage, considering the cir-
cumstances under which they were made; and it should
respect its word.38
33. See generally VATrEL, supra note 28, at 346.
34. Id. at 347.
35. Id. at 349.
36. Id. "[N]either of the parties is condemned as unjust, a proceeding which
scarcely any sovereign would submit to." Id. at 350.
37. Id. at 356.
38. Id. at 357.
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Vattel also treated the problem of interpreting an imposed peace
treaty. He contended that when the meaning of a clause is in doubt, it is
to be interpreted against the party prescribing the terms of the treaty.
"For as it was he who in a measure dictated the treaty, the fault is his if it
was not worded more clearly .... 39 He thought that by interpreting
an ambiguous clause against the imposing state, a measure of fairness
would be provided to the weaker party.
In summary, Vattel contended that imposed treaties are lawful,
including all peace treaties. The need to save a state from further
destruction and to uphold the general sanctity of treaties were his
essential policy considerations. This need was recognized as providing a
reason for a rule of treaty law allowing the use of force in concluding
treaties. This rule was incongruous to the existing law of war, which was
that there should be no unjust resort to wars. He believed that the consent
of the defeated state was not vitiated by the duress. However, he argued
that ambiguous terms of a peace treaty are to be interpreted against the
dictating state.
P.P. Shafirov. It is of interest to indicate the views of Shafirov, as
Vice-Chancellor of the Russian Empire, in his 1717 discourse concern-
ing the just causes of the war between Sweden and Russia in the early
eighteenth century .' This has been rediscovered and republished only
recently.
Shafirov argued that the Russo-Swedish Treaty of 1616 was "a
prejudicial and forced peace" 41 that was signed in order to save Russia
from "impending utter ruin." 42 Shafirov contended that the Tsar had
observed a peace treaty which had been extorted from his
predecessors.' 3
Shafirov attempted to rely upon the "just war doctrine" in order to
39. Id. at 354. Bynkershoek contended that it was unjust for the leading powers to
impose a treaty on a smaller state with the overt intention of precluding a conflict between
that smaller and innocent state and its larger and aggressive neighbor.
As it is unjust to compel a sovereign to make war against his will, so it is unjust to
force peace upon him.
The pretext to such acts of injustice is usually a desire to conserve the
peace, as it has been the pretext for even greater wrongs which have been
fashionable for some years past, seeing that sovereigns have banded together to
dispose of the dominions and powers of other sovereigns at pleasure, and as
freely as if these were their own.
2 C. BYNKERSHOEK, QUAESTIONUM JURIS PUBLICI LIBRI Duo (1st ed. T. Frank transl. 1737)
in CLASSICS IN INT'L L. 142 (J. Scott ed. 1930).
40. P. SHAFIROV, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE JUST CAUSES OFTHE WAR BETWEEN
SWEDEN AND RUSSIA: 1700-1721 (1973) (introduction by W. Butler).
41. Id. at 268.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 273.
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justify Russia's first use of force in the Swedish-Russian War of
1700-1721." He believed that the prior imposed peace treaty was cause
in and of itself to justify politically the use of force against Sweden.
45
Thus the Treaty of 1616, even though it was declared to be both
observed and valid, was proposed as a factor in determining the justness
of a subsequent war.
This reasoning highlights an anomaly of the eighteenth century
theorists. Imposed treaties were viewed as legally valid, but they were
also thought of as grounds to be relied upon to justify renewed
warfare. One may conclude that Shafirov's reasoning is that a legally
valid treaty may serve as political justification for renewed hostilities-
the paradoxical absurdity of the classical view of "imposed treaties"
and "just wars."
B. Nineteenth Century Writers
By and large, nineteenth and early twentieth century writers rarely
discussed imposed treaties. 6 When they did, they viewed them as being
legal. These writers did not make the theoretical distinction between an
unjust treaty of peace, defined here as a treaty resulting from the military
success of an aggressor, and a just peace treaty imposed by the
victorious victim of aggression. Neither did they discuss the justness of
the provisions within the peace treaties. These omissions are indicative
of their less rigorous analysis of the topic of imposed treaties. A
discussion of two leading nineteenth century treatises is presented in
order to indicate the prevalent views of this time period.
Wharton. Francis Wharton, in his DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES 4 7 in 1887, quoted Woolsey 48 and Bernard4 9 as
having accepted the validity of all coerced treaties. Woolsey stated that
coercion, while invalidating a private agreement produced by it, did not
44. Id.
45. Butler in his introduction stated that Shafirov argued that treaties obtained by
coercing a state during a period of domestic stress were void. Id. at 1, 9. This is a broad
reading of Shafirov's work. The "domestic distress" approach by itself is not a statement
of the law as existing in the twentieth century, let alone in the eighteenth century.
46. Perhaps this was because the Western states were the imposers of many treaties
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
47. 2 A DIGEST OFTHE INTERNATIONAL LAWOFTHE UNITED STATES 5 (F. Wharton ed.
1887) [hereinafter cited as WHARTON]. See also 5 A DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
183-84 (J. Moore ed. 1906) [hereinafter cited as MOORE].
48. T. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (4th ed.
1875) [hereinafter cited as WOOLSEY].
49. M. BERNARD, FOUR LECTURESON SUBJECTS CONNECTED WITH DIPLOMACY 184-85
(1868) [hereinafter cited as BERNARD].
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invalidate a treaty so produced.5" Thus, Wharton declared that there
could be no question of the binding force of the treaty between France
and Germany that led to the dethroning of Napoleon III, though its terms
were concluded through coercion. 51 He also argued that the same may
be said of the consent of France to a treaty after the defeat of its armies at
Waterloo, and of the treaty by which Mexico ceded California and other
territory to the United States.
52
Bernard declared that neither the plea of "duress" nor that of
laesio enarnes (severe hardships) could be recognized as justifying the
non-fulfillment of a treaty. 53 He contended, for example, that the
hardship inflicted by France on Russia after the Battle of Jena did not
invalidate the Peace of Tilsit.
54
However, both Woolsey and Bernard, as did all nineteenth century
writers, recognized that personal duress upon the negotiator vitiated the
underlying consent of the international agreement.55 The views illus-
trated subsequently by Moore in his digest56 were essentially similar to
those of Woolsey and Bernard.
Oppenheim. In his treatise on international law, Oppenheim
clearly assented to the existing rule by stating that the repudiation of any
treaty, whether or not the treaty was brought about by the threat or use of
military force, was to be viewed as an unlawful repudiation under
international treaty law.517 He stated that, generally, a treaty without real
consent lacked binding force, but that circumstances of urgent distress,
such as defeat in war or the menace of a strong state to a weak state,
would not invalidate the consent of a state to the terms of a treaty.
58
His conclusions were essentially similar to those of the writers of
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, his writings did not
indicate that he had ever assessed the views of the classical writers,
especially those of the naturalist school of international law; nor did he
discuss policy reasons for not invalidating imposed treaties, or the
relation of a treaty of peace to just and unjust wars.
50. WOOLSEY, supra note 48, at 175.
Again, when we speak of force invalidating a treaty, we must intend unjust
duress or violence practised on the sovereign or the treaty-making agent. A
disadvantageous treaty made to prevent further conquest . . . is as binding as
any other ....
Id.
51. WHARTON, supra note 47, at 5.
52. Id.
53. BERNARD, supra note 49, at 184.
54. Id. at 185.
55. WOOLSEY, supra note 48, at 172; BERNARD, supra note 49, at 184.
56. MOORE, supra note 47.
57. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 525 (1905); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 547 (1912).
58. Id.
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C. Summary of Classical and Traditional Writers
The writers of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
never used the term "imposed treaties", but only the term "unequal
treaties". It is interesting to compare the discussions of seventeenth and
eighteenth century writers to writers of the nineteenth century who
viewed all imposed treaties as valid and did not discuss this topic
further. The earlier classical writers reached much the same conclu-
sions; however, unlike the nineteenth century writers, they struggled
with various subtle propositions. The refusal of nineteenth century
writers to discuss more fully the problem of imposed treaties may be
explained in part by the movement away from the older naturalist legal
philosophy59 to a stronger positivistic approach.
The writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were
confronted with the problem of upholding the validity of imposed or
forced treaties, especially in light of these writers' view of the law of war
under which unjust wars were illegal. They contended that this anomaly
was unfortunate but unavoidable because of existing state practice.
Forced treaties or imposed treaties were discussed most often by
classical and traditional writers in the context of peace treaties. The
writers rarely indicated what forms "forced treaties" could have if they
were not in the form of peace treaties. Also, the writers rarely discussed
the law of imposed treaties in the context of restricting the possibility of
renewed warfare; they discussed the law only in terms of ending the
immediate conflict. Treaties were always to be observed under pacta
sunt servanda. The consent of the defeated or coerced state was viewed
as real, and not a legal fiction. In cases of ambiguity, these treaties were
to be construed against the imposer.
For the early writers, the policy considerations for validating
imposed treaties were two-fold. First, the essential consideration was
59. The older naturalist school of international law approved of various rules as
positive law which were at variance with jus naturale. One such rule seems to have been
the rule precluding the invalidity of treaties because of military duress against the state.
Seegenerallythe Swedish treatise T. GIHL, INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 46 (S. Charleston
transl. 1937).
Two major private codes of international law in the nineteenth century, Field's
International Code and Bluntschli's International Law Code, which purported to reflect
existing law, did not proscribe the use of military force in treaty-making. D. FIELD,
OUTLINES OF AN INTERNATIONAL CODE art. 190 (2d ed. 1876); M. BLUNTSCHLI, LE DROIT
INTERNATIONAL CODIFIE art. 402 et seq. (1870). However, the Fiore Code, a nineteenth
century code which posited an ideal set of rules, proscribed such use of force in treaty
relations. P. FIORE, IL DIRITrO INTERNAZIONALE CODIFICATO E LA SUA SANZIONE
GIURIDICA arts. 757-58 (1915) (Ist ed. 1890). The international law community waited
almost eighty years to have an analogous rule codified into a draft international conven-
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the need for a state to be able to ensure its survival by consenting to an
agreement to prevent that state and its people from further destruction.
Second, there was the need to ensure the observation of treaties by all
states in the international community. The early writers did not believe
that states should be permitted to use a plea of duress in order to vitiate
their contractual agreements.
II. WORLD WAR I AND THE INTER-WAR PERIOD:
THE TRADITIONAL RULE SURVIVES DEMANDS FOR CHANGE
The inter-war period saw continuing approval of the traditional
rule. An evaluation of that period discloses the emergence of a demand
for change and of a developing state of tension between contemporary
views and the continued acceptance of the more classical position.
A. Doctrine
The great majority of scholars writing during the inter-war period
did not believe that the rule upholding the validity of imposed treaties
had in any way been changed. Only a few writers argued that the
developing new rule, which rejected the validity of imposed treaties,
had crystallized sufficiently to be classifiable as a rule of international
treaty law.
1. Adherents to the Traditional Rule. The adherents to the
traditional rule in the inter-war period generally agreed with many of the
observations made by earlier writers, although they emphasized more
the lack of third-party adjudication and the concern for the larger
international community, rather than just the interests of the directly
affected states.
Julius Hatschek. The Danish professor of international law at the
University of Guttinger, Dr. Julius Hatschek, in 1930, fully accepted
the prevailing view that duress on a state did not vitiate the validity of a
treaty.6° Hatschek contended that equality was an essential condition for
the valid consummation of a treaty. 6 ' Nevertheless, he argued that
constraint alone could not constitute a basis in international law upon
which a state might contest the validity of a treaty. 62 Hatschek discussed
60. J. HATSCHEK, AN OUTLINE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 170 (C. Manning transl.
1930) [hereinafter cited as HATSCHEK]. See also the views of the Dutch Councillor of State,
D. JITTA, THE RENOVATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1919). An earlier writer declared
imposed treaties to be valid, no matter how unequal they were, and proffered the phrase
"unilateral imposition of demands" to be used in lieu of imposed or unequal treaties. C.
PHILLIPSON, TERMINATION OF WAR AND TREATIES OF PEACE 165 (1916).
61. HATSCHEK, supra note 60, at 170.
62. Id.
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neither the details of his position nor the policy consideration of the
stated rule; he merely cited Grotius.63
Axel Miller. This Danish professor, in 1931, treated the question
of duress against a state in one sentence: "l[Wlar or threat of war, does
not, according to positive international law, generally render the treaty
invalid.' 64 Mller accepted the existing rule with no trace of dissent.
Charles Butler. At the annual meeting of the American Society of
International Law in 1932, there was'a round table discussion of treaty
interpretation which centered on the topic of treaties made under duress.
This was one of the earlier scholarly discussions at an organized
international law conference which treated the question of the juridical
impact of duress on states in their treaty relations and, especially,
treaty-making. The views of Charles Butler and Edgar Turlington are
notably instructive in light of their clear statements on this topic.
At the 1932 meeting, Butler specifically commented on whether
the obligor party can be released from a treaty obligation by reason of
duress exercised over him in the making of the treaty. 65 In a passing
reference to the 1932 confrontation between China and Japan over the
latter's invasion of Manchuria, Butler contended that any treaty arising
from that conflict would be binding, even if it were forced upon China. 
66
Butler rejected the notion that there existed a single standard of
morality for both individuals and nations. 67 The answer to the question
of whether obligations assumed under duress could be avoided under
any recognized principles of international law was for Butler, "I do not
think so.''
68
In Butler's view, the basis of the existing rule was two-fold: 1)
even if there existed an authoritative body competent to determine the
validity of a plea of duress, no recognition of such a plea should be
given, because to do so would undermine the rights of people and
nations;69 2) adherence to the traditional rule would assure the interna-
63. Id.
64. A. MOLLER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN PEACE AND WAR 228 (H. Pratt transl. 1931).
65. Treaties Made Under Duress, 26 PROCED. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 45 (1932).
At the 1927 meeting of the American Society of International Law, there was a
discussion of imposed treaties within the context of termination of unequal treaties.
Putney, The Termination of Unequal Treaties, 21 PROCED. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 87, 88-89
(1927); Buell, The Termination of Unequal Treaties, id. at 90, 90-91. Putney stated:
"[W]hatever kind of unequal treaty we refer to, I do not think that there is any principle of
international law . . . [which gives] a right to abrogate it." Id. at 89.
66. Id. at 45-46.
67. Id. at 46.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 46, 48.
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tional community of a rule tending to end military hostilities.7 °
Edgar Turlington. Turlington readily agreed with the observations
of Butler, and in surprisingly blunt language, declared that a treaty of
peace was a kind of judgment following a trial by battle. 71 Given the
decentralized nature of the international community, a treaty of peace is
valid regardless of the duress directed against a state. 72 He cited
contemporary state practice of the United States in Latin America
(Haiti, 1915 and Santo Domingo, 1916),73 as well as the partitioning of
Poland in the nineteenth century by other European states, as examples
supporting the traditional rule.
74
Turlington believed it dangerous to accept the "implied analogy
between treaties and private contracts." 75 Moreover, he considered it
especially dangerous to transfer the rules of morality binding in a
domestic legal order to the international legal order.
76
Turlington argued that the policy basis of the traditional rule to be
of at least a dual nature. First, he believed a defeated state to have a role,
however slight, in drafting a peace treaty.77 Thus, he contended that
imposed treaties are based on actual consent. Second, he argued that the
"welfare of society demands [the] observance [of imposed treaties]." 78
He emphasized the need of protecting the larger society from a rule
allowing a subjective and unilateral denunciation of a treaty in a manner
not subject to review by an authoritative third party.
The above arguments were standard reasons for recognizing
imposed treaties given by the older classical writers, the nineteenth
century writers and the inter-war writers. Turlington restated them in a
direct and uncritical manner.
Two additional observations of Turlington are of importance: 1)
after identifying the work of a scholar, Dr. Verdross, as adhering to a
position that the old rule has been changed, Turlington explicitly
rejected this view as being "a little ahead of the procession;" 79 2) he
raised the problem of treaty revision as it relates to imposed treaties.
80
70. Id. at 46.
71. Id. at 50.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 49, 50.
74. Id. at 52.
75. Id. at 49.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 50. Turlington contended that, -[T]he welfare of society may be deemed at
some time in the future not to demand the observance of [imposed] treaties." Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 52.
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The second proposition is significant in the sense that these two
concepts, treaty revision and imposed treaties, were rarely discussed as
related concepts by scholars of the inter-war period. This was the case
even though these concepts were linked by several states in their practice
during that period. Turlington believed that although there may be many
reasons for treaty revision, a paramount reason, if not the main reason in
practice, is the existence of imposed treaties.8 I Turlington also
implicitly distinguished the differing effects of these two doctrines. 82
Treaty revision requires the consent of the disputing parties, while the
abrogation of imposed treaties, if the new rule put forward by some
writers was to be accepted, would allow a unilateral denunciation of
obligations.
Charles Hyde. Hyde accepted the traditional rule and argued that
force directed against a state is generally irrelevant. 83 His analysis, more
than that of some of the other scholars of the inter-war period, raised
questions of particular interest to writers of the present decade. His
critique of the rule was basically similar to that of other writers of the
inter-war period. Yet, he accepted the use of force against a state in
treaty-making as an unfortunate characteristic of the existing interna-
tional legal system.
84
Hyde did not believe that the municipal law analogy which held
that duress vitiated a contract, was applicable to the existing interna-
tional law of treaties. 85 For Hyde, the basis of the existing rule was that
the consent did not need to be real, a legal fiction being sufficient. He
argued that the consensual nature of the agreement was not significant.
What was important was the objective sought to be effected. He insisted
that the chief concern of international society was recognition of all
treaties whether or not concluded under duress, in light of the practical
problems which subsequent denouncement might create. 86
Hyde's position described above does not distinguish his writing
from writings of other publicists of that period. However, he went on to
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW-CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES 1380 (2d ed. 1945) [hereinafter cited as HYDE].
84. Id. at 1381.
85. Id. at 1379. "There is deemed to be slight opportunity for the application of this
principle at least in some stages of the process of concluding formal agreements between
States." Id.
86. Id. at 1381.
The practical problem of the present time concerns, therefore, the legal
effect of compulsion upon achievements attributable to it, rather than the legal
quality of agreements, that are utilized in order to make compulsion effective.
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make several trenchant remarks. First, Hyde stated that the belligerent's
right to impose a treaty might be limited.87 He raised the possibility of
the invalidity of the transfer of the territory of the defeated state, 88 a legal
proposition that has not yet been settled definitely. Second, Hyde
asserted that the then accepted rule may be counter-productive in the
sense that it weakens respect for the sanctity of treaties. 89 It is also
interesting to note that Hyde believed the Brest-Litovsk Treaty90 to be
invalid not because it violated any rule against the use of force; rather, it
subsequently became invalid by what might best be termed the fortunes
of war. 91 Hyde accepted the traditional rule, but did so with the clear
knowledge that it was the lesser of two evils. 92 Either the international
community would recognize such treaties, or wars would be prolonged.
Hyde, like other writers of this period, emphasized peace in the
international community more than any other factor. He gave greater
emphasis to this proposition than to the need to spare the defeated state
from further suffering, the view expressed more by the classical writers
than by the writers in the twentieth century. This was a subtle but
interesting development.
2. Proponents of a New Rule. The Western proponents of a new
rule of international treaty law during the inter-war period numbered
only a few writers. They often demonstrated an acceptance, if only
limited, of a new rule which was at times viewed to be a new jus
cogens. 
93
Alfred von Verdross. Professor Verdross of the University of
Vienna discussed the validity of immoral treaties under the concept of
jus cogens.94 Although other authors of this period viewed imposed
treaties as invalid, Verdross' discussion of immoral treaties and jus
cogens added another dimension.
87. Id. at 1380 n.5. An earlier writer suggested this proposition as a maxim to guide
the forthcoming 1919 Versailles Peace Conference. W. PHILLIMORE, THREE CENTURIES OF
TREATIES OF PEACE 4 (1917).
88. HYDE, supra note 83, at 1380 n.5.
89. Id. at 1381.
90. Armistice Concluded at Brest-Litovsk, done Dec. 15, 1917, 2 DOCUMENTS IN
PREPARATION FOR PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE I (U.S. Dep't of State ed. 1918).
91. HYDE,supra note 83, at 1380.
92. Id.
93. Writers during this period often rejected the doctrine of legal equality of states.
Baker argued that such a doctrine is a fiction which is based upon older naturalist writings
of the seventeenth century, but the doctrine is rejected by the positivist writers of the
nineteenth century. Baker, The Doctrine of Legal Equality of States, 4 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
1, 7 (1924). See also McNair, Equality in International Law, 26 MICH. L. REV. 131 (1927).
94. Verdross, Rigles Ginirales du Droit International de la Paix, 30 RECUEIL DES
COURS 271, 496-500 (1929) [hereinafter cited as 1929 Verdross]; Verdross, Forbidden
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Verdross thought that the comments of Judge Schucking in his
dissenting opinion in the Chinn Case95 evidenced the principle that
international law declared immoral treaties to be void. 96 He quoted
Judge Schiicking's comment that the Permanent Court would never
recognize an international treaty in contradiction to bonos mores.97
Judge Schicking's full comments indicated that treaties are immoral if
they had a "flaw in their origin. "98 This could be construed to include
the unlawful use of force against a state in concluding a treaty, as the use
of force often had been thought of as at least a violation of good morals.
Verdross argued that the League Covenant kept intact the distinc-
tion between just and unjust wars, 99 merely adding another category,
that of wars of self-defense. 100 Thus, some wars initiated by a state may
be just, even if they were not in self-defense. He contended that in
addition to the Covenant, the Lucarno Pact and the Kellogg-Briand Pact
also had an impact on changing the law of war and, implicitly, the law of
treaties. 101
Verdross concluded that immoral treaties are void, and that no
valid obligation could come into existence concerning the immoral
contents of a treaty. He believed that international tribunals are under a
duty to take judicial notice that such treaties are void, even if there be no
demand by a party to this effect. 102 "In consequence, a formal voidance
of immoral contents of treaties is not necessary. The burdened state has
the right simply to refuse the fulfillment of such an obligation."' 03 For
Verdross, the rule against immoral treaties was a jus cogens, and no
obligation whatsoever could flow from such treaties. 104
One ambiguity arises in the context of Verdross' view of void
treaties. He argued that a burdened state has a right simply to refuse the
fulfillment of an immoral obligation. One might ask whether this means
that the burdened state also enjoys the alternative right to require the
fulfillment of such an obligation. Verdross would seem to say no, but he
did not treat this problem fully.
Hersch Lauterpacht. Lauterpacht, in the edited work of
95. [1934] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 63.
96. 1937 Verdross, supra note 94, at 576.
97. Id. at n.16.
98. Chin Case [1934] P.C.I.J. ser. A/R, No. 63, at 50.
99. 1929 Verdross, supra note 94, at 498.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 499.
102. 1937 Verdross, supra note 94, at 576-77. Such juridical notice should also be
taken by national courts.
103. Id. at 577.
104. Id. at 571, 576.
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OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, stated that a change in treaty law
probably occurred during the inter-war period. 105 His statement was not
as clear and unequivocal as it was in later editions of OPPENHEIM
appearing after the Second World War.
Lauterpacht argued that in light of the Covenant of the League and
the General Treaty for the Renunciation of War, international law had
rejected the previously existing rule. 106 He made it clear that there was
no change in general international law as the result of these two
instruments. The change was limited to the views of the parties adhering
to these agreements which were not universal.1 07
He did not present a discussion of the policy considerations behind
these rules. He merely stated that the prior law was obnoxious to some
general principle of law, presumably one requiring the consent of states,
but was nevertheless the existing law. 0 He did believe, however, that
an invalidly imposed treaty could be given some effect if other states
subsequently recognized the situation created by the imposed treaty. 10 9
One may conclude that while Lauterpacht espoused the existence
of a new rule of treaty law in the inter-war period, his views were not a
radical departure from those generally accepted by other Western
writers of that era.
B. State Practice
An analysis of the practice of a number of states during the
inter-war period evidences an early development of the rule against
imposed treaties. Yet, state practice as a whole was neither persistent
nor consistent. The evidence analyzed does not support the proposition
that state practice during the inter-war period crystallized a new rule of
treaty law on imposed treaties.
The practice of states over a period of time, accepted by most of
them as legitimate, is the process that creates customary international
law. This study cites examples of treaty practice as evidence bearing on
the existence or non-existence of that customary rule of international
law which governs the conclusion of treaties.
1. United States Response to Japan's 21 Demands (1915). The
105. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 703 (H. Lauterpacht 5th ed. 1937).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 702.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 703 & n. I. This proposition is discussed below in the text accompanying
note 1015 infra. It will be shown that the 1%9 Vienna Convention, to the contrary,
explicitly postulated that imposed treaties could not have even a limited effect.
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response of the United States government" 0° to the "Twenty-One
Demands" made on China by Japan in 1915,111 is one of the earliest
examples of state practice in the twentieth century challenging the
existence of the generally accepted rule of treaty law at that time.
As a result of the Japanese threat of military force against China in
1915, China acquiesced in the signing of several treaties with Japan.
Among those treaties were the Treaty Respecting the Province of
Shantung 112 and the Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern
Inner Mongolia.113 Both were concluded on May 25, 1915.
On May 11, 1915, exactly two weeks before the conclusion of
these treaties, United States Secretary of State Bryan had asked the
United States ambassador to Japan to convey a note to the Japanese
government stating that the United States could not recognize any
agreement arising from the prevailing circumstances.1 14 Those cir-
cumstances included the threat of military force as contained in the
Japanese ultimatum. "15 The Bryan Note stated the following:
In view of the circumstances of the negotiations which
have taken place and which are pending between the Govern-
ment of Japan and the Government of China, and the agree-
ments which have been reached as a result thereof, the
Government of the United States has the honor to notify the
Imperial Japanese Government that it cannot recognize any
agreement or undertaking which has been entered into or
which may be entered into between the Governments of Japan
and China impairing the treaty rights of the United States and
its citizens in China, the political or territorial integrity of the
Republic of China, or the international policy relative to
China commonly known as the open door policy."16
This early twentieth century treaty practice of the United States
exhibited a newly developing approach to the validity of treaties, an
approach denying recognition to treaties imposed by the threat of
military force. This position was reasserted by the United States during
110. Letter from Secretary of State to Ambassador Guthrie, May 11, 1915, repro-
duced in FOR. REL. U.S. 146 (1924) [hereinafter cited as Bryan Letter].
111. Id. at 145. See also 2 TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING CHINA
1231 (J. MacMurray ed. 1921).
112. Treaty Respecting the Province of Shantung, done May 25, 1915, 110 BRIT. FOR.
ST. PAPERS 791 (1916).
113. Treaty Respecting South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia, done May 25,
1915, id. at 796.
114. Bryan Letter, supra note 110, at 146.
115. For the official Chinese statement on its compliance with the Japanese
ultimatum of May 7, 1915, see id. at 178-85. See also LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec.
Supp. 101, at 165 (1932).
116. Bryan Letter, supra note 110, at 146 (emphasis added).
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the 1932 Sino-Japanese conflict in the form of the Stimson Note.'" 7
2. The Soviet Attitude Toward the Brest-Litovsk Treaty (1918)
and the Versailles Peace Treaty (1919). The Soviet attitude toward the
Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918 was the Soviet Union's earliest practice
regarding imposed treaties. It was one basis for the soon to be developed
Soviet doctrine espousing a new rule of international law on the nature
of treaties. The new Soviet government signed the Treaty, but believed
it to be an imposed agreement and questioned its legitimacy.
The Armistice between Russia and Germany was signed December
15, 1917, at Brest-Litovsk. 118 Article 9 required that the parties "enter
into peace negotiations immediately after the signature of the present
Armistice Treaty.' ' 9 The history of Russia's conduct during this
period and immediately after the signing of the peace treaty evidences
that Russia believed itself forced to sign an imposed and unjust peace
treaty.
On February 10, 1918, two months after the signing of the
Armistice, Russia issued a declaration signed by Trotsky and others
stating that she was putting "an end to the state of war with Ger-
many." 120 Russia was renouncing "any intention of signing an annex-
ationist peace," and was ordering complete demobilization of all
troops. 12' This was a most unusual declaration and certainly one with
little historical precedent.
In response to the Russian announcement, Germany declared that
the Armistice on the Russian front was terminated 122 and immediately
renewed military operations. Germany argued that Russia's refusal to
sign a peace treaty rendered the establishment of peace impossible and
amounted to the denunciation of the Armistice. 123 This argument had
some legal validity in that article 9 of the Armistice required that the
sides enter immediately into peace negotiations.
In another declaration, both Lenin and Trotsky announced that
Russia was "forced to formally declare its willingness to sign a peace
upon the conditions which have been dictated." 24 Negotiations were
resumed, but the German military operations continued. By the terms of
the German ultimatum, such military operations were to continue until
117. Wright, The Stmson Note of January 7, 1932, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 342 (1932).
118. Armistice Concluded at Brest-Litovsk, done Dec. 15, 1917, 2 DOCUMENTS IN
PREPARATION FOR PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE I (U.S. Dep't of State ed. 1918).
119. Id. at 7.
120. Russia's Declaration to the Powers, Feb. 10, 1918, id. at 173.
121. Id.
122. Termination of Armistice, Feb. 17, 1918, id. at 173-74.
123. Id. at 174.
124. Surrender of Russia, Feb. 19, 1918, id. at 175.
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the signing of the peace treaty. The Germans allowed only three days for
negotiations.125 The Peace of Brest-Litovsk was signed March 3,
1918.126
Russia subsequently protested its signing of the Peace Treaty. 27 In
a lengthy declaration, the Russian peace delegation stated that the
Treaty had been forced upon them by violence, and that the agreement
was definitely an "annexationist and imperialistic peace."'
128
The peace which is being concluded here at Brest-Litovsk is
not a peace based on a free agreement of the peoples of Russia
. . . but a peace dictated by the force of arms. This is the
peace which Russia, grinding its teeth, is compelled to
accept. 129
The Russian delegation went on to state: "[N]o honest man can believe
that the war against Russia can now be termed a defensive war."
130
They declared further:
[W]e are forced to accept the peace dictated by those who
. . . are the more powerful. . . we refuse to enter into any
discussion of these terms. 3'
Russia believed that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty was imposed by
force, contained unequal provisions and was a result of a non-defensive
war. By its pronouncements the Soviet government questioned the
legitimacy of the agreement which was imposed by the actual use of
military force.
Although one writer, T.A. Taracouzio, argued in 1938, that the
Brest-Litovsk Treaty was "insignificant,"'1 32 Russia's attitude toward
the treaty was an important development in support of its subsequent
doctrinal position on imposed treaties.
In language similar to the earlier Russian pronouncements, the
Versailles Treaty proclaimed the invalidity of treaties imposed by
Germany. By article 292, Germany recognized that its treaties with
Russia were abrogated, and by article 293, all treaties concluded with
Allied states by reason of military force were ipso facto annulled. 13 3 By
125. Resumption of Negotiations, Feb. 28, 1918, id. at 180.
126. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, id. at 13.
127. Russian Delegates Protest Against German Terms, id. at 185.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 186.
131. Id. at 187.
132. T. TARACOUZIO, THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 251 (1935).
133. Treaty of Peace with Germany, doneJune 28, 1919, 112 BRIT. & FOR. ST. PAPERS
1, 139 (1920); reproduced in 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 151 (1919) [hereinafter cited as Versailles
Treaty]. See generally THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND AFTER-ANNOTATIONS OF THE TEXT
OF THE TREATY (U.S. Dep't of State ed. 1947). Article 292 provides in relevant part:
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article 231, Germany recognized that the war had been imposed by her
own aggression. 134 Thus, the Versailles Treaty linked the notion of
aggression with illegally imposed treaties. This was in furtherance of the
position put forward by Russia regarding its objections to the Brest-
Litovsk Treaty. The Versailles Treaty not only questioned the legiti-
macy of a treaty imposed by aggression, but went further and annulled a
specific example of one.
3. The Versailles Treaty: German Reaction (1919) and Its
Repudiation (1936). The German reaction in 1919, to the Versailles
Peace Treaty, as revealed by the official comments of the German
delegation to the draft treaty in 1919,135 and by the Allied Reply to those
comments, 136 indicates that Germany believed the Treaty violated that
state's basis of entry into negotiations. Germany did not claim at that
time that the treaty was invalid because it was imposed by Allied
aggression. 137 It was not until 1936, that Germany renounced the
Versailles Treaty as being an imposed treaty.
Comments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of
Peace'3 8 discusses the following: the legal basis of the negotiations; the
contradiction between the draft of the Versailles Treaty and the negotia-
tions' legal basis which had been previously agreed upon; the contradic-
tion between the draft of the Versailles Treaty and the previous assur-
ances given; and general ideas of international law.
The German delegation's position was that they had entered into
the Armistice of 1918 and subsequent peace negotiations in reliance on
President Wilson's Fourteen Points as contained in his Congressional
message of January 8, 1918, and in subsequent proclamations. The
delegation argued that Germany had a right to discuss the terms of
Germany recognizes that all treaties, conventions or arrangements which
she concluded with Russia . . . are and remain abrogated.
Id. at 296. Article 293 states in part:
Should an Allied or Associated Power . . . have been forced . . . by
reason of military occupation or by any other means or for any other cause, to
grant. . . favors of any kind. . . are ipsofactoannulled by the present Treaty.
Id. at 296. Article 231 in part provides:
. . . Germany accepts the responsibility. . . [for] the war imposed upon
[the Allies] by the aggression of Germany and her allies.
Id. 251-52.
134. Versailles Treaty, supra note 133, at 251-52.
135. Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, 6 FOR. REL.
U.S. 795 (1946). See also 143 Itrr'L CONCIL. 1203 (1919).
136. Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German
Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, 6 FOR. REL. U.S. 926 (1946). See also 144 INT'L
CONCIL. 1341 (1919).
137. Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, 6 FOR. REL.
U.S. 795, 802 (1946).
138. 143 INT'L CONCIL. 1203 (1919).
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peace, and that the discussion should extend only to the Fourteen Points.
The delegation stated: "If a peace of a different nature were forced upon
Germany it would constitute a breach of a solemn pledge."' 3 9 The
delegation went on to conclude: "[T]he draft of a peace treaty as
submitted to the German Government stands in full and irreconcilable
conflict with the basis agreed upon for a just and durable peace."'
140
Germany's position was that the imposition of the treaty would be a
breach of a solemn pledge, not a violation of general international law.
However, it did believe that a pactum de contrahendo existed, and that it
would be violated by the conclusion of a treaty along the lines of the
draft submitted by the Allies. 141 The point to be noted is that Germany
did not contend the existence of a customary rule of international law
limiting the use of an imposed and one-sided peace agreement. At most,
Germany argued that a particular conventional obligation would be
violated.
The Reply of the Allies to the observations of the German delega-
tion rejected the general position of Germany regarding the variance of
terms. 142 The Reply threatened the renewed outbreak of military hos-
tilities. 143 It stated: "[T]his letter and the memorandum attached consti-
tute [the Allied and Associated Powers'] last word." 1 44 The Reply
added that if the treaty were not to be signed, "[t]he said armistice will
thus terminate and the Allied and Associated powers will take such steps
as they think needful to enforce their Terms.' 1 45 The Reply also
contended that a basis for the negotiation had been contained in the prior
correspondence and pronouncements, and concluded that the Allies had
adhered to previous commitments.
Hitler's speech to the German Reichstag on March 7, 1936,
repudiated the Versailles Treaty. Hitler enlarged the legal grounds of the
German objection to the Versailles Treaty to include the element of
imposed provisions. 146 In other documents, he also stated that the Peace
Treaty was both imposed and dictated. 1
47
139. Observations of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, 6 FOR. REL.
U.S. 795, 803 (1946).
140. Comments of the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, 143 INT'L
CONCIL. 1203, 1220 (1919).
141. Id. at 1205.
142. Reply of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German
Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, 144 INT'L CONCIL. 1341, 1349 (1919).
143. Id. at 1349.
144. Id. at 1351.
145. Id. at 1352.
146. Text of Chancellor Hitler's Speech to the German Reichstag, Mar. 7, 1936,
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4. Early Soviet Treaty Practice. While early Soviet treaty prac-
tice was not entirely consistent, it did, for the first time in the history of
international treaty law, explicitly abrogate treaties that were imposed.
Soviet practice was not unilateral, but was based upon mutual state
consent.
Soviet policy was based somewhat on the treaty practice of the
former Czarist government. The Czarist government in 1870,
demanded the revision of the earlier multilateral treaty of 1856, which
had neutralized the Black Sea. The resulting Treaty of 1870 among
Russia, Great Britain, Austria, France, Germany, Italy and Turkey,
revised the earlier treaty 4 8 by denouncing the 1856 Neutralization of the
Black Sea. The 1870 Protocol was not a unilateral abrogation, but
revised the 1856 Treaty in a "spirit of conciliation and equitable
appreciation."' 49 Thus, the 1870 Protocol was explicitly based upon
unanimity, which was specifically reaffirmed in the treaty as "un
principe essentiel du droit des gens." 150
Czarist Russia often viewed itself as a victim of imposed treaties.
However, like Japan in the nineteenth century, Russia had a two-sided
experience with imposed treaties. It was also an imposer. This is proven
by Russia's treaty policy with China in the nineteenth century concern-
ing their borders.
The Soviet policy in the 1920's and the 1930's had a similar
two-sided nature. The Soviets strengthened their opposition to imposed
treaties by actually abrogating some treaties which they believed were
imposed. However, they did not abrogate other treaties, in some of
which they were the stronger party, and in others the weaker.
The Russian-Persian Treaty of Friendship of 1921 is an example of
the Soviet government's extension of the Czarist government's juridical
position which required unanimity for treaty revision. 151 In this treaty,
the Soviet Union renounced the tyrannical policy of Czarist Russia and
held that the body of treaties concluded with Persia were null and
void. 152 The various articles of the treaty proclaimed that the securing of
treaties with the absence of the consent of Persia amounted to a criminal
policy on behalf of the Czarist government, 53 and that such treaties
were repugnant to the Soviet Union. 154
148. 1870 Protocal Denouncing the 1856 Neutralization of the Black Sea, 61 BRIT. &
FOR. ST. PAPERS 1193 (1877).
149. Id. at 1195 (transl. by the author).
150. Id.
151. Treaty of Friendship Between Persia and the U.S.S.R., done Feb. 26, 1921, 9
L.N.T.S. 384.
152. Id.
153. Id. art. 2.
154. Id. art. 3.
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This treaty showed that the Soviet Union believed certain treaties
imposed by the Czarist government to be unlawful. However, the treaty
abrogating the earlier treaty was consented to by both states in a
subsequent bilateral treaty. Thus, the actual bilateral abrogation of the
former treaty was a new policy, but not as extreme as it would have been
if the Soviet Union had abrogated the treaty unilaterally. It is juridically
significant that in a provision of the later treaty, the Soviet Union
contended that imposed treaties are both unlawful and criminal.
The Soviet Union in the 1921 Treaty with Turkey abolished its
existing capitulation rights in Turkey.'55 In article 1, Russia explicitly
stated its view on imposed treaties. 156
Article 1-Each of the contracting parties agrees not to recog-
nize any peace treaty or other international agreements
imposed upon the other against its will ....
This treaty further illustrates the position of the Soviet Union toward
imposed treaties which was then developing to the effect that no treaty
was to be recognized if it were imposed on either state against its will.
This referred to any treaty, not only to those in which these states were
the contracting parties.
Some treaties concluded by Russia in the 1920's did not abrogate
prior imposed treaties. The 1925 Soviet-Japanese Treaty of Friendship
perpetuated the earlier treaty which had been imposed on Russia in
1905.157 Article 1(2) specifically recognized the continued existence of
the Treaty of Portsmouth of 1905 that had been imposed upon Czarist
Russia by Japan at the conclusion of the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese
War.
The Soviet-Chinese Treaty of 1924 clearly reveals inconsistent
state practice, and a contradiction between practice and the developing
Soviet doctrine of imposed treaties. 58 The parties declared that new
treaties were to be enacted on the basis of equality and reciprocity.' 
59
The Soviet Union reaffirmed, on the basis of its earlier policy pro-
nouncements of 1919-1920, that all former treaties between China and
Czarist Russia were null and void."6 However, in the supplementary
155. Treaty of Friendship Between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey, art. 7, Mar. 16, 1921,
118 BRIT. & FOR. ST. PAPERS 990, 992 (1923). See also, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 228 (1923).
156. Id. at 990.
157. Convention Embodying Basic Rules of the Relations Between Japan and the
U.S.S.R., art. 2, done Jan. 20, 1925, 34 L.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter cited as Friendship
Between Japan and U.S.S.R.].
158. Agreement on General Principles for the Settlement of the Questions Between
the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R., art. 9, done May 31, 1924, 37 L.N.T.S. 176
[hereinafter cited as Settlement of Questions].
159. Id. art. 3.
160. Id. art. 4.
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agreements and declaration relating to Outer Mongolia and the Chinese
Eastern Railway,"'6 the Soviet Union kept many of its rights which had
been secured by actions of the Czarist government. 1
62
Another illustration of contradictory Soviet state practice was the
1937 Soviet-Chinese Treaty. 163 Article 3 of that treaty explicitly pro-
vided that the present treaty, implementing the Kellog-Briand Pact of
1928, should not be interpreted as affecting obligations arising out of
prior bilateral or multilateral treaties. 164
The Soviet Union in the 1920's and 1930's concluded a treaty
reaffirming a previous treaty imposed upon it, the 1925 Soviet-Japanese
Treaty, 165 and concluded agreements with China166 which may be
termed imposed. Yet Soviet treaty practice nevertheless revealed an
attitude novel for the international community at that time, that imposed
treaties were unlawful. While this juridical development was to some
extent an outgrowth of Czarist Russian policy, it was new in the sense
that it was explicitly based upon a concept of imposed treaties. This was
a milestone in the history of international treaty law.
5. United States Reaction to Japanese Occupation of Manchuria
(1932). The Stimson Doctrine issued in the midst of the Japanese-
Chinese conflict over Manchuria in the early 1930's, was a reaffirma-
tion by the United States of its 1915 position established during the
period of Japan's Twenty-one Demands on China. The Stimson Doc-
trine declared that no agreement brought about by the threat or use of
military force against a state would be recognized by the United States.
This represented a major policy position of the United States in the early
1930's.
Quincy Wright, writing in 1932, stated his belief that the Stimson
letter of January 7, 1932, was a significant instrument setting forth a
new rule of international law. 167 He stated the new rule thus: "[T]reaties
161. Agreement Between China and the U.S.S.R. for the Provisional Management of
the "Chinese Eastern Railway", done May 31, 1924,37 L.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter cited as
Chinese Eastern Railway].
162. Id. Declaration VII.
163. Treaty of Non-Aggression Between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R.,
done Aug. 21, 1937, 181 L.N.T.S. 101.
164. Id.
165. Friendship Between Japan and U.S.S.R., supra note 157.
166. Settlement of Questions, supra note 158.
167. Wright, The Stimson Note of January 7, 1932, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 342(1932). For a
critical view of the political significance of the Stimson Doctrine seeWhitton, The Sanctity
of Treaties, 313 INT'L CONCIL. 395, 425 (1935). But see Liang, The Pact of Paris as
Envisaged by Mr. Stimson: Its Significance in International Law, 5 CHINA L. REV. 198
(1932). This author states that "The doctrine ... has been criticized as not productive of
positive results .... ." Id. at 204.
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in the making of which non-pacific means have been employed are
void."1
68
The Stimson Note of January 7, 1932, was sent to both Japan and
China. It states the following:
With the recent military operations about Chinchow...
the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify
both the Government of the Chinese Republic and the Impe-
rial Japanese Government that it cannot admit the legality of
any situation defacto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty
or agreement entered into between those governments...
including those which relate to the sovereignty, the indepen-
dence, or the territorial and administrative integrity of the
Republic of China. . .and it does not intend to recognize any
situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by
means contrary to the covenants and obligations of the Pact of
Paris of August 27, 1928, to which treaty both China and
Japan, as well as the United States are parties. 1
69
Stimson recorded in a memorandum that he had reminded the
Japanese Ambassador in Washington of a similar note sent in 1915, at
the time of the Twenty-One Demands.1 70 The Japanese Ambassador
replied that he remembered the earlier note. 171 Stimson previously had
authorized a verbal message, different in language, but similar in tone to
the earlier note, regarding the Soviet military actions concerning the
Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria in 1929,172 to be conveyed to
over thirty foreign ministries.
The Stimson Note of 1932 evidences, at the least, that the United
States as a matter of national policy would not recognize any interna-
tional agreement brought about by means contrary to the terms of the
1928 Pact of Paris which had renounced the use of force as an instrument
of foreign policy.
In the Note, Stimson specifically refers to the Japanese military
operations taking place in China. In the last sentence, the Note indicates
that the United States, Japan and China were parties to the 1928 Pact of
168. Wright, The Stimson Note of January 7, 1932, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 342,344 (1932).
169. Letter from The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Nanking, Jan. 7,
1932, 3 FOR. REL. U.S. 7-8 (1948) (emphasis added).
170. Memorandum by the Secretary of State, Jan. 5, 1932, id. at 5-6.
171. Memorandum by the Secretary of State, Jan. 7, 1932, id. at 8-9. For an unofficial
statement of the Japanese view of the Stimson Doctrine see S. TOMINAS, THE NINE POWER
TREATY AND THE KELLOGG-BRIAND TREATY (REVIEW OF SECRETARY STIMSON'S POSITION)
(1932).
172. The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Representatives, 2 FOR. REL. U.S.
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Paris. One construction of the Note concludes that the United States
favored what was only a conventional rule, not an obligation of
customary international law. 173 However, even this construction seems
too broad. Nowhere in the 1928 Pact of Paris is it explicitly declared that
treaties brought about by the use of force are invalid. Nowhere in the
Note does the United States indicate that a treaty brought about by force
is unlawful; the Note states only that the United States would not
recognize such a treaty.
It may be concluded that the Stimson Note was a clear indication,
no matter how limited, that at least one major power in the 1930's was
not going to recognize an imposed treaty, for whatever reasons, political
or otherwise. However, this did not amount to a clear acceptance or even
a statement of a juridical rule against imposed treaties.
6. Chinese Practice (Republic of China and the Nationalists).
The Chinese government's practice in response to existing treaties and
newly imposed treaties during the inter-war period was one of limited
success. Although some treaties were renegotiated, China continued to
suffer from newer imposed treaties. The Chinese government did not
deny the validity of imposed treaties. Rather, it viewed them as being
subject to renegotiation only.
a. Writers. A number of Chinese writers of the inter-war period
and contemporary writers have discussed this period of Chinese interna-
tional treaty relations.
Loo Ching Yen in 1927, discussed international treaty law but did
not criticize existing rules of treaty law. 174 In 1931, Yu-Hao criticized
the practice of concluding imposed treaties. ' 75 He did not maintain that
imposed treaties were illegal, 76 but stated merely that they were a
decaying institution and contrary to morality. 177 His position is similar
to the position developed by the Nationalist government of the Republic
of China in the inter-war period. Yu-Hao noted that the topic of imposed
173. Id. at 371-73.
174. L. CH'ING YEN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (1927). For an even earlier study see M.
TYAU, THE LEGAL OBLIGATIONS ARISING OUT OF TREATY RELATIONS AND OTHER STATES
(1917). Tyau stated: "[T]he obligations she has to discharge were not contracted voluntar-
ily, but imposed upon her by superior force." Id. at 212. For a research guide to both
original Chinese sources and secondary works on China's general response to the West in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and its attempt at a positive foreign policy, see
Ssu-Yu TENG & J. FAIRBANK, RESEARCH GUIDE FOR CHINA'S RESPONSETOTHE WEST-A
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY, 1839-923, at 1, 15 (1954).
175. T. Yu-HAO, THE TERMINATION OF UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1931). "[T]he extraordinary political and economic privileges and immunities therein
confered upon the foreigners seems to be hardly warranted by circumstances." Id. at 3 1.
176. Id. at 63.
177. Id. at 17, 21.
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treaties had received very little attention from publicists. 17 8 He dis-
cussed Porter's Congressional Resolution of 1927 which requested that the
President enter into new treaties with China based on an equitable and
reciprocal basis. 1
79
A modern-day writer, Hungdau Chiu, has written on the inter-war
treaty practice of the Republic of China.' 80 Chiu argues that it was the
policy of the Republican (Peking) government 18' and subsequently of
the Nationalist government to revise existing treaties. 1 82 This policy had
its roots in Imperial Chinese treaty relations. 183 As early as 1902, the
Ch'ing government exhibited a similar attitude in the negotiations
leading to the conclusion of the Sino-British Treaty Concerning Com-
mercial Relations." Chiu points out that in the 1919 Versailles Peace
Conference, the Republican government of China submitted a
memorandum concerning the abolition of spheres of influence, consular
jurisdiction and tariff preferences. 185 However, the Conference took no
action on that memorandum.
Chiu states186 that in 1931, the Nationalist government issued a
regulation' 87 requesting the revision of treaties on the basis of rebus sic
stantibus under article 19 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.
However, a year later, after Japan's occupation of Mukeden, the
implementation of the regulation was postponed indefinitely. 8 8 Chiu
further points out that in 1943, after a period of negotiations, the
Nationalist Government was successful in concluding new treaties with
the United Kingdom and the United States abolishing extra-territoriality
and other rights.' 
89
b. Treaty Practice of the Republic of China. At the Washington
Conference in 1922, China questioned the justice of the previously
imposed Twenty-One Demands on China, but agreed to their technical
178. Id. at 7.
179. Id. at 13. See Revision of Treaties with China, H.R. REP. No. 1891,69th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1927) which emphasizes "mutual fairness and equity."
180. Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal
Treaties, in CHINA'S PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES 239 (J. Cohen
ed. 1972).
181. Id. at 245.
182. Id. at 246, 254. "[T]hey did not argue that such treaties are void or can be
abrogated at will." Id. at 254.
183. Id. at 243.
184. Id. at 244.
185. Id. at 245 n.29.
186. Id. at 256.
187. Id.
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validity. 9 ° China believed that the circumstances surrounding the
negotiation of the 1915 treaties created an "essential injustice."''
China questioned the validity of the 1915 treaties from the point of view
of equality and justice,' 92 not law.' 93 The purpose of the Conference was
to arrange a political conciliation between China and the foreign
powers. 194 China's policy at the Conference was to adhere to the juristic
validity of the 1915 treaties, which China believed were imposed. At the
same time, China asked the Conference to arrive at a more equitable and
just solution acceptable to all states concerned.
China was successful n having the Soviet Union relinquish
extraterritorial and consular jurisdiction in article 21 of the Sino-Soviet
Treaty of May 31, 1924. 195 It was not until 1943, that China was able to
obtain similar treatment from the Western powers. However, the
Chinese Manifesto of 1929,196 resulting from China's dispute with the
Soviet Union over the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria, indicated
that China was still suffering under existing imposed treaties. China
could not do very much about it, and the Manifesto did not declare
invalid the Soviet treaties on which the Soviet Union's right to operate
the railway were based.
197
The Chinese government's note to Japan in 1932, protesting the
recognition of Manchoukuo, was a clear example of China's continued
plight under foreign military forces and treaties, and its inability to
change the situation.198 China relied upon the League of Nations
190. 1 LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. 101, at 172 (1932).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 170-71. Baron Shidehara of Japan emphasized the traditional rule. He
stated the following during the Washington Conference of 1922:
The insistence by China on the cancellation of those instruments would in
itself indicate that she shares the view that the compacts actually remain in force
and will continue to be effective, unless and until they are cancelled.
. ..If it should once be recognized that rights solemnly granted by treaty
may be revoked at any time on the ground that they were conceded against the
spontaneous will of the grantor, an exceeding dangerous precedent will be
established, with far-reaching consequences upon the stability of the existing
international relations in Asia, in Europe and everywhere.
Id. at 171.
194. Id. at 172.
195. See generally Q. WRIGHT, THE EXISTING LEGAL SITUATION AS IT RELATES TOTHE
CONFLICT IN THE FAR EAST 110 n.89 (1939).
196. Manifesto of Chinese Government, 2 FOR. REL. U.S. 228 (1943).
197. China proclaimed her right of self-defense, but did not declare a unilateral
termination of any treaties. Id. at 231. See alsoChinese Eastern Railway, supra note 161,
at 197.
198. Note sent by Chinese Government to the Japanese Government, Sept. 16, 1932,
4 FOR. REL. U.S. 262 (1948).
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Resolution of March 11, 1932, but was not able to enforce it. 199 This
resolution 200 declares that agreements resulting from the use of force
contrary to the Covenant or the Pact of Paris are not to be recognized by
members of the League.
The aforementioned events support the conclusion that China's
view of imposed treaties was not that they were legally invalid, but that
they ought to be subject to revision based upon the consent of the states
concerned. 20 As a view of international law, this Chinese position
certainly was not excessive.
7. Munich Four-Power Agreement (1938). The four-power
Munich Agreement of 1938, to which Czechoslovakia subsequently
adhered, was signed by the representatives of the English, French,
Italian and German governments. 20 2 Neither the United States nor the
Soviet Union participated in the Munich Conference. The Agreement
was treated by the major powers, including the United States, as a
legally valid agreement, despite the threat of military force by Germany
against Czechoslovakia and, implicitly, against the other major powers.
Only after the outbreak of World War II did the Allies declare it to be
invalid.
a. Writers. Two American international law writers discussed the
Munich Agreement of 1938 prior to the outbreak of World War II. Both
Fenwick 20 3 and Wright 2°4 dealt with the Agreement's juridical signifi-
cance in the development of international law, and concluded that the
Agreement was invalid.
20 5
Fenwick argued that the Munich Agreement was a "severe set-
back" for the development of international law. 2° He stated that the
international community had developed a new rule of law, created by
the series of multilateral treaties concluded during the inter-war
199. Id. at 263-64. Stimson during these debates argued that the Covenant was not
applicable to the United States, and implicitly argued that its rules were essentially only
conventional and not customary international law obligations. Id. at 348.
200. See also text accompanying notes 325-32 infra, for a discussion of League of
Nations Resolution of March I1, 1932.
201. Chang has supported this view at the 1967 meeting of the American Society of
International Law. 61 PROCED. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 137 (1967).
202. Agreement for the Cession by Czechoslovakia, Sept. 29, 1938, 142 BRIT. FOR.
ST. PAPERS 438 (1938). See 2 DOCUMENTS ON GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY 1918-1945, 1014
(Ser. D 1949) [hereinafter cited as GERMAN DOCUMENTS].
203. Fenwick, The Outlook for International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 105 (1939)
[hereinafter cited as FENWICK].
204. Wright, The Munich Settlement and International Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 12
(1939) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
205. FENWICK, supra note 203, at 105; WRIGHT, supra note 204, at 29.
206. FENWICK, supra note 203, at 105.
Vol. 7
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period,2°7 which outlawed the use of force against a state in concluding
agreements. 2 08 Fenwick noted that the Munich Agreement was not even
in the form of a negotiated peace. 2° He emphasized that although the
transfer of territory under the Agreement might be lawful, the "pro-
cedural" means employed rendered the transfer invalid.
210
Quincy Wright analyzed the history of the Sudeten problem
211
and the legality of the methods used in concluding the 1938 Munich
Agreement. 212 He conceived the history of the settlement and of Nazi
foreign policy in general as being one of constant threat of force.
213
Thus, he believed that the agreement reached at Munich was illegal, and
that it was caused by panic on the part of the Western powers. 214 Wright
laid the blame in part on the failure of the League to implement article 19
of the Covenant 215 which allowed the revision of treaties, especially in
relation to demands for territorial changes. Wright also analyzed the
symbiotic nature of the 1919 Versailles Treaty and the 1938 Munich
Agreement. Dictatorial procedures were used in concluding both agree-
ments, and to an extent, the former made the occurance of the latter
inevitable as soon as the military balance changed.
The Versailles settlement may not have been seriously
unjust in substance, but it eventually succumbed because it
had been achieved by procedures of dictation which did not
provide assurances that it was just. Germany's resentment at
the treaty was mobilized less against the terms of the treaty
than against its dictated origin ...
Until the people of the world are similarly determined to
place procedures ahead of substance, we may expect the
207. Id.
208. Id. "International Law has in recent years established procedures which defi-
nitely exclude the use of force to accomplish legal ends." Id.
209. Id. at 106.
210. Id. at 105-06.
211. WRIGHT supra note 204, at 20.
212. Id. at 28. Wright considered the methods used by Germany in concluding the
treaty as the factor making the Agreement invalid.
It may be that settlement of Munich was in substance just. Of that no one
can ever be certain because it was not arrived at by a procedure which general
human experience has approved as likely to yield justice.
Id. at 31.
213. Id. at 19, 31.
214. Id. at 29.
Through successive stages in dealing with the Sudeten problem the
Powers had proceeded from acts which were merely impolitic, to acts which
were positively illegal and finally to acts which suggested panic-facilis descen-
sus A verno.
Id.
215. Id. at 30.
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world to alternate between dictates of Versailles and dictates
of Munich, with little respite from wars and rumors of wars.
2 16
b. Practice. The form of the Munich Agreement represents a
dictation of terms.217 Even the language of the particular articles betrays
this factor. For example, certain articles state that "evacuation will
begin," 218 and "the remaining territory [will] be occupied by German
troops. "1219
Chamberlain noted that it was the failure to apply article 19 that
was a cause of the Sudeten situation.
220
I cannot help reflecting that if Article XIX of the Coven-
ant providing for the revision of the Treaties by agreement
had been put into operation, as was contemplated by the
framers of the Covenant, instead of waiting until passion
became so exasperated that revision by agreement became
impossible, we might have avoided the crisis.
221
It is clear that the parties concerned with the Munich Agreement
recognized that military force was being threatened. They nevertheless
acted as though the agreement were negotiated and lawful. This
included Roosevelt, even though he was not directly involved in the
negotiations. 222 Czechoslovakian Minister Hurban stated that the
Czechoslovakian people were making a "sacrifice which never before
in history was required under such concentrated pressure of an unde-
feated State without war." 223 A secret German memo clearly indicated
that Hitler had threatened the British and French foreign ministers that
216. Id. at 31-32 (emphasis added). Hitler stated: "The peace conditions imposed on
the conquered nations in the Paris suburbs treaties have fulfilled nothing of the promises
given." Telegram from German Chancellor (Hitler) to President Roosevelt, Sept. 27,
1938. 1 FOR. REL. U.S. 669, 670 (1955). See also Fiihrer to the President of the United
States, GERMAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 202, at 969.
217. See generally The Czechoslovak Crisis and Munich Agreement-Documents and
Speeches, 15 BULL. INT'L NEWS (1938); The German-Czechoslovak Crisis, I FOR. REL.
U.S. 483-739 (1955).
218. 1938 Munich Agreement, art. 1.
219. Id. art. 4.
220. Chamberlain's Statement on the Negotiations with Herr Hitler Sept. 28, 1938, 15
BULL. INT'L NEWS 30 (1938).
221. Id. at 30-31. "The specter of Munich has not finished haunting the foreign
offices," and former officials at that time continue to argue the validity and effect of the
Agreement. Bretton, Les Ndgociations Germano-Tchdcoslovaques sur L'Accord de
Munich du 29 Septembre 1938, 19 ANNUAIRE FRANI;AIS DE DROIT 189 (1973).
222. Telegram from President Roosevelt to German Chancellor Hitler, Sept. 26, 1938,
1 FOR. REL. U.S. 657-58 (1955) wherein Roosevelt stated, "I most earnestly appeal to you
not to break off negotiations looking to a peaceful, fair, and constructive settlement." Id.
at 658.
223. Letter from Czechoslovak Minister (Hurban) to the Secretary of State, Sept. 29,
1938, id. at 701.
Vol. 7
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military force would be used against Czechoslovakia if the Agreement
were not concluded.224
In determining Whether or not international law in the inter-war
period supported the existence of a new rule of treaty law denying the
validity of imposed treaties, one must look at actual state practice. State
practice in this period is overshadowed in importance by the negotiation
and the conclusion of the 1938 Munich Agreement. The four great
powers who signed it, as well as others, viewed it as a legally valid treaty
despite the fact that military force was threatened against Czecho-
slovakia. The overriding policy consideration of the Western powers
was to maintain world peace by imposing a treaty on a small state, a state
that was clearly not the aggressor, but the victim of aggression.
C. International Legislation and Codification
Multilateral treaties and resolutions of the League of Nations
during the inter-war period, as well as public and private codification
efforts, supported the early development of a new rule of treaty law, but
not its crystallization. These instruments evidenced the formation of a
new rule of law which limited in general the use of military force in
international relations. However, no rule developed in the context of a
rule of treaty law precluding the validity of a treaty brought about by the
threat or actual use of military force against a contracting state.
1. Article I of the Hague Conventions of 1 899 and 1907. Article I
of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 states the following:
With a view to obviating, as far as possible, recourse to
force in the relations between states, the Signatory
[Contracting]22 5 powers agree to use their best efforts to insure
the pacific settlement of international differences. 2 6
Article I requires only the best efforts of states "as far as possible"
to avoid recourse to force. Article I did not in any other manner change
the existing rule of the law of war relating to the use of military force, let
alone the rule of treaty law recognizing as valid those treaties emerging
224. Memorandum of the First Meeting Between the British and French Prime
Ministers, the Duce, and the Fiihrer, Sept. 29, 1938, GERMAN DOCUMENTS, supra note 202,
at 1003. "[Hitler] has now declared in his speech in the Sportpalast that he would in any
case march in on October 1." Id. at 1004. See also id. at 1008.
225. The 1899 Convention used the term "signatory," while the 1907 Convention
used the term "contracting."
226. The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art.
1, done July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1779, T.S. No. 392 [hereinafter cited as Hague Convention
of 1899]; The Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, art.
I, done Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2199, T.S. No. 536 (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as
Hague Convention of 1907].
41
Malawer: Imposed Treaties and International Law
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
from the threat or use of force.227
2. Article 19 (Revision of Treaties) of the League Covenant.
Article 19 of the Covenant was the first major provision adopted by the
international community which aided in the development of a new rule
of treaty law.
228
Although article 19 did not specifically refer to imposed treaties, an
analysis of its language, its drafting history and the subsequent practice
of the League and its member states indicates that the article was
construed to refer specifically to imposed treaties. However, article 19
did not declare imposed treaties or any other treaties to be invalid. It
allowed only an advisory opinion by the League Assembly to the
member states concerned. The opinion could request only the reconsi-
deration of the treaty by those states and could not even suggest specific
terms of revision.
Article 19 adds significantly to the development of a rule against
imposed treaties in two respects. First, article 19 had particular applica-
tion to the revision of imposed treaties. Second, it extended to an
international organization the right to suggest treaty revision, an expan-
sion of the right traditionally exercised by contracting states only.
a. Drafting Article 19. The drafters of article 19 discussed the
revision of treaties in relation to imposed treaties and the territorial
guarantees of the Covenant under article 10.229 The drafters of the treaty
did not intend to declare imposed treaties as void, but as treaties that
would fall generally within the operation of treaty revision under article
19.
227. Both Conventions established an International Commission of Inquiry and a
Permanent Court of Arbitration. Neither of the tribunals had compulsory or binding
authority. Hague Convention of 1899, supra note 226, arts. 14, 18; Hague Convention of
1907, supra note 226, arts. 35, 37-40. The Hague Convention Respecting the Limitation of
the Employment of Force, art. 1, done Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2241, T.S. No. 537,
prohibited the use of force in the recovery of contract debts. This was a codification of the
1903 Drago Doctrine. It also represents an early development in the law of war prohibiting
the use of force in one specific type of interstate dispute.
228. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 19.
The Assembly may from time to time advise the reconsideration by Members of
the League of treaties which have become inapplicableand the consideration of
international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the
world.
Id. (emphasis added).
229. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10. See generally D. MILLER, THE DRAFTING
OF THE COVENANT (1928) [hereinafter cited as MILLER].
"Disputes ... will no longer be settled by a unilateral pronouncement of the most
powerful party by means of pressure or violence, but in accordance with the Charter of the
League." F. Van Asbeck, The Relationship between International and Colonial Law, in
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY IN SEARCH OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 48, 65 (H. Van
Panhuys & M. Boomkamp eds. 1976) (essay published 1931).
Vol. 7
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Early in the drafting of article 19, Cecil of the United Kingdom
argued that the Covenant's guarantee against external aggression and
protecting territorial integrity, as it appeared in article 10, would be
directly linked to the provision for treaty revision. 230 However, as they
appeared in the final text, there was no direct connection between the
two provisions.
Early in the drafting process, the Italian delegation proposed that
"every coercive act" be abstained from, 231 and that 'all treaties entered
into . . . contrary to the principles laid down. . . shall be considered
null and void.' '232 This proposal was not incorporated into the final text.
Subsequent proposals linked the revision of treaties to the recently
made peace treaties of that period. This was the case in the Wilson-
British draft233 and its subsequent version revising the Cecil-Miller
drafts. 234 Those proposals also were not specifically included in the final
text.
The Wilson-British draft would have allowed the League to recom-
mend "any modification which it may think necessary." 235 If such a
modification were not accepted in cases of territorial questions, mem-
bers would cease to be under an obligation to protect a state from
forcible aggression.
236
An earlier draft of Cecil's considered the revision of treaties as a
means of dealing with terms of treaties which had become obsolete.237
An Italian proposal suggested that the Assembly ought to have the
230. I MILLER, supra note 229, at 169-70.
231. Draft Scheme for the Constitution of the Society of Nations, art. 1, para. c, 2
MILLER, supra note 229, at 246, 248.
232. Id. art. 2. One of the basic principles of the Covenant was to create the obligation
to protect member states against external aggression. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art.
10.
233. British Draft Convention, Jan. 20, 1919, 2 MILLER, supra note 229, at 106,
118-19.
234. Cecil-Miller Draft, Jan. 27, 1919, id. at 131, 134.
235. 2 MILLER, supra note 229, at 118.
If at any time it should appear that any feature of the settlement guaranteed
by this Covenant and by the present treaties of peace no longer conforms to the
requirements of the situation, the League shall . . . recommend . . . any
modification which it may think necessary. If such recommendation is rejected
by the parties affected, the States. . . in the case ofterritorial questions, cease
to be under the obligation to protect the territory in question from forcible
aggression by other States, imposed on them by subsection (ii) of the Preamble.
Id. at 118-19 (emphasis added).
236. Id.
237. 1 MILLER, supra note 229, at 170. The proposal read:
Subject, however, to provision being made by the Body of Delegates foy the
periodic revision of treaties which have become obsolete and of International
conditions, the continuance of which may endanger the Peace of the World.
Id. (emphasis added).
43
Malawer: Imposed Treaties and International Law
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
power to declare treaties void. 238 These proposals, likewise, were never
accepted.
The drafting history of article 19 indicates that certain delegations
wanted to create a provision broader than the one actually accepted. In
short, these delegations sought to give the Assembly the power to
declare treaties void, especially those brought about by coercive acts.
They wanted to link this provision directly to the territorial guarantees of
the Covenant and the guarantee against external aggression. These
delegates did not prevail, however.
An analysis of the language of the text clearly indicates the rule
which was adopted. The Assembly "may from time to time advise" the
member states. This clearly means that the Assembly had only an
advisory right. As explained by Cecil, this right could be exercised only
by the unanimity of the Assembly. 239 The Assembly could not declare
treaties inapplicable, let alone void. The Assembly could advise only
the "reconsideration" of treaties which became "inapplicable." This
criterion of "inapplicable" was not certain, and could have included
political, social and legal considerations. "Inapplicable" presumed that
the treaty was valid at one point and was still valid. It was left to the
member states concerned whether or not to revise a treaty. In such a
case, the consent of the states involved was required.
b. Writers on Article 19. At the 1936 annual meetings of the
American Society of International Law, a paper was presented by
Quincy Wright on article 19.240 The paper and the discussion of it are
especially significant in that they came towards the end of the inter-war
period when the practice under the Covenant was completed. Quincy
Wright concluded that the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus "does not limit
the action of the Assembly and its interpretation is unimportant in the
function of Article 19.'"241 Wright argued that article 19 was more than a
mere codification of an existing juridical rule; it was a development in
international law which intended to adjust the legal situation to political
realities, especially territorial demands. 242 Article 19 was to provide a
238. Draft Scheme For the Constitution of the Society of Nations, art. 2, 2 MILLER,
supra note 229, at 246, 248.
239. F. WILSON, THE ORIGINS OF THE LEAGUE COVENANT-DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF ITS DRAFTING 75 (1928).
240. Wright, Article 19 of the League Covenant and the Doctrine "Rebus Sic Stan-
tibus", 30 PROCED. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 55 (1936).
241. Id. at 68. "It is difficult to interpret Article 19 juristically because it has had so
little application in practice." Id. at 66.
242. Id. at 68. Wright emphasized that the application of article 19 was to include
political considerations. Id. This may well have been the situation, but it was also
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procedure for effectuating peaceful change. It was to close the gap
between necessity and the law.
Professor James Garner, in commenting upon Wright's presenta-
tion, stated that the group of treaties which created a substantial problem
were imposed treaties, particularly treaties of peace. 243 He cited also the
Soviet Union's success in abrogating and re-examining such treaties
based upon mutual state consent of the Soviet Union and its treaty
partners. 244
Article 19 did not enumerate any particular grounds that would
allow treaty revision. It was believed by both publicists and various
governments that an imposed treaty was a qualifying basis for revi-
sion. 245 These proponents thought that an imposed treaty would become
inapplicable almost as 'soon as any condition existing at the time of the
making of the agreement had changed, such as the social needs of the
international community or a change in international morality. In fact,
some argued that no additional changes needed to be indicated after a
treaty was shown to be imposed.24
Pitman Potter and several other writers discussed article 19 during
the inter-war era. Pitman Potter of the Graduate Institute of International
Studies in Geneva presented not one, but two significant studies of
article 19. The first study was made in 1932247 during the height of the
League's activities, and the second, a larger study was completed in
1941, after the demise of the League.
248
In 1932, Potter stated that the study of revision of treaties is one of
the most important questions a student of international affairs in Geneva
could study. 249 He believed that the recent demand for treaty revision
was in large part because of the "alleged inequities of treaties imposed
by force." 250
243. Id. at 78. "But there is a class of treaties which makes the trouble. Those are
treaties which have been imposed upon the parties on one side, and particular treaties of
peace." Id.
244. Id. at 80.
245. Potter, The Revision of Treaties, 3 GENEVA SPEC. STUDIES 3 (1932) [hereinafter
cited as 1932 POTTER].
246. Id. at 10. Potter quoted the report of the 1920 Committee of Jurists appointed by
the Assembly in the Bolivia-Chile dispute.
[Wihen the state of affairs existing at the moment of their conclusion has
subsequently undergone, either materially or morally, such radical changes
... . [t]he Assembly would have to ascertain .. .whether one of these
conditions did in point of fact exist.
League of Nations, Records, Plenary Meetings, Second Assembly 466 (1921).
247. 1932 POTTER, supra note 245.
248. Potter, Article XIX of the Covenant of the League of Nations, 12 GENEVA
STUDIES 9 (1941) [hereinafter cited as 1941 POTTER].
249. 1932 POTTER, supra note 245, at 3.
250. Id. at 8.
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Potter did not think that a rule of treaty law existed which
invalidated imposed treaties, although such treaties had been particu-
larly susceptible to a plea of revision under article 19.251 He did not
believe that article 19 was intended to refer only to a change of military
strength. 252 He believed it should also apply if there was a change in the
social needs of the international community, or when a treaty was "in
the strict sense of the term, unjust.' '253 Potter believed that a treaty could
be viewed as either imposed or unequal. In his view, such concepts were
severable, and the unequalness of a treaty, even if the inequality existed
from the outset, would subject the treaty to a plea under article 19 as
much as if the treaty had been imposed.
254
In 1941, with the help of hindsight, Potter analyzed in depth the
drafting of article 19 and the history of the state practice under it. Potter
concluded that article 19 "constituted an integral and a potentially
important element in the political and juridical system set up under the
name of the League."
255
Potter thought that an important reason for the League's collapse
was its failure to utilize article 19.256 It was Potter's belief that the
powerful members of the League were the beneficiaries of treaties to
which other members objected .257 The objecting states were generally
the weaker ones or the ones thought of as the weaker. The powerful
states feared that any use of article 19 would upset the system and the
251. But the demand for revision in recent times has arisen to take care of cases
where the fault existed from the beginning and was. . unescapable because the
treaty was forced upon the now complaining signatory-not a situation covered
by any such rule. It is very largely to deal with alleged inequities imposed by force
that the demand for revision of treaties has arisen and been developed in recent
years.
Id.
252. Id. at 9.
253. Id. at 10.
254. Potter viewed the 1871 London Conference of the powers as making an earlier
declaration concerning the right of treaty revision, based upon mutual state consent.
However, he believed that the statement was primarily political, rather than juridical. Id.
at 7.
255. 1941 POTTER, supra note 248, at 9. As to rebus sic stantibus he stated:
[Article 191 does not constitute an application of the rule rebus (non) sic
stantibus nor even justify its invocation by . . . the Assembly (or any other
League organ) itself.
Id. at 67. For a recent study of rebus sic stantibus see Ridruejo, La Doctrine "'Rebus Sic
Stantibus " 6 la Confirence de Vienne de 1968sur le Droit des Traitis, 25 SCHWEIZERISCHES
JAHRBUCH FOR INTERNATIONALES RECHT 81 (1968).
256. 1941 PoTrTER, supra note 248, at 66, 75.
And among those functions the one which historically, logically, and
technically was the most advanced in character, and furthest from actual
performance in the League system, is or has been precisely that of community
revision or legislation.
Id. at 75.
257. Id. at 69.
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advantages gained by four years of war.258 Many of the demanding
states simply gave up attempting to secure revision by pacific means.
259
Of course, "the crux of the matter on the technical side" ' 260 was that
only the states themselves could revise such treaties.
The views of other writers on article 19 are essentially consistent
with each other and are supported by the practice of that period.
Professor Brierly, writing in 1927, evaluated article 19 and con-
cluded that it would not be advisable to attempt a formal amendment of
it. 2 6 Brierly believed the real problem for international law to be the
demand for unilateral release from treaties known and intended to be
oppressive at the time they were entered into. 262 He believed that
international law in 1926, did not vitiate such agreements. 263 Brierly's
advice was that time was to allow "the moral sanction behind" article
19 to grow. 264 He summarized the current status of international law and
article 19 as they related to imposed treaties in the following:
Let us recognize candidly the existence of a blot upon the
system, and admit that here not as a matter of morality, but for
practical utilitarian reasons, la force prime la droit.
265
Two other authors, Paul de Auer266 and F. Llewellyn-Jones, 267 also
analyzed the revision of treaties in light of the League's practice.
De Auer contended that article 19 did not provide a means of
fulfilling its purpose, which he believed was to bring about freely
negotiated treaties. 268 De Auer recommended the adoption of a legal
rule being essentially a rule against imposed treaties .269 The rule he
envisioned would provide that treaties were to be effective only if states
had joint debates and exhaustive conferences.27°
Llewellyn-Jones also analyzed article 19 and state practice under
it. He was particularly interested in the subsequent revision of the
258. Id. at 56, 73.
259. Id. at 72.
260. Id. at 74.
261. Brierly, Some Considerations on the Obsolescence of Treaties, I I TRANSACTIONS




265. Id. at 19.
266. DeAuer, Revision of Treaties, 18 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC'Y 155 (1932)
[hereinafter cited as DeAuer].
267. Llewellyn-Jones, Treaty Revision and Art. XIX of the Covenant of the League of
Nations, 19 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC'Y 13 (1933) [hereinafter cited as Llewellyn].
268. DeAuer, supra note 266, at 161.
269. Id. at 158.
270. Id.
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1919-1920 peace treaties that had taken place outside the context of the
article 19 procedure. 271 He agreed with the suggestion that further
revision of these peace treaties under article 19 might succeed in keeping
the peace in Europe. 27 2 He concluded by quoting: "It is not to be
expected that the vanquished will settle down tranquilly under a dispen-
sation ordained by the victors."
273
c. Subsequent Practice Under Article 19. There were only two
cases of state practice under article 19: Bolivia and Peru v. Chile in
1920, 1921; and China's requests of 1925 and 1929. Both evidenced
that the complaining states believed article 19 to be applicable especially
to imposed treaties.
In the matter of Bolivia and Peru v. Chile (1920, 1921), both
Bolivia and Peru in the very first Assembly meeting of the League of
Nations, attempted to invoke article 19 in connection with treaties that
were previously imposed upon them by Chile. Bolivia argued that the
Bolivian-Chile Treaty of 1904 was imposed on her by force. 274 Peru
contended that the Peru-Chile Treaty of 1883 was forced upon her.
275
Both Bolivia276 and Peru 277 asked the Secretary-General to have the
respective matters put on the agenda. Peru later withdrew its request and
Bolivia asked that its request 278 be considered in the Second Assembly
in 1921 .279 The Committee of Three Jurists in 1921 was appointed to
assess Bolivia's case.
280
The report of that committee pointed out that Bolivia's request was
not in the correct form, since it could not request the Assembly to revise
a treaty, but could only request it to advise the contracting states to
reconsider the treaty. 281 The report went on to state that a treaty may be
271. Llewellyn, supra note 267, at 23.
272. Id. at 29-30.
273. Id. at 29, quoting, FORTNIGHTLY REV. (no additional citation was given). See also
M. RADOIKOVITCH, LE RtVISION DES TRAITtS ET LE PACTE DE LA SOCIfTt DES NATIONS
(1930).
274. Bolivia-Chile Treaty of Commerce, Oct. 20, 1904, 98 BRIT. FOR. ST. PAPERS 763
(1903-05).
275. Peru-Chile Treaty of Peace, Oct. 20, 1883, 74 BRIT. FOR. ST. PAPERS 349
(1882-83).
276. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 1ST ASS., at 595-97 (1920). See also Borchard, The
Tacna-Arica Controversy, I FOR. AFF. 42 (1923). As recently as 1976, Bolivia demanded a
change in the 1904 Treaty. In October, 1975, President Hugo Banzer Surdrez of Bolivia
promised to resign unless Bolivia received a corridor to the sea. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1975,
at 5, col. I. In 1976, Bolivia asserted that the recovery of a port on the Pacific north of
Arica is Bolivia's principal foreign policy goal. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1976, at 13, col. 1.
277. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, IST Ass., at 595-97 (1920).
278. Id. at 581.
279. Id. at 580.
280. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 2D Ass., at 261 (1921).
281. Id. at 466.
Vol. 7
48
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1977], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol7/iss1/2
IMPOSED TREATIES
inapplicable if "either materially or morally radical changes" have
taken place.
282
The position of Bolivia was that an imposed treaty allowed a state
to request that the League of Nations advise that the treaty be reconsi-
dered. No additional showing, such as a change of morality, need be
proven. 283 Bolivia did not resubmit its application, 284 which makes it
difficult to conclude very much, however, one may conclude that the
practice discussed above discloses an early development in the growth
of the rule against imposed treaties, and that the League of Nations had a
right under the proper circumstances to advise the reconsideration of an
imposed treaty.
In both 1925,285 at the Sixth Assembly, and in 1929,286 during the
Tenth Assembly, China requested that resolutions be passed relating to
the problem of imposed treaties.
In 1925, and 1929, China was in the process of attempting by
diplomatic means to revise several treaties. In both the Sixth and Tenth
Assemblies, the resolutions passed did not accurately reflect China's
desire that imposed treaties be criticized as they applied to China. In
fact, the 1925 resolution did not even mention China.
287
It was in the Assembly on the tenth anniversary of the League of
Nations that the most significant Chinese attempts were made to have
the League influence the revision of China's treaties. China had pro-
posed a draft resolution in the First Committee (Constitutional and Legal
Question) suggesting that a committee be appointed to study article
19.288 Belgium suggested an amendment, 289 but neither the draft nor the
amendment passed. The First Committee accepted a resolution of its
sub-committee which included in its appendix the earlier Chinese draft
resolution. 290 This was subsequently adopted by the plenary meeting of
the Tenth Assembly.
291
The Chinese draft resolution in 1929, had not specifically referred
to imposed or unequal treaties, although the comments of the Chinese
282. Id.
283. The treaties that [Chile] imposed on Bolivia and Peru after an unjustifiable
war of conquest, are not among those whose stability is demanded by universal
public opinion.
Id. at 51.
284. Id. at 468.
285. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 6TH Ass., at 44 (1925).
286. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 10TH Ass., at 40 (1929).
287. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 6TH Ass., at 44 (1925).
288. LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. 76, at 44 (1929).
289. Id. at 45.
290. Id. at 100.
291. LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. Spec. Supp. 75, at 177-78 (1929).
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delegates in the First Committee had referred to them. M. Chao Chu Wu
had stated:
The Chinese declaration envisaged particularly those
"unequal" treaties and conventions, with whose general out-
line the Committee was doubtless familiar, under which China
laboured. If it could be said of any treaties that had become
inapplicable, it could be said of those. 92
The draft resolution submitted by the sub-committee and adopted
by both the First Committee and the Assembly specifically referred to
the treaties between China and other states:
[Treaties] between China and other States, being incon-
sistent with present conditions in China, have become inap-
plicable within the meaning of Article 19 of the Covenant.
293
Statements made by members of other delegations also indicate
that they were referring to imposed treaties. Yoshida of Japan said that
the statements contained in the resolution related not only to China, but
were of general application. 294 Dr. Kock-Weser believed that the recent
developments of the international community in forbidding war man-
dated that progress be made to achieve active pacifism. 295 He believed
that new treaties ought to be concluded. 96 Unfortunately, China, as
Bolivia before her, failed to invoke article 19 formally in accordance
with the proper procedures. While Bolivia had made an application
which turned out to be in improper form, China never actually applied,
even after passage of a "morale boosting" resolution of a general nature
on imposed treaties.
3. The Failure of the 1921 Proposed Brazilian Amendment to the
Covenant. In 1921, Brazil proposed an amendment to the Covenant,
which was not adopted. The amendment would have declared void any
international treaties concluded contrary to the Covenant clauses pro-
hibiting aggression. 297 The Permanent Court was to have jurisdiction to
determine which state was the aggressor.
The proposed amendment read as follows:
All the Members of the League of Nations consider null
and void pleno jure, the provisions of any international treaty
concluded in the future which grant to a State which has made
war contrary to Articles 12, 13 and 15 of the Covenant the
following . . . (reparations, economic benefits, annexation
of territory) . ...
292. LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. Spec. Supp. 76, at 44 (1929).
293. Id. at 100.
294. Id. at 54.
295. Id. at 44.
296. Id. at 45.
297. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 2D Ass., Committee Meeting, at 396, 400 (1921).
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All the Members of the League recognize the compe-
tence of the Court of International Justice, in case of doubt, to
determine de piano . . . which has been the aggressor
State .298
Braga of Brazil believed that the amendment embodied objective
international law which would lead to a protection more effective than
any military blockade.2 99 Braga asserted that this amendment would
help to establish "an international legal system in accordance with
which no aggressor State could continue, even after the war, to enjoy a
tranquil and prosperous existence." 300 Unfortunately, such a new legal
system was not to be developed at that time.
4. The League of Nations Commission of Experts (1925-1928)
and the Hague Codification Conference (1930). The Hague Codifica-
tion Conference of 1930 was a general codification conference con-
vened during the inter-war period to codify rules of customary interna-
tional law. 301 If it had succeeded in producing even a draft rule on
imposed treaties, this would have been strong evidence of the existence
of such a rule. Not only did the Conference not produce such a draft, it
hardly attempted to discuss this or related rules. The Commission of
Experts through one of its sub-committees only touched upon the
problem of imposed treaties.
The Assembly in 1924, created by resolution the Committee of
Experts to report to the Council "on the questions which are sufficiently
ripe [for a conference]." 312 A sub-committee was eventually created to
examine the possibility of formulating rules of procedure for interna-
tional conferences, and for the conclusion and drafting of treaties.
303
The rules on concluding and drafting treaties referred to those treaties
drafted by a codification conference. Even the suggestion for a conven-
tion did not consider that the proposed rules would be binding.
3°4
Rather, they were to serve only as guidelines for states.
The report of the sub-committee by Mastny suggested that one area
that might be investigated was the general theory of the validity of
298. Id. at 400-01.
299. Id. at 398-99.
300. Id. at 399.
301. See generally LEAGUE OF NATIONS, COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS FOR THE PROGRES-
SIVE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (S. Rosenne ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as
ROSENNE]. See generally 2 V. YVES & C. GHEBALI, A REPERTOIRE OF LEAGUEOF NATIONS
SERIAL DOCUMENTS, 1919-1947, at 671-92 (1973).
302. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 5TH ASS., at 125 (1924); See also I ROSENNE, supra note
301, at vii.
303. I ROSENNE, supra note 301, at 36.
304. Id. at 236.
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treaties. 305 The Committee of Experts sent out questionnaires to a
number of states. 306 Only one response, made by Denmark, 30 7 raised the
possibility of discussing the right of unilateral denunciation. Neither
Japan308 nor Germany 3° believed the question of international confer-
ences and multilateral treaty-making to be a question sufficiently ripe
for a codification conference.
310
Verzijl, the Dutch jurist, commenting in 1968, on the 1930
Conference stated, "[It] did not correspond to the expectations it
aroused;'' 311 in fact, "[It] fell far short of expectations. ''312 Rosenne,
the former Israeli member of the International Law Commission,
concluded that while the Conference was not a success, it was not a
waste of effort.31 3 Hearne, in a lecture delivered in 1931, at the Geneva
Institute of International Relations, stated that the 1930 Conference
directed attention to the science of codification and the nature of the
legal relationship between history and jurisprudence. 314 Alvarez in
1931, also believed that the experience was valuable. 315 Nevertheless,
the Conference failed to produce any significant resolutions or treaties.
A basic failure of the Conference has been ascribed to the proce-
dures it followed. As Rosenne argued, it was the sub-committee system
and poor instructions to the rapporteurs, as well as the lack of political
will of the states, which caused the failure. 316 Thus, it would not be
entirely correct to believe that the failure of the Conference evidences,
on the part of the participants, a lack of consensus on any particular rule
of international law. However, it would be proper to conclude that the
failure even to draft a rule on imposed treaties renders doubtful the
existence of any consensus in favor of that rule.
5. 1928 Pact of Paris and the 1934 Budapest Articles of Interpre-
305. 2 ROSENNE, supra note 301, at 132.
306; Id. at 264.
307. Id. at 298-99.
308. Id. at 299.
309. Id.
310. Part IV of the conference's final recommendation stated: "[There is] the
necessity of preparing the work of the next conference for the codification of international
law a sufficient time in advance." 5 ACTES DE LA CONFERENCE POUR LA CODIFICATION DU
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 171 (1930).
311. I J. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 13 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as VERZIJL].
312. Id. at 29.
313. 1 ROSENNE, supra note 301, at xcvix. "[lI]t has come to be seen that despite its
limited and timid approach, the Committee of Experts performed useful services in
starting to clear the ground." Id.
314. Hearne, The Codification ofInternational Law, 6 PROBLEMS OF PEACE 89 (1931).
315. Alvarez, Impressions Left by the First Hague Conference for the Codification of
International Law, 16 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC'Y 119, 120-21 (1930).
316. I ROSENNE, supra note 301, at ciii.
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tation, and the Committee to Amend the Covenant. Under article 1 of the
1928 General Pact for the Renunciation of War, popularly known as the
Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Kellogg Pact, and the Pact of Paris, the
contracting states: "condemn recourse to war. . .and renounce it as an
instrument of national policy. .... -3"17 This provision of the multilat-
eral treaty proclaimed a rule of international law restricting the use of
force except for the implicit right of self-defense. This was an extension
of the law of war which had been enunciated by the League Covenant.
However, the treaty did not develop further the analogous rule of treaty
law.
The International Law Association meeting in Budapest in 1934,
agreed upon a number of articles to be used as a guide to interpreting the
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact. Article 5 of the Budapest Articles states the
following:
The signatory states are not entitled to recognize as
acquired de jure any territorial or other advantages acquired
de facto by means of a violation of the Pact.
318
Article 5 of the Budapest Articles, if read in conjunction with
article 1 of the Kellogg-Briand Pact which renounced the use of war,
meant that any territorial or "other advantage" gained by a state using
illegal force was not to be recognized. Article 5 did not further define the
term "other advantages." An interpretation relying on the ordinary
meaning of that term might include an imposed treaty.
To fully understand the impact of the Budapest Articles, one
should recall that the International Law Association is a private group
independent of the League of Nations, and cannot be viewed as a source
of international law. Its private international codifications are at most
merely a subsidiary means of evidencing the then existing international
law. The acceptance of the Budapest Articles as anything more than the
view of one group of legal scholars would be erroneous. One may
generalize that the rule of treaty law as to imposed treaties underwent
some development, but in light of the fact that the International Law
Association was a private group and the Budapest Rules of Interpreta-
317. General Pact for the Renunciation of War, art. 1, done Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat.
2343 (1931), T.S. No. 796, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.
318. Lauterpacht, The Pact of Paris and the Budapest Articles of interpretation, 20
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC'Y 178, 206 (1935) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited as
LAUTERPACHT]. See also Stimson, The Pact of Paris: Three Years of Development, I I FOR.
AFF. Spec. Supp., i (1933).
Hereafter when two nations engage in armed conflict either one or both of
them must be wrongdoers-violators of the general treaty. We no longer draw a
circle about them and treat them with the punctilios of the duelist's code.
Id. at iv.
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tion did not explicitly refer to imposed treaties, its development cer-
tainly did not amount to a crystallization of a rule of treaty law.
Quincy Wright in 1933, argued that the Pact of Paris had "a
positive legal character," even though the hope of the Pact had not been
realized. 319 Lauterpacht in 1935, took issue with the position Wright
postulated, and said that the "shortcomings of international law cannot
be removed by juristic effort, however well meaning."
320
It was to a large measure United States influence that led to the
conclusion of the 1928 Pact of Paris. Columbos, in his 1928 article
reviewing the drafting history of the Pact, noted that the Pact of Paris
''comes from one of the greatest and richest states [the United States] in
the world, which for more than eight years has consistently kept aloof
from any active cooperation with the rest of the world."
321
The League of Nations, itself, recognized the juridical significance
of the Pact of Paris. It appointed the Committee to Amend the Cove-
nant 322 and gave it a mandate to bring the Covenant into conformity with
the new development in the law of war, a demand that the Dutch
international lawyer, Verzijl, made in 1931 .323 During the Committee
sessions, the British delegation suggested in 1929, that article 12(1) of
the Covenant be amended in order to reflect the new law, and that in no
instance was resort to force to be sanctioned.
324
Although the Covenant was not so amended, the fact that such a
committee was appointed and such proposals made indicates the belief
by the League and its member states that a new rule of international law
relating to war had emerged. However, in only a very minimal sense did
the 1928 Pact of Paris explicitly aid in the development of an analogous
rule of treaty law.
6. League of Nations Resolution of March 11, 1932 (Resolution
on Forced Treaties). The Assembly of the League of Nations on March
319. Wright, The Meaning of the Pact of Paris, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 39 (1933).
320. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 318, at 190. He also was critical of the apparent
encroachment that was made as to the rights of neutral states. Id. at 178-79. See also
Whitton, What Follows the Pact of Paris, 276 INT'L CONCIL. 9 (1932).
321. Colombos, The Paris Pact, Otherwise Called the Kellogg Pact, 14 TRANSACTIONS
GROTIUS Soc'Y 87 (1929).
322. LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. 75, 510 (1929).
323. VERZIJL, supra note 31 , at 503. Verzijl also stated: "[T]he Kellogg Pact is well in
advance of the Covenant." Id. at 501.
324. LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. 75, 510 (1929).
Proposed Article 12(l): The Members of the League agree that if there should
arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the
matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council,
and they agree that they will in no case resort to war.
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11, 1932, adopted a resolution which is a significant milestone in the
early development by the international community of a new rule of
treaty law.
325
The relevant sections of the 1932 League Resolution on Forced
Treaties are as follows:
Part I. Considering that the provisions of the Covenant are
entirely applicable to the present dispute, more particularly as
regards: (1) principle of a scrupulous respect for treaties...
[which] [p]roclaims the binding nature of the principle and
provisions referred to above and declares that it is incumbent
upon the Members of the League of Nations not to recognize
any situation, treaty or agreement, which may be brought
about by means contrary to the Covenant of the League of
Nations . . . [or contrary to the Pact of Paris.]
Part II. Affirming that it is contrary to the spirit of the
Covenant that the settlement of the Sino-Japanese dispute
should be sought under the stress of military pressure on the
part of either party .... 326
The Resolution declares that treaties brought about by means
contrary to the Covenant or the Pact of Paris are not to be recognized.
The League resolution was worded in terms of non-recognition, not
illegality. Non-recognition is most often a political judgment, not a
juridical determination. Non-recognition can be based on many factors,
political, economic and military. It is not normally based upon solely
legal considerations. 327
Some of the statements made during the debate of this resolution by
the various delegates to the Assembly are of some interest. Sir John
Simon of the United Kingdom sought to add a reference to the sig-
natories of the Pact of Paris. 328 The amendment was adopted .329 Count
Apponyi of Hungary stated that he approved of the Assembly restating
the general principles of the Covenant. 30 Mr. Costa du Rels of Bolivia,
obviously mindful of his own country's experience, unfortunately
overstated the situation by declaring, "To-day [sic], no nation can
impose its will by force; the international community would acknowl-
edge no advantage obtained in that way."331
325. LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. 101, 70-85 (1932).
326. Id. at 81-82 (emphasis added). See also id. at 87.
327. See B. BOT, NON-RECOGNITION AND TREATY RELATIONS 254-55 (1968).
328. LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J., Spec. Supp. 101, 82 (1932).
329. Id. at 83.
330. Id. at 71.
331. Id. at 77.
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A review of the diplomatic correspondence between the United
States Ambassador Wilson in Switzerland and the Secretary of State
discloses that the amendment suggested by Sir John and adopted by the
Assembly, was formulated by United States diplomats in Switzerland in
response to British inquiries. This explains the similarity between the
resolution and the Stimson Note. It was the intention of the United States
officials, in the terms of the subsequent correspondence, "not to fail to
call attention to the reasons for cooperation between the members of the
League and the United States as well as providing in the future a
common ground on which we might act.' 332
While this disclosure is quite interesting from a foreign policy
perspective, the amendment is not of great juridical significance. The
significance of the Resolution is that the League of Nations restated the
view earlier posited by the United States in the Stimson Note.
7. The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States
(1933) and the 1928Havana Convention on the Law of Treaties. Article
11 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States
333
is significant in that it used the same general phrase as the aforemen-
tioned 1932 League Resolution. It denied recognition to "advantages
which have been obtained by force." 334 Article 11 did not state which
advantages were unlawful, nor did it state explicitly that imposed
treaties were among the advantages specifically contemplated as not to
be recognized.
The 1933 Montevideo Convention was based upon the 1927 draft
of the International Commission of American Jurists, which was drafted
at the Commission's Rio de Janeiro meeting. 335 Ratifications to the
Montevideo Convention were deposited in 1934, at the Pan American
Union by a number of states including the United States.
Article 11 states the following:
The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of
their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial
acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained
by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in
threatening diplomatic representation, or in any other effec-
332. Telegram from The Minister in Switzerland to the Secretary of State, March 1I,
1932, 3 FOR. REL. U.S. 563 (1948). "[The British representative] did this effectively and
that the words 'or contrary to the Pact of Paris' were inserted at the end of the final
paragraph of Part I." Id. at 564. See also Second Telegram from The Minister in
Switzerland to the Secretary of State, March I1, 1932, id. at 568. This contained a note
from Drummond (the League Secretary-General).
333. Convention on Rights and Duties of States, art. 11, done Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat.
3097 (1936), T.S. No. 881,165 L.N.T.S. 19, [hereinafter cited as Montevideo Convention].
334. Id.
335. 6 INT'L LEG. 620 (M. Hudson ed. 1937).
Vol. 7
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tive coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and
may not be the objective of military occupation nor of other
measures by force imposed by another state directly or indi-
rectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily. 33
6
Without going into the drafting history of this provision, it is clear
from the language that no special advantages were to be recognized if
they were created by military force. However, the convention did not
explicitly identify imposed treaties as "special advantages."
The Montevideo Convention was a regional convention only. It
had less juridical significance in formulating a general rule of customary
international law than would a universal multilateral treaty. Perhaps, it
has even less significance than a multilateral treaty that has not even
entered into force, such as the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.
The International Conference of American States in 1928, had
adopted a treaty on the law of treaties, the 1928 Havana Convention on
Treaties. 337 The Havana Treaty did not mention in any of its provisions
the problem of imposed treaties, let alone declare such treaties to be
invalid. 338 Article 10 specifically provided that no state could relieve
itself of treaty obligations except by peaceful means. 339 Article 14(f)
required agreement of both states in cases of renunciation. 340
Assessing both the 1933 Montevideo Convention and the 1928
Havana Convention on Treaties, one may conclude that discontent with
the existing rule was demonstrated in the more recent convention.
However, the earlier treaty on treaty law, by not even discussing the
problem, raises the question as to whether the delegates really intended
to change treaty law.
8. The Draft Mexican Peace Code (1933). A draft regional treaty
never signed, ratified or entered into force, is not of much weight as a
source of general international law. However, it is worthwhile to
indicate one such instrument, the Draft Mexican Peace Code of 1933 .341
The Mexican delegation presented a draft peace code to the
Seventh International Conference of American States, held in Mon-
336. Montevedeo Convention, supra note 333, art.'I I (emphasis added).
337. Convention on Treaties, done Feb. 20, 1928, 4 INT'L LEG. 2378 (M. Hudson
1928-1929) [hereinafter cited as Havana Convention].
338. For a study of the 1928 Havana Convention on the Law of Treaties see The Law
of Treaties (M. Hudson ed. 1931) (unpublished study resulting from the work of the
International Law Seminar, 1930-1931, at the Harvard Law School).
339. Havanna Convention, supra note 337, art. 10.
340. Id. art. 14(f).
341. I PAN-AM. UNION, IMPROVEMENT AND COORDINATION OF INTER-AMERICAN
PEACE INSTRUMENTS 75, 79 (1942).
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tevideo in 1933, the same conference which produced the Convention
on the Rights and Duties of States.342 The purpose of the draft code was
to coordinate in a single instrument the various American instruments
for the maintenance of peace.
343
Article 4 of the draft Mexican Peace Code contained similar
language to that of article 11 of the Convention on Rights and Duties of
States (1933). 344 It used the formulation of "non-acceptance," rather
than "non-recognition." While such a formulation may have intended
to signify a different juridical proposition, such an intendment was not
clear. The Code adhered to the principle of non-acceptance of force,
whether military or of any other sort, to acquire territory or "any special
advantage." 
345
Resolution XV, approved by the Eighth International Conference
of American States at Lima in 1938, 346 requested the Pan American
Union to transmit the Draft Mexican Peace Code to the various Ameri-
can Governments for their opinions; it was intended that the opinions
should serve as a basis for subsequent adoption. 347 No further significant
action was taken on the draft code.
The draft Mexican Peace Code is of little help in determining
whether a new rule of treaty law had crystallized. Its significance is less
than that of the 1933 Montevideo Convention which was adopted and
ratified. However, the history of the Mexican Peace Code indicates the
inability of the interested states, especially the victims of imposed
treaties, to act successfully even at this relatively minor level.348
9. Harvard International Law Draft on the Law of Treaties
(1935) and Harvard Draft Convention on Rights and Duties of States in
Case of Aggression (1939). An analysis of article 32 (Duress) of the
Harvard International Law Draft on the Law of Treaties (1935)349 and
article 4(3) (Aggressor's Treaties) of the Harvard Draft Convention on
Rights and Duties of States in Case of Aggression (1939)350 is of
particular significance. The articles indicate that a group of the most
342. See Montevideo Convention, supra note 333.
343. 1 PAN-AM. UNION, IMPROVEMENT AND COORDINATION OF INTER-AMERICAN
PEACE INSTRUMENTS 75.
344. Id. art. IV.
345. Id.
346. [1944] PAN-AM. UNION, GEN. REP. 33.
347. Id. at 34.
348. "Minor" is used here in the sense of states not taking action to question the
validity of imposed treaties, action which might have brought victim states into a
confrontation with a stronger power at the international conference.
349. 29 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 1148 (1935) [hereinafter cited as 1935 HARVARD DRAFT].
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eminent international legal scholars in the United States in the middle
and late 1930's, after all the advances toward the new rule occurred,
rejected the rule's existence.
Article 32 of the Harvard International Law Draft on the Law of
Treaties (1935) states the following:
(a) As the term is used in this Convention, duress involves the
employment of coercion directed against the persons signing a
treaty on behalf of a state .... "I
The Comment to the 1935 Draft clearly indicates that the Draft
Convention's term "duress" did not include the employment of force or
coercion by one state against another.352 It clearly rejects the position
that a new rule of law had emerged, 353 and recognizes merely that the
law was in a state of transition. 354 The Comment states the following:
The term "duress" as used in this Convention does not
include the employment of force or coercion by one State
against another State for the purpose of compelling the
acceptance of a treaty. . . .Such indirect compulsion is not
• . ."duress" as the term is used in this Convention.
355
The Comment further states:
[11n recent years there has been an increasing disposition
among writers on international law to challenge the traditional
view as to the right of one State to use force against another
State and to impose upon the latter a treaty embodying such
terms as the former State may see fit to demand.
35 6
. . .The views just quoted and pronouncements referred
to undoubtedly present a new attitude in regard to the validity
of treaties imposed by force, and perhaps it can only be said
that the law on this point is in a state of transition. It cannot be
said, however, that the conception of duress has been
extended to embrace the use of force against a State as such,
even though the force is unjustifiably used by the State
resorting to it and in violation of its treaty engagements.357
An investigation into the preparatory work discloses that earlier
drafts of article 32 held peace treaties invalid if their imposition involved
the violation of the rules governing the making of war. These drafts were
351. 1935 HARVARD DRAFT, supra note 349, at 1148.
352. Id. at 1151. "It is this narrow or restricted sense that the term 'duress' is used in
this section." Id.
353. Id. at 1153.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 1152.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1153.
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rejected ,358 indicating that in 1935, the drafters had hoped to find such a
rule existing, but were not able to do so.
In 1935, the group of eminent scholars of international law rejected
the existence of a new rule of treaty law. This group included, among
others: Hackworth, Hyde, Jessup, Whitton, Woolsey and Wright. They
did not cite fully the existing state practice of the twentieth century, but
they did assess major instances of state practice, such as the Twenty-
One Demands of Japan of 1915, the Brest-Litovsk Treaty of 1918, and
Bolivia/Peru-Chile dispute of 1921, as well as the Covenant (1919) and
the Pact of Paris (1928). 359
Article 4(3) of the 1939 Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties
of States in Cases of Aggression provides that an aggressor's imposed
treaty is voidable.360 The Commentary indicates that some states may be
satisfied with a treaty imposed upon them.
361
Article 4(3) is a clear statement of a rule, and approaches the idea
codified in articles 52 and 75 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties. However, an analysis of the documents relating to the
drafting of article 4(3) discloses no consensus for the statement of that
rule. The drafters themselves state that the Draft Convention as a whole
was subject to "fundamental differences of opinion," 362 and did not
enjoy even the "consensus of the members of the Advisory Commit-
tee. ,363 The Draft Convention was presented only in order to facilitate
"debates upon the problem. . . among scholars throughout the world
with a view to the further clarification of the subject."364
The Draft Convention's article 4(3) can be viewed as a rule that the
Advisory Committee at most hoped would be substantiated after greater
analysis and debate. Even this interpretation of its significance may be
too generous. The most significant development at the time that this
article was drafted was the Munich Agreement of 1938. That agreement
35g. Art. 4(2), Preliminary and Revised Draft of Articles II - XVIII of a Convention
on Treaties, HARVARD LAW SCHOOL, RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW ii (J. Garner
Reporter 1935).
Article 5(2). A treaty of peace imposed, during the course of or at the
conclusion of a war, by one belligerant upon his adversary, is binding upon the
latter, provided the party which imposed the treaty did not, in declaring and
prosecuting the war, violate its obligations under the generally recognized rules
of international law. . . . In case the fact of such violation. . . the party upon
whom the treaty was imposed ceases to be bound by its stipulations . ...
Id. at ii-iii.
359. 1935 HARVARD DRAFT, supra note 349, at 1159.
360. Article 4(3) states: "A treaty brought about by an aggressor's use of armed force
is voidable." 1939 HARVARD DRAFT, supra note 350, at 828.
361. Id. at 895-96.
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certainly would not support a belief that a new rule of law had
crystallized since 1935, when the Harvard research group had last
examined the problem.
By reading both the 1935 Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties
and the 1939 Draft Convention on the Rights and Duties of States in
Case of Aggression, one may conclude that the drafters of these
documents hoped for a new rule, but did not find its crystallization.
D. Jurisprudence
To a limited extent, international jurisprudence of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, international arbitration, and national
jurisprudence dealt with the problem of imposed treaties during the
inter-war period. Such jurisprudence involved the related issues of
restrictive treaty interpretation of imposed treaties, treaty revision, state
equality and state consent. An analysis of the jurisprudence of this
period discloses that not one case, international or national, held a treaty
unlawful because of its being imposed. On the contrary, jurisprudence
consistently upheld the validity of imposed treaties.
1. International Jurisprudence. Writers have stated that the
jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice never
discussed imposed treaties or inequality in treaty relations. Such a view
is not a completely accurate assessment. While no cases explicitly
decided these issues, a number of cases, including oral arguments and
dissenting opinions, discussed these and related propositions. The
Court, in fact, established some case law in this area, albeit only slight.
The case of The S. S. "Wimbledon", the first contentious case the
Permanent Court was called on to decide, involved an action in 1923, by
some of the former Allies of World War I (United Kingdom, France,
Italy, Japan and Poland) against Germany.365 It was brought for the
latter's refusal to allow passage through the Kiel Canal of a munitions
ship (English registered and chartered by a French company) traveling
to the Polish Naval Base at Danzig.3 66 The voyage was in support of the
forces opposing the Communist Russian armies in the Russo-Polish
War. 367 The Court awarded judgment to the applicants.3 68
The case treated the validity of the imposed Versailles Peace Treaty
and the construction of article 380.369 The joint dissenting opinion of
365. Case of The S.S. "Wimbledon," [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. i.
366. Id. at 16.
367. Id. at 19.
368. Id. at 33-34.
369. Id. at 22.
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Anzilotti and Huber,370 the oral argument of Schiffer, 371 and the
dissenting opinion of Schiicking372 regarding the restrictive interpreta-
tion of imposed treaties are of particular interest. Schiffer was the
German counsel, Schucking the German national judge.
The Court concluded that article 380 obligated Germany to allow
the passage of the Wimbledon,373 and this duty was not vitiated by
Germany's obligations as a neutral, which in any case did not obligate
Germany to forbid the passage. 374 Both France and Poland were at peace
with Germany; thus, they were entitled to exercise their right of
passage.
375
The Court declined to see in the conclusion of any treaty, an
abandonment of sovereignty, 376 regardless of whatever restrictions were
assumed. The Court declared that the right of entering into any interna-
tional engagement is an attribute of state sovereignty.
377
Anzilotti and Huber in their dissenting opinion, specifically argued
that article 380, the central issue in the case, was an "obligation,
imposed upon a State." 378 Neither Anzilotti nor Huber ever questioned
the validity of imposing obligations. They merely concluded that an
imposed obligation, if it is clear, is to be given a literal meaning. 37
9
However, this meaning was not to extend beyond the intention of the
parties.380
Schiffer agreed that the Versailles Treaty was an imposed agree-
ment.381 He argued that the general rule which requires an ambiguous
treaty provision to be interpreted against the state drafting a treaty,
should be applied also against the imposers of a treaty. 382 Schiffer relied
upon the arguments of Professor Zitelmann as contained in the German
rejoinder.
383
370. Id. at 35-42.
371. The S.S. "Wimbledon," [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. C, No. 1, at 334, 362.
372. Case of The S.S. "Wimbledon," (1923] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 1, at 43-47.
373. Id. at 30.
374. "Germany not only did not, in consequence of her neutrality, incur the obliga-
tion to prohibit the passage of the 'Wimbledon' through the Kiel Canal, but, on the
contrary, was entitled to permit it." Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 25.
377. Id.
378. Id. at 39.
379. Id. at 36.
380. Id.
381. The S.S. "Wimbledon," [19231 P.C.I.J., ser. C, No. 1, at 362.
382. Id.
383. Id. Schiffer stated, "It was for those who imposed the Treaty of Versailles on
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The Court adhered to, but did not find it necessary to apply the
restrictive interpretation of imposed treaties rule. It followed the French
counsel Bosdevant's arguments384 that article 380 was not an ambiguous
provision nor a provision drafted in favor of the Allies. It also held that
the article should not be interpreted restrictively against any of the
parties, because it was clear and it favored all states, establishing a
general freedom of transit.
Schucking believed the problem of servitudes to be a subject of
controversy among writers on international law,3 85 but that such writers
generally required all treaties concerning servitudes to be interpreted
restrictively so as to minimize any limitation of the sovereignty of states
suffering under servitudes. Schicking concluded that article 380 should
not be subjected to a purely literal construction, but should be construed
in a way which would allow Germany to exercise its rights as a
neutral .386
The existence or non-existence of the restrictive rule of interpreta-
tion in the Court's decision is not essential to the significance of the case
in this analysis. 387 The significance of the case lies in the conclusion that
the Permanent Court of International Justice did not declare the Versail-
les Treaty or any provision in it to be void because of its being imposed.
No dissenting opinion or oral argument ever asserted this proposition.
The dissenting opinions and oral arguments merely disclosed the belief
that a restrictive rule of treaty interpretation existed, especially in
relation to imposed treaties. Such treaties, if ambiguous, were to be
interpreted against the imposer in order to allow the state suffering under
the imposed treaty to relinquish as little of its sovereign rights as was
consistent with the terms of the treaty.
In S. S. Wimbledon, the restrictive interpretation of an imposed
treaty was discussed only by losing counsel and a dissenting opinion.
However, in German Settlers in Poland,3 88 these same arguments were
made by winning counsel and were clearly accepted by the Court's
decision. Although S.S. Wimbledon was a contentious case and Ger-
384. Id. at 212. Basdevant stated:
Restrictive interpretation logically stands against extensive interpretation.
But we do not claim the latter in our favour, we only take Article 380 in the strict
and natural meaning of its terms, which terms are quite sufficient for establish-
ing freedom of transit.
Id.
385. Case of The S.S. "Wimbledon," [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 1, at 43.
386. Id.
387. However, the Court stated, "This [restriction of sovereignty] constitutes a
sufficient reason for the restrictive interpretation, in case of doubt, of the clause which
produces such a limitation." Id. at 24. But the Court does not apply the above rule when it
would be contrary to the plain terms of a treaty provision. Id. at 24-25.
388. Advisory Opinion on German Settlers in Poland, [1923] P.C.I.J., ser. B, No. 6.
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man Settlers in Poland was an advisory opinion, the significance of the
latter is not substantially diminished.
German Settlers in Poland concerned the legality of Poland's
seizure of property of Germans and former German nationals living in
Poland after World War 1. 389 The Court upheld the rights of the Germans
and former German nationals, 390 holding that the Polish action was
contrary to its international treaty obligations.
391
The Court was faced with the central problem of construing article
93 and especially article 256 of the Versailles Treaty. 392 It also had to
construe article 21 of the Minorities Treaty, concluded the same day as
the Versailles Treaty, and articles 1 and 5 of the Polish legislation of July
14, 1920. 393 Article 93 of the Versailles Treaty required Poland to
conclude the Minorities Treaty, and article 256 of Versailles required
Polish compensation for all property formerly owned by the German
state and royal family. Poland argued that article 256 of the Versailles
Treaty was also applicable to properties held by private German
individuals, not just to property held by the German government.
The Court held that it was contrary to the principle of equality for
Poland to subject the German settlers' private rights to expropriation. 
394
The Court went on to discuss its interpretation of article 256 of the
Versailles Treaty .3 5 It asserted that the preservation of such rights
was to be implied.
396
The Court, as has already been seen, is of the opinion that
no treaty provision is required for the preservation of the
. rights and obligations now in question. In the opinion of the
Court, therefore, no conclusion can be drawn from the silence
of the Treaty of Peace contrary to that resulting from the
preceding statements. On the other hand, however, the posi-
tion of the Court as regards the protection of the private rights
now in question appears to be supported by the provisions of
that Treaty.
It is true that the Treaty of Peace does not in terms
formally announce the principle that, in case of a change of
sovereignty, private rights are to be respected; burthe princi-
ple is clearly recognized by the Treaty.397
389. Id. at 6.
390. Id. at 43.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 13-14.
393. Id. at 14.
394. Id. at 43.
395. Id. at 25.
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While the Court did not indicate explicitly that it was restrictively
construing an imposed treaty in order to uphold the rights of Germany,
the Court, in fact, interpreted the Treaty as it did in order to protect the
rights of Germany and to restrict the degree of "sovereignty" which
Germany was considered to have contracted away, that is, the right of a
state not to have its citizens' property discriminatorily taken by a foreign
country when the property is located in that foreign country.
Schiffer, the German counsel and a former German Minister of
Justice, argued, as he had in S. S. Wimbledon,398 that changes created by
the Versailles Treaty should be restrictively interpreted against the states
upon which they were imposed .399 He specifically discussed the transfer
of territory and population.
The guiding principle is at all times that the injury and
damage caused by any change of territory to the population of
such territory must be reduced to a minimum .... 4W
The arguments by Schiffer were found by the Court to be control-
ling. Schiffer wanted the Versailles Treaty to be interpreted in such a
way as to limit the obligations of Germany to a minimum. The Court
favored such an interpretation.
The case of the Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2, 1865
Between China and Belgium (1927) had the potential of being one of the
most significant to be decided by the Permanent Court in making new
law in the area of imposed treaties. 401
In 1928, China, by a Presidential decree, terminated the Sino-
Belgian Commercial Treaty of 1865.40 China believed the 1865 Treaty
to be a unilateral treaty providing for unequal treatment 40 and wanted a
new treaty to be negotiated "on the basis of equality and mutual respect
for territorial sovereignty. "404 Documents filed with the Registrar of the
Court indicated that China believed the continuation of the 1865 Treaty
398. Advisory Opinion on German Settlers in Poland, [19231 P.C.I.J., ser. C, No. 6.
399. Id.
400. Id. Schiffer further stated:
[1] feel bound to abide by the arguments which I have here developed; these
arguments are not, I consider, in any way shaken by the contentions of the
previous speakers.
Id. at 748.
401. Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2nd, 1865 Between China and Belgium,
[1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 8.
402. Id. at 5. See generally Revision of Expiring Treaties, 3 CHINA L. REV. 45 (1927);
Sino-Belgian Treaty, 3 CHINA L. REV. 89 (1927).
403. Chinese Reply to the Memorandum of Nov. 5, 1926, Denunciation of the Treaty
of November 2nd, 1865 Between China and Belgium, [19291 P.C.I.J., ser. C, No. 16-1,73.
404. Id. at 74.
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would have been one-sided and at the expense of China. 41 It is
reasonable to expect that China also would have raised in the Court
questions concerning the conclusion of the 1865 Treaty.
Belgium declared that under article 46 of the 1865 Treaty, it alone
had the right of renouncing the Treaty. 4°6 Article 46 gave Belgium the
right to terminate the Treaty by giving notice at least six months before
the end of each ten year period. China had no such right.
By the application of November 25th, 1926, Belgium invoked the
Court's jurisdiction and requested the application of provisional mea-
sures. 407 The Court granted them on January 8th, 1927, 408 until they
were revoked by the Court order of February 15th, 1927, after the
Chinese government 4 9 consented to a provisional regime regulating the
treatment of Belgians in China. Eventually, Belgium withdrew the
application to the Court.
In ascertaining the significance of the Denunciation of the 1865
Sino-Belgium Treaty, it is difficult to draw any broad juridical conclu-
sions in the context of the law relating to imposed treaties. In the context
of the imposed treaty problem, the awarding of provisional measures is
not significant, although for a research study of provisional measures
they may well be. The case certainly represents a missed opportunity for
the Court to fully analyze the issue under discussion, since the issue
most likely would have been presented to the Court. It was not the fault
of the Court that it was not able to adjudicate the question. The events of
the day precluded the case from being heard.
Although Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex
(1929) is one of the more widely known cases to have been decided by
the Permanent Court, 410 only the portion of Judge Negulesco's indi-
vidual opinion discussing article 19 (treaty revision) of the Versailles
Treaty is discussed here.411 The significance of this opinion is mainly
the full treatment of all matters in the case relating to article 19, includ-
ing an express reference to the article. Negulesco's opinion dissented
from the legal arguments of the Court, but adhered to them in allowing
the parties additional time to negotiate.
405. Letter from the United Chambers of Commerce of China To the Permanent
Court of International Justice, Nov. 20, 1926, id. at 283.
406. Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2nd, 1865 Between China and Belgium,
[1929] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 8.
407. Id. at 4-5.
408. Id. at 6.
409. Id. at 9.
410. Case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, [1929] P.C.I.J.,
ser. A, No. 22.
411. Id. at 28.
Vol. 7
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Switzerland, by an act of the federal Diet, had acceded to the earlier
1815 Declaration of the Powers Assembled at the Congress of Vienna in
Regard to Switzerland.41 2 This declaration was received in final form in
article 1 of the Treaty of Peace of 1815, which emerged from the
Congress of Vienna.4 13 Switzerland agreed to the withdrawal of French
customs barriers from the political frontier around Geneva.
Article 435(2) of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which Switzerland
did not sign but had partially acceded to by diplomatic notes, declared
that the 1815 arrangeiients were, "no longer consistent with present
conditions . and that it is for France and Switzerland to come to an
agreement. '414 France believed that the 1815 arrangement had been
abrogated. Switzerland opposed that interpretation. The Court accorded
the parties a period of time to negotiate a new agreement.
415
Judge Negulesco of Rumania made two arguments concerning
article 19: first, he argued that article 19 empowered the Assembly to
apply the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus;416 second, article 435 of the
Treaty of Versailles was a particular application of article 19.417
To clearly present Negulesco's arguments it is best to quote them
directly:
Article 19 of the Treaty of Versailles permits changes in
or the abrogation of a treaty which has become inapplicable
owing to a new situation having arisen; but only as a result of a
unanimous vote of the Assembly of the League of Nations
and not by means of a unilateral declaration. Article 19 of the
Treaty of Versailles therefore confirms the validity of the
clause rebus sic stantibus and at the same time rejects any
claim to apply it unilaterally.
Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles is simply the
application of this principle.
418
Negulesco's conclusion that article 19 was intended to be an
adoption of the principle rebus sic stantibus, and that only the Assembly
could apply it was incorrect. As indicated previously, article 19 called
for, at the most, only the eventual revision of a treaty. Moreover, the
Assembly had power only to recommend the reconsideration of a treaty.
Article 19 did not give the Assembly a right to revise, let alone to
terminate, a treaty.
412. Id. at 19.
413. Id.
414. Id. at 17.
415. Id. at 21.
416. Id. at 30.
417. Id.
418. Id. (emphasis added).
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As to Negulesco's conclusion that article 435 of Versailles was a
particular application of article 19, the Court explicitly rejected that
argument. The Court declared that, according to the facts, mutual state
consent was required in order to terminate the 1815 Treaty. The Court
held that the construction of article 435 and the subsequent Swiss action
did not create a Swiss acceptance of the termination. Both France and
Switzerland had undertaken merely to enter into new negotiations.
The question of treaty revision came up in the context of the 1815
Treaty which was imposed upon France as a consequence of her military
defeat. Neither the Court nor Negulesco's opinion indicated that France
or Switzerland questioned the validity of that treaty or the Peace Treaty
of 1919.
Oscar Chinn4 19 is a significant case because of the language Judge
Schiucking used in his individual opinion concerning the absolute nullity
of a treaty having a flaw in its origin, as determined by international
public policy and public morality.4 20 This case indicates that at least one
judge of the Permanent Court believed that treaties may be void because
of various problems related to their origin, even though such problems
were not enumerated.
Oscar Chinn involved an action by the United Kingdom, on behalf
of one of its citizens, against Belgium.42' The United Kingdom alleged
that Belgium had taken unfavorable action in the Congo through
changes in shipping rates which resulted in damage to British owned
shipping interests in the Congo.4 22 The Court was presented with the
problem of the validity of a subsequent multilateral treaty ab-
rogating provisions of a prior multilateral treaty that had required
unanimity of consent for any subsequent changes, when not all of the
contracting states of the first treaty consented. However, the Court did
not decide directly the question of imposed treaties.
Judge Schiicking's arguments in Oscar Chinn in 1934, were
consistent with his earlier arguments in the 1923 S. S. Wimbledon case.
In S.S. Wimbledon, he had argued that imposed treaties should be
construed restrictively against the imposer. In this case, Schijcking
contended that even if states did not question the invalidity of a
subsequent multilateral treaty, the treaty still could be void. It would be
void if it lacked the consent of all the signatories of the prior treaty,
which by its terms was not to be deviated from subsequently without
unanimity of consent .423 Schiicking thought that the case under discus-
419. Oscar Chinn Case, [1934] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 63.
420. Id. at 150.
421. Id. at 66.
422. Id. at 70.
423. Id. at 148.
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sion was similar to the regime established by article 20 of the Covenant
which obligated states not to enter into subsequent agreements inconsis-
tent with the Covenant.424
Schiicking stated that article 38(1)(a) of the Statute of the Court did
not require the Court to apply conventions "which it knows to be
invalid." 425 Schiicking further stated that in general, the Court would
never apply a treaty which was contrary to international law. He pointed
out that the Court would find itself in the same position if a treaty had "a
flaw in its origin," which would make it null and void426 as a matter of
"international public policy. "427 This was the situation even if a treaty
was made applicable by a special agreement authorizing the Court to
exercise its jurisdiction. Although SchUcking in Oscar Chinn did not
specifically refer to imposed treaties, his language certainly could have
encompassed that concept, especially in light of the Covenant's inten-
tion to regulate the use of military force by states.
Schiicking's full statement, for purposes of completeness and
clarity, is given below:
The Court would never, for instance apply a convention
the terms of which were contrary to public morality. But, in
my view, a tribunal finds itself in the same position if a
convention advanced by the parties is in reality null and void,
owing to a flaw in its origin. The attitude of the tribunal
should, in my opinion, be governed in such a case by consider-
ations of international public policy, even when jurisdiction is
conferred on the Court by virtue of a Special Agreement.
428
The significance of the 1937 River Meuse case 429 is noteworthy in
that the Permanent Court of International Justice discussed as a principle
of interpretation the equality of treaty obligations. The Court held that it
would interpret a treaty, if at all possible, as creating equal obligations.
Moreover, it would interpret an obligation in terms of the actual effect of
the treaty provisions. River Meuse indicated that unequal treaty provi-
sions are valid.
In River Meuse, the Netherlands as the applicant brought the action
against Belgium.430 In the memorial, counter-memorial, rejoinder and
reply, both countries argued that the 1863 Belgium-Netherlands Treaty
had been violated.43'
424. Id. at 149.
425. Id. at 150.
426. Id.
427. Id.
I428. d. (emphasis added).
429. The Diversion of Water from the River Meuse, [1937] P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 70.
430. Id. at 6.
431. Id. at 6-9.
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The 1863 Treaty created obligations on both parties to limit their
taking of water from the River Meuse for purposes of feeding the Dutch
and Belgian canal systems. Even though the Netherlands, the applicant,
argued that Belgium had a more extensive obligation, the Netherlands
contended that the Treaty was valid. The Court, having actually visited
several cities involved in the case, concluded that both parties had
similar obligations 432 and that the claims of both parties were
ill-founded.
The individual opinion of Judge Altamira argued that the obliga-
tions contained in the 1863 Treaty were both equal as stated and equal in
their operation.4 33 He concluded:
In this interpretation of the 1863 Treaty, I have been at
pains to state by an analysis of its articles the express or
implied obligations contained in each of them. The Treaty
does not seem to me to impose any other obligation upon
either Party.
434
The individual opinion of Judge Hudson concluded that the opera-
tion by Belgium and the Netherlands of the locks on the Meuse, "in law
as well as in fact," was not in violation of the 1863 Treaty. 435 Hudson
further concluded that both parties had assumed identical treaty obliga-
tions.4 36 He argued that, as a principle of equity, even if there were a
violation of a treaty by one party, the other party should not be permitted
to take advantage of it."'
Both Altamira and Hudson contended that the actual treaty obliga-
tions involved in the case were equal. Hudson went further and
discussed the possible non-performance of such obligations. The sig-
nificance of these two views and the decision of the Court lies in the fact
that none of them dealt with the consequences of unequal obligations, let
alone obligations imposed by military force, even though the Nether-
lands had actually pleaded the existence of unequal obligation as a valid
basis for Court enforcement of the treaty.438
In addition to the holdings of the Permanent Court, international
jurisprudence on the rule of imposed treaties includes a case of interna-
432. Id. at 32.
433. Id. at 39-40.
434. Id. at 43.
435. Id. at 75.
436. Id. at 77.
437. Id. Hudson quoted the following Anglo-American maxim, "Equality is equity."
Id. He also stated that -[A] tribunal bound by international law ought not to shrink from
applying a principle of such obvious fairness." Id.
438. The Treaty was not viewed by any party as imposed.
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tional arbitration. The 1931 Salem Case4 39 was an international arbitra-
tion involving the United States and Egypt during the inter-war period.
It explicitly denied the existence of a rule of treaty law which declared
unequal treaties to be unlawful.440 The Tribunal was presented with the
application of a capitulation treaty, but neither the parties nor the
Tribunal discussed the treaty as being imposed.
Salem involved George Salem, a naturalized American citizen441
who had been born in Egypt. 42 He was criminally prosecuted in a local
Egyptian court and found not guilty. 4 3 He then brought an action for
damages in a mixed court and lost.' The United States brought this
action against Egypt for a denial of justice."
5
The United States argued that the bringing of the criminal action,
excessive delay and the holding of certain legal papers, such as a
property deed, constituted a denial of the international standard of
justice.'4 The United States also argued that there was a violation of the
United States-Turkey Treaty of 1830, to which Egypt had acceded as an
independent state.
By the Special Agreement of January 20, 1931, an arbitral tribunal
was authorized, and, under the Agreement, Walter Simons of Germany,
Fred K. Nielsen of the United States and Abdel Pasha of Egypt were
appointed.448
In defense against the United States' allegations, Egypt argued that
international law did not recognize a "one-sided agreement," referring
to the 1830 Treaty."49 The Egyptian government argued the following:
In as much [sic] as the pecuniary claim of the American
Government is based on an alleged violation of the Treaty of
1830 between the United States and Turkey, such a claim is
not well founded in international law.
This treaty confers a unilateral right on the United States.
Now, according to established principles of international law,
no pecuniary claim for damages can be based on such a
one-sided agreement. 50
439. Salem Case (United States v. Egypt), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1163(1932); 5 Ann.
Dig. 188.
440. Id. at 1194.
441. Id. at 1164.
442. Id. at 1165.
443. Id. at 1169.
444. Id. at 1177.
445. Id. at 1163.
446. Id. at 1174.
447. Id. at 1175.
448. Id. at 1163, 1165.
449. Id. at 1179.
450. Id.
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The Tribunal rejected this defense by Egypt.45 1 It stated that the body of
rules constituting international law did not contain a rule declaring
unequal or unilateral treaties to be unlawful.45 2 In rejection of this
Egyptian defense, the Tribunal stated:
The Egyptian Government considers the pecuniary claim
to be inadmissible because the treaty on which the alleged
violation capitulation rights of the United States are based,
namely, the Treaty of 1830 with Turkey, granted the United
States unilateral rights and because, according to interna-
tional law, no claim for money in respect of violation of such a
one-sided agreement could be entertained. The Arbitral Tri-
bunal cannot acknowledge the existence of such an interna-
tional rule; it will always depend upon the circumstances
whether compensation in money can be claimed in respect of
the violation of a valid treaty, even if it be unilateral."3
The Tribunal stated that the 1830 Treaty was not "a purely
unilateral agreement. ,45 The treaty provided that the consular jurisdic-
tion granted to the United States would oblige the consular courts to
conform to the same standard of efficiency as the local jurisdiction.
455
The Tribunal concluded that the treaty was lawful, holding unequal
treaties to be lawful agreements. It did not believe that a "less than
purely" unequal treaty was invalid. The Tribunal found no denial of
justice and then held on Egypt's behalf.
456
While Salem did not mention imposed treaties, it is important for
an analysis of the case to mention them. The 1830 Treaty, like many
capitulation treaties of the nineteenth century in the Near East and North
Africa, has been viewed often as being imposed. Yet, invalidity based
upon a rule of treaty law proscribing imposed treaties was not alleged by
Egypt. Egypt did not argue that the 1830 Treaty was invalid because of
the illegal use of force. Egypt argued that the treaty was invalid only
because of the unequal obligations contained in the Treaty. One may
conclude that from the failure even to invoke such a rule, Egypt did not
believe such a rule existed.
2. National Jurisprudence. National jurisprudence generally
accepted the traditional rule. The national jurisprudence of the inter-war
era held that imposed treaties were to be restrictively interpreted in favor
of the vanquished state.
451. Id. at 1194.
452. Id.
453. Id. (emphasis added).
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 1203.
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In Austrian jurisprudence, Yugoslav Liquidations 57 was a 1934
municipal case decided by the Austrian Supreme Court which held that
an imposed treaty was subject to a restrictive rule of treaty interpreta-
tion.458 The Court also held that such a treaty was a valid agreement.459
The case involved an action by an Austrian national also having
Yugoslav nationality, against a Yugoslav bank in Austria. 460 He alleged
a wrongful liquidation by the bank of his property in Yugoslavia. The
liquidation was based upon article 249(b) of the Treaty of St. Germain
which authorized the liquidation by Allied countries of the property of
former enemy nationals. The plaintiff alleged that his dual nationality
precluded the operation of article 249(b), because the article did not
apply to dual nationals. The lower court and the Supreme Court held
against the plaintiff. 46'
The Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff that the treaty was to
be interpreted strictly. 462 However, it held that the lower court was not
guilty of "a too wide interpretation."' 463 The Supreme Court went on to
say that although the treaty was dictated, it must be viewed as an
agreement. It also stated that it is the intent of both the victors and of
Austria at the time the treaty was made which must be determined. The
Supreme Court stated the following:
Since [the Treaty of St. Germain], although for the most
part representing the dictates of the Allied and Associated
Powers, is nevertheless to be regarded as being in essence an
agreement, we must look not only to the will of the victor
States but also to the discoverable intention of Austria
464
The Supreme Court concluded that article 249(b) was clear, it did not
exclude dual nationals, and Austria was obligated to enforce it." 5
Yugoslav Liquidations technically serves only as evidence of the
then existing rule of treaty law, rather than as a source of it. By the terms
of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice and of the
existing International Court, national jurisprudence is only a subsidiary
means of determining international law. Even with this limitation,
457. Treaty of St. Germain (Yugoslav Liquidations) Case, 7 Ann. Dig. 296 (Supreme
Court of Austria 1934).
458. Id. at 297.
459. Id. at 296.
460. Id.
461. Id.
462. Id. at 297. "This Court agrees with the contention of the appellant that the Treaty
of St. Germain is 'to be interpreted strictly.' " Id.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 297-98 (emphasis added).
465. Id. at 298.
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Yugoslav Liquidations is significant in that it is consistent with the
international jurisprudence of that period.
Without giving too much value to wartime German jurisprudence,
R & G v. Hochbahn A. G. & FR.466 (1941) implicitly upheld the validity
of the 1938 union of Austria with Germany, but held that the German
Civil Code was not intended to be introduced into Austria.4 67 The
German Supreme Court did not blindly apply the relevant legal instru-
ments in a broad manner. It looked at the situation and decided that the
German Civil Code was not intended to replace the Austrian Civil Code
even though other German legislation had been made applicable in
Austria.
E. Summary of the Inter- War Era
An analysis of doctrine, state practice, international legislation,
and international and national jurisprudence during the inter-war period
indicates the continued existence of the rule of treaty law recognizing
the validity of treaties imposed upon states without their consent. Some
discontent appeared during this period, but it certainly did not crystallize
into a new rule of treaty law which proclaimed the vitiating effect in
treaty-making of the threat or use of military force against a state.
Doctrine for the most part favored the traditional rule, but some
writers proclaimed a new standard. Treaty practice, while inconsistent,
showed the beginnings of the development of a new rule of law.
International legislation, while limiting the recourse to war, did not
formulate an explicit rule of treaty law which would have acted as a
corollary of that prohibition. Neither international nor national jurispru-
derice rejected the traditional rule even though a number of decisions
concerned some propositions closely related to the traditional rule.
III. POST-WORLD WAR II: A NEW RULE IS RECOGNIZED AND CODIFIED
Events from 1945 to 1975 have contributed to the further develop-
ment and crystallization of a rule against imposed treaties, based upon
the principle of sovereign equality, its derivative rule of state consent,
and the general prohibition against the use of force in international
relations.
A. Doctrine
Western writers in the post-war era have discussed the concept of
imposed treaties only in passing, and treatment of the subject by
466. Judgment of April 4, 1941, 167 RGZ 1; 14 Ann. Dig. 104 (Supreme Court of
Austria 1941).
467. Id. at 106.
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Communist writers has been restricted to a very general level. It is only
more recently that greater consideration has been given to this topic,
primarily as a result of the adoption of article 52 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.
A most interesting characteristic of the writings of the post-World
War II era is that while many writers agree that a new rule exists
prohibiting the use of military force in the conclusion of treaties, several
others deny this. Moreover, among those writers who do accept the new
rule, there is a lack of consensus on virtually all of its aspects.
The points of dispute among the writers are reflected in their
answers to the following questions: Does a rule against imposed treaties
exist? What type of force is unlawful-economic or military? Does the
existing rule also outlaw all "unequal" treaties? What is the theoretical
basis of the rule?
The following brief discussion of three recent commentators
clearly demonstrates the diversity of issues included in this subject area.
In a recent study, Arie David makes several general observations
on unilateral treaty termination.468 David notes that the general prob-
lem of unilateral treaty termination is "monstrously complex," 469 and
contends that the problem is not susceptible to simple yes-or-no an-
swers.470 He decries the fact that many writers have crossed off the
problem as having no solution, and have studied other subjects.47'
In a recent article, Professor Briggs also discusses unilateral treaty
termination.472 He does so in the context of three cases decided by the
468. A. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION-LAWFUL BREACHES AND
RETALIATIONS xi, 301-312 (1975) [hereinafter cited as DAVID], reviewed, Murphy, 70 AM. J.
INT'L L. 161 (1976).
469. DAVID, supra note 468, at xi.
470. Id.
471. Id.
[T]he problem of unilateral termination in modern times is monstrously
complex . . . . The problem is not susceptible to traditionally neat, simple,
yes-or-no legal answers. Thus, a great many writers in international law have
crossed the problem of unilateral termination out of their books and marked it
"no solution•"
* . . Modern writers, rather than face the problem and try to provide more
effective answers, for the most part have professed disillusionment and have
withdrawn to other subjects.
Id. David was not much concerned about the equality of the terms of a treaty; he adhered
to a "contextual" approach.
Although the terms of a particular treaty may be unbalanced, the seemingly
disadvantaged party may still be deriving benefits for the transaction from other
transactions between the parties.
Id. at 302.
472. Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the
International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 51 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Briggs].
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International Court of Justice in the 1970's. 473 He concludes that recent
jurisprudence has been helpful in consolidating, for the first time, some
law on unilateral treaty termination.4 74 Unfortunately, he refers only in
passing to the element of duress.475
A recently published work on the general problem of imposed
treaties discusses state succession in the context of state practice relating
to unequal treaties. 47 6 Lung-Fong Chen analyzes state practice and
devolution agreements and concludes that no separate rule exists as to
state succession and unequal treaties.477
Chen defines unequal treaties in categories similar to those con-
tained in this article.478 He also reaches a conclusion similar to that of
this work, regarding the nature of the existing rule against imposed
treaties. He defines a treaty as unequal if either military or economic
coercion is used as a strategy in concluding it. 479 However, he concludes
that a rule of treaty law exists only against the use of military coer-
cion.48° While he does not use the term "imposed treaties," Chen
argues that only such treaties are prohibited, rather than all unequal
473. Advisory Opinion on South West Africa, [1971] I.C.J. 16; Appeal Relating to
I.C.A.O. Council, [1972] I.C.J. 46, noted in 14 HARV. INT'L L.J. 612 (1973); Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland)
[1973] I.C.J. 3 (merits).
474. Briggs, supra note 472, at 68.
475. Briggs argued that even though ICAO Council and Fisheries Jurisdiction
involved jurisdictional clauses, the larger implications should not be overlooked. Id. at 67.
476. L. CHEN, STATE SUCCESSION RELATING TO UNEQUAL TREATIES (1974).
477. Id. at 235.
Since the special characteristics of unequal treaties in cases of state
succession have not been generally recognized and treated distinctly, the
practice regarding state succession to unequal treaties and the rules adopted by
the states in this area are inconsistent and confusing.
Id.
[R]egarding state succession to unequal treaties. . . there is no universally
accepted legal rule.
Id. at 239.
478. Id. at 37-38, 49.
479. Id. at 47.
480. Id. at 40. Chen summarizes the arguments for and against excluding the concepts
of economic and political force from being included in a definition of the term "force."
The arguments for the restrictive view are: 1) the drafting of article 2(4) precluded it; 2)
economic and political coercion is too vague; 3) it is too difficult to apply the concepts of
economic and political coercion; 4) the application of this position would undermine pacta
sunt servanda. The arguments for the broad view are: I) there is no need to rely upon the
legislative history of article 2(4); 2) the vagueness of the concepts of political and
economic force is no excuse; 3) there is no need to rely upon an obsolete concept of force;
4) there is a need to uphold the sovereign equality of states; 5) there is a need for the
beneficial effects of applying this view; 6) the necessary procedural safeguards exist. Id.
at 42-46.
[l]t is controversial whether political and economic strategies can serve as
criteria for characterizing a treaty unequal.
Id. at 40 (footnotes omitted).
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treaties. However, unlike the present writer, Chen argues that the rule
against militarily imposed treaties already existed in 1919, at the time of
the Covenant.48' Chen suggests that a broader competence ought to be
given to the International Court of Justice in the 1970's.482 This
contention is a conventional response of writers in many fields of
international law. 483
1. Recent Doctoral Theses. Three recent'doctoral theses are of
particular interest. A recent Swedish LL.D. thesis deals specifically
with the problem of imposed treaties. An Oxford D. Phil. thesis discuss-
es state sovereignty484 and state consent, and an American J.S.D. thesis
discusses jus cogens.485 The first thesis is the most significant. The other
two make relevant observations, while analyzing propositions closely
related to the rule against imposed treaties.
F Nozari. This LL.D thesis, UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, 486 was completed in 1971 at the Institute of International
Law at the University of Stockholm. In the text, Nozari defined
"unequal" to mean "imposed", and to include both military and
economic force.
Nozari spends much of his effort distinguishing his definition of
imposed treaties from clausula rebus sic stantibus,487 and discussing
pacta sunt servanda and a host of other basic aspects of treaty law. Only
at the end of his thesis does he address the question of treaties made in
connection with war.
488
Nozari concludes that an unequal treaty is:
[A] treaty which, through the application of direct or indirect
pressure, is imposed, wholly or partly, by a powerful State on
a weaker State-a situation which is the consequence of a
481. Id. at 41.
482. Id. at 241.
483. See generally Higgins, The Desirability of Third-Party Adjudication: Conven-
tional Wisdom or Continuing Truth Z in INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION-LAW IN MOVE-
MENT 37 (J. Fawcett & R. Higgins eds. 1974).
484. K. Hossain, State Sovereignty and the U.N. Charter, (1964) (unpublished D.
Phil. thesis at Oxford University).
485. C. Rosenstein-Rozakis, The Peremptory Norms of General International Law
(Jus Cogens) Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, (1973) (unpublished
J.S.D. thesis at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign). For a recently published
bibliography on treaty law, see Saxena, Select Recent Bibliography on Law of Treaties,
1960-73, 13 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 668 (1973). For annual bibliographies on treaty law see the
United Nations Juridical Yearbook; Bibliography on the Selected Articles on International
Public Law (International Law Departrpent, Institute of International Politics and
Economics, Yugoslavia).
486. F. NOZARI, UNEQUAL TREATIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1971) [hereinafter cited
as NOZARI].
487. NOZARI, supra note 486, at 134.
488. Id. at 274.
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State [sic] of inequality. . . . Inequality can be either politi-
cal or legal, or both legal and political at the same time. The
pressure applied by the powerful State can be physical, social,
economic or political, all depending on circumstances in every
specific case.
48 9
In Nozari's view, it is the unlawful force, economic or military,
which makes a treaty unequal. "The object or the substance of a treaty
cannot alone establish criterion for inequality." 49 It is this element of
force, rather than the unequal provisions in a treaty, which makes a
treaty invalid.
Concerning the terms "unjust", "unequitable", and
"leonine" treaties, it is suggested that these terms define, in
principle, the object and the substance of unequal treaties.
Such terms cannot thus be used interchangeably with the term
"unequal treaty". 491
A significant aspect of Nozari's effort is his inclusion of relevant
state practice as an important factor in analyzing the prevailing interna-
tional rule. He discusses a number of events, as does this writer, but
omits many important examples, including the 1938 and 1968
Czechslovakian Agreements.
K. Hossain. This Oxford University D.Phil. thesis, State
Sovereignty and the U.N. Charter, does not discuss imposed treaties,
but does discuss certain directly related propositions,4 92 including both
the "consent rule ' 493 and the "rule of restrictive interpretation of
treaties" as pertinent to all treaties. 494 Hossain believes that the former
exists while the latter does not.495 He argues that these rules are
489. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
It is submitted that by the term "unequal treaty" is meant a treaty which,
through the application of direct or indirect pressure, is imposed wholly or
partly, by a powerful State upon a weaker State.
Id. at 169.
490. Id. at 120.
491. Id. at 121.
The inclusion of Articles 52 [prohibition of the threat or use of force] and 53
[rules of jus cogensl in the Convention on the Law of Treaties, can be
considered a great advancement in the progressive codification of international
law in general, and in the recognition of the norm "unequal treaty" in particular.
Id. at 243. However, unequal treaties might not be invalid. Id. at 298. "It should be
mentioned that the term "unequal treaty" has never been subject of a discussion in any
international tribunal." Id. at 114.
492. See note 484, supra.
493. Id. at 138-86. See also Kozai, UN Peace-Keeping Operations: the 'Consent
Principle' Reconsidered, 69 . INT'L L. & DIP'L, 409 (1971) (in Japanese with English
summary).
494. Id. at 244-308.
495. Id. at 149-50. "This view [restrictive treaty interpretation], however, is not
borne out by practice." He argued that the competing principle of effectiveness has been
applied in preference to the principle of restrictive treaty interpretation. Id. at 150.
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subsumed under the general principle of sovereign equality as enun-
ciated in article 2(1) of the Charter,496 and he concludes that a restrictive
rule of interpretation has not in fact been sustained by the practice of the
United Nations.
Rosenstein-Rozakis. This 1973 thesis, The Peremptory Norms of
General International Law (Jus Cogens) Under the Vienna Convention
of the Law of Treaties, does not directly discuss imposed treaties, but
does make an observation significant to their analysis.4 97 The author
suggests that certain provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties have "faded" some of the differences between interna-
tional law and domestic law.498 In particular, he argues that the jus
cogens rule is such a provision.4 99 Traditionally, states were allowed to
create any substantive inter-se rule, but now this right has been
limited. 500
This writer believes that article 52 brings international and domes-
tic law closer together by prohibiting force as a permissible means of
bringing about agreements between subjects of the international legal
order. In domestic law, proof of direct threat of physical harm will
vitiate the consent of a party to a contract. The same principle now exists
in international law.
50 1
2. Western Writers. Western writers continued to reject the
existence of a new rule, and even today, they are very cautious. The
views presented here are in chronological order as they appeared from
the immediate beginning of the post-war era to thirty years later in 1975.
With a few exceptions, the writings of authors on article 52 of the 1969
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and on the work of the
International Law Commission are presented later in this work.
Ross (Danish). In 1947, Professor Alf Ross of the University of
Copenhagen, Denmark, in A TEXT BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
accepted the traditional view. 5°2 Surprisingly, he did not even mention
the then recently concluded United Nations Charter. He accepted the
view that all imposed treaties are valid.
It is generally recognized that compulsion exercised
against a state (war) does not render a treaty invalid. On the
496. Id. at 149-50.
497. See note 485, supra.
498. Id. at 1.
499. Id. at 9.
500. Id. at 1.
501. Id. at 9.
502. A. Ross, A TEXTBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 210 (1947).
79
Malawer: Imposed Treaties and International Law
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
contrary view no peace treaty would be valid under Interna-
tional Law.
50 3
Keeton (British). G.W. Keeton, the Dean of the Faculty of Law at
University College, London, in his 1948 lecture at the Hague Academy
of International Law, discussed the problem of extraterritoriality." He
treated imposed treaties as an aspect of that problem, but remarkably,
still argued that use of force against a state was irrelevant .505
Keeton discussed the 1842 Treaty of Nanking and the 1858
Treaties of Tientsin which concluded respectively the first and second
Anglo-Chinese Wars. 50 6 He also discussed the first capitulation treaties
with Turkey, which were agreed upon at the height of Turkish power.
Even if [imposed treaties] were not [freely concluded], it
is unquestioned international law that a treaty obtained by the
exercise of pressure by one state upon another, even at the
end of a war, is nonetheless binding.50 7
Fitzmaurice (British). Also lecturing in 1948, to the Hague
Academy of International Law, Fitzmaurice, then Deputy-Legal
Advisor to the British Foreign Office, contended that a new rule had
emerged. 50 8
In the ordinary way, the mere fact that a State is under a
political or military necessity to sign a given treaty. . . does
not affect the validity of the treaty. . . . [A]n aggressive war
must now be regarded as an international wrong, and logically
therefore the rule . . . should perhaps be regarded as mod-
ified, so as to except the case of a peace treaty imposed by a
victorious aggressor.
5°9
Fitzmaurice suggested that if the war were "wrong" under interna-
tional law, no consequences ought to flow to the wrongdoer. 510 An
aggressor would be such a wrongdoer. However, a peace treaty would
be imposable by the victim of the aggression on the aggressor.
511
Fitzmaurice did not offer any supporting evidence for these views, and
he recognized that his views were not thoroughly thought out.
503. Id.
504. Keeton, Extraterritoriality in International and Comparative Law, 72 RECUEIL
DES COURs 285, 350 (1948).
505. Id.
506. Id.
507. Id. See also Keeton, The Revision Clauses in Certain Chinese Treaties, 10 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. I1, 119-21 (1929).
508. Fitzmaurice, The Juridical Clauses of the Peace Treaties, 73 RECUEIL DES COURS
255, 355 (1948).
509. Id. (emphasis added).
510. Id.
511. Id. at 356.
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This is a subject the full implications of which will have to
be worked out, and the writer is only concerned to draw
attention to it and makes no claim that the view suggested is
necessarily correct in all aspects.
512
Fenwick (American). Charles Fenwick, in his 1951 lecture to the
Hague Academy of International Law, discussed the progress of inter-
national law."1 3 He accepted the view that where military force against a
state is used or threatened, a resulting treaty is invalid.51 4
Fenwick focused on the situation in which no military force was
used, but in which the bargaining positions of the states involved were
so widely separated and the result so unfair as to shock world public
opinion. He contended that these circumstances should be taken into
consideration only when interpreting a treaty.
515
Lauterpacht (British). Professor H. Lauterpacht in 1954, in the
BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, discussed the law of war
and reinforced the view he had expressed in the 1930's, that a new rule
of treaty law probably had emerged.516 While his earlier view seems to
have been premature, his writings in the 1950's corresponded more
closely with the prevailing system. In 1954, Lauterpacht, like Fitz-
maurice, 517 argued that "a peace treaty imposed by the victorious
aggressor has no legal validity."- 518 However, both Lauterpacht, and
Fitzmaurice, failed to explain whether a validly imposed peace treaty
was subject to limitations, which obligations might be imposed, or the
exact nature of the invalidity of an unlawfully imposed peace treaty.
519
Professor Lauterpacht in editing OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1955), indicated that although his views as expressed in the 1930's
were not then widely accepted, a new rule had "probably" developed
since the Charter.52 He indicated that this was only a rule of conven-
tional law and not customary international law, and that if the aggressor
512. Id.
513. Fenwick, The Progress of International Law During the Past Forty Years, 79
RECUEIL DES COURS 1 (1951).
514. Id. at 50.
515. Id. at 51.
Obviously any attempt to annul a treaty on the mere ground that it proves to
be to the disadvantage of one of the parties could not be permitted without
undermining the principle itself of good faith.
Id.
516. Lauterpacht, The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War, 30 BRIT Y.B. INT'L
L. 228 n.l (1953).
517. Supra note 508.
518. See Lauterpacht, supra note 516, at 233.
519. I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 891 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955).
520. Id. at 892.
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were not a party to the Charter, then only the traditional rule might be
applicable. 521
Schwarzenberger (British). In 1955, Georg Schwarzenberger,
while delivering the basic course in international law at the Hague
Academy of International Law, provided a theoretical basis for the rule
against imposed treaties, and contended that the rule was derived from
the principle of state consent.
522
Schwarzenberger argued that the Kellogg Pact and the U.N.
Charter had "radically" changed the traditional rule, 523 and that the
principle of state consent was an important principle of international
law. 5
24
de Visscher (Belgian). Professor de Visscher in the 1957 English
edition of his treatise, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW, rejected the view that treaties imposed by an unjust aggression are
invalid.525
De Visscher contended that although some treaties, particularly
peace treaties, are concluded under pressure ,526 "[p]ositive interna-
tional law nevertheless holds them valid.' '527 He believed that this
validity could not be explained by moral principles5 28 and that this
situation emphasizes the unfortunate but primitive nature of interna-
tional law. International law has to reckon with force and the phenome-
non that only states utilizing force are capable of establishing order,
even if this works to the detriment of other legitimate interests.
529
De Visscher concluded that despite recent efforts in defining
521. Id.
In so far as the victorious State was not bound by either of these instru-
ments, or if resort to war on its part was not in violation of them, there is room
for the continuance of the traditional rule disregarding the vitiating effect of
physical coercion exercised against a State.
Id.
522. Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87
RECUEIL DES COURS 193, 265-67 (1955). He also analyzed the problem of imposed treaties
by emphasizing the historical tendency to employ them as a pretext for new hostilities.
Medieval international law abounds with picturesque incidents culminating
in treaties which were concluded under duress and disregarded if possible at the
earliest opportunity on the excuse of duress. At the same time, early practice
was fully conscious of the possibly vitiating effect of duress and compulsion of
treaties.
Id. at 265.
523. Id. at 266.
524. Id. at 289. He further contends that imposed treaties are void. Id. at 266, 270.
525. C. DE VISSCHER, THEORY AND REALITY IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 247 (P.
Corbett transl. 1957).
526. Id.
527. Id. at 246.
528. Id.
529. Id. at 247.
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aggression, no consensus as to its essential nature had been achieved,
and the prevailing nebulous concept of aggression "could not constitute
a cause of nullity in law. "530 It was this point which was essential to de
Visscher. If a well established definition existed, then the nullity of an
agreement resulting from aggression should be recognized.
53'
McNair (British). Lord McNair in THE LAW OF TREATIES, pub-
lished in 1961, was one of the first writers of the early 1960's to suggest
that treaties imposed by military force are illegal. 532 He did not contend,
however, that unequal bargaining position was alone sufficient to render
a treaty illegal. 533 Lord McNair argued that it should be "the duty of an
international tribunal to scrutinize closely the circumstances in which a
treaty . . . was concluded. . . [where a] party's consent [was secured]
by means of the illegal use or threat of force."
534
On the general problem of coercion of states and treaties, Lord
McNair accurately and succinctly described the state of the law of the
early 1960's: "[T]here exists abundant literary authority, a little dip-
lomatic authority, and almost no judicial authority" in support of the
rule against imposed treaties. 13 He also pointed out,
[T]hat in no case did any of the defeated Powers [of World
War II] allege that an armistice agreement or a treaty was not
binding upon it because its consent had been obtained by
force or the threat of force .... 116
Jennings (British). Jennings, in 1967, in the general course on
principles of international law at the Hague Academy of International
Law, made an observation very relevant to this study .5 7 In discussing
an early draft of article 52 prepared by the International Law Commis-
sion, Jennings stated in reference to the definition of "force" and its
application in a particular situation, that in "the end the field is likely to
be open to subjective assertion and counter-assertion.'" 538 His lecture
discloses his concern with the inability of the international community
to formulate a practical rule, free of ambiguity.
O'Connell (New Zealand). D.P. O'Connell, the Chichele Profes-
530. Id.
531. Even though article 14 of the Charter does not explicity refer to treaty revision,
de Visscher argued that it is essentially similar to article 19 of the Covenant. Id. at 323.
This view is similar to the one this writer develops.
532. LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 210 (1961).
533. Id.
534. Id. The same may be said of domestic tribunals.
535. Id. at 207.
536. Id. at 209.
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sor of Law at All Soul's College, Oxford University, wrote in 1970, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW that "it is more difficult to agree that a treaty is
vitiated if one of the contracting States signs it under pressure." He
believed the Munich Agreement of 1938 to be invalid, 539 and stated that
the subsequent Czech-German Treaty of March 1939 was "probably"
invalid because of the then physical occupation of Czechoslovakia.
540
O'Connell pointed out that certain countries, including the United
Kingdom and Switzerland, had initially recognized the validity of their
existing treaties with Nazi Germany, and the extension of those treaties,
in 1938, to apply to annexed Austria and, in 1939, to certain provinces
of Czechoslovakia. 541 He characterized article 52 of the 1969 Vienna
Convention as "a blank cheque to States seeking escape from inconve-
nient treaty commitments.' '542
Brownlie (British). Ian Brownlie, in 1968, merely identified the
problem of imposed treaties in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF
FORCE BY STATES .543 His treatise did not discuss the effect of the case of
military force in concluding treaties, but simply presented the basic
anomaly in the area of imposed treaties: the law of war in the twentieth
century has developed so as to limit the use of force, while the law of
treaties has lagged behind. He implicitly requested further study by
observing that jurists "have avoided any detailed examination of the
problems involved. "
Sztucki (Swedish). Jerzy Sztucki in his treatise on jus cogens and
the 1969 Vienna Convention, made several valuable observations on the
general problem of the validity of treaties.5 45 Sztucki contended that the
invalidity of a treaty is in essence a "question of a legal construction in a
legal system . . . it is also the question of possible appropriate legal
action bringing about specific legal results on specific established
grounds. ' ' 546 He also urged the determination of the actual juridical
significance of a void treaty. He contended that the pronouncement of a
treaty as void did not preclude legal effects, but mandated an investiga-
539. 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 239 ('2d ed. 1970).
540. Id. at 240.
541. Switzerland's extension was in 1942 during the early part of World War II. Id. at
380.
542. Id. at 240. See also 2 D. O'CONNELL, STATE SUCCESSION IN MUNICIPAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (1967). Here O'Connell argued: "It is evident that the hypothesis
that generally treaties lapse on independence or union must be rejected."
543. 1. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES viii (1968).
544. Id. at 405. See also I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 594
(2d ed. 1973).
545. J. SZTUCKI, JUS COGENS ANDTHE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES
(1974).
546. Id. at 190.
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tion into what the effects may be. 547
He believed that "a margin of freedom" ought to be left to the
states in ascertaining legal effect in an otherwise invalid treaty. He also
noted that there unfortunately was only "extremely scarce international
practice" with regard to the problem.548 Sztucki concluded his analysis
in 1974, with an invitation to scholars to undertake additional relevant
research.
3. Non- Western Writers. Non-Western writers have generally
accepted the principle that imposed treaties are void, although some
have not. Only a few such writers have contended that the use of
economic force alone will also invalidate international agreements.
Communist writers go beyond the above views and declare that treaties
are invalid, even though they do not involve the unlawful use of either
military or economic force, when they contain provisions which are
unilateral on their face or in their operation.
These writers are divided into two groups: those from Communist
states (Eastern European) and those from non-Communist, less
developed states. The views of Soviet and Chinese writers are presented
separately in later discussion.
a. Communist Writers (Eastern European).
Herczech (Hungarian). In 1969, the Hungarian jurist, Geza Her-
czech, in GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER, discussed unequal treaties only in a brief footnote. 549 Herczech
believed the principle of not recognizing unequal treaties to be a jus
cogens, and unequal treaties to be invalid because they conflict with the
principles of sovereign equality of states and the right of self-
determination. Moreover, unequal treaties are not to be held valid under
pacta sunt servanda.
Herczech's dual view, that the principle of unequal treaties is a
limitation on pacta sunt servanda, and that it is based upon the more
general principle of sovereign equality of states, is a theme running
through the writings of many authors from Communist and lesser
developed states.
Dabrowa (Polish). In 1969, the Polish writer, Slawomir Dabrowa,
547. Id. at 192.
548. Id. at 193. A Yugloslav writer in 1960, asserted the legal validity of the 1940 Nazi
imposed treaty on Norway. Dedijer, Legal Character of the Capitulation of Norwegian
Armed Forces on June 10, 1940, NORDISK TIDSSKRIFT FOR INT'L RET. 39, 40 (1960).
549. G. HERCZEGH, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
ORDER 73 n.60 (1969).
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analyzed Polish treaty practice and Poland's pre-war treaties550 in the
context of the recently concluded 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties."' Dabrowa argued that the problem of state succession of
Communist regimes to prior treaties has not been colored by the doctrine
of unequal treaties.
Bierzanek (Polish). Bierzanek, another Polish writer, criticized
American international law writers, especially political scientists, as
deprecating the function of international law and rejecting the need for
fundamental change. 552 He argued that there is a need for the codifica-
tion of the legal principle of peaceful coexistence, presumably including
a rule against unequal treaties. He did not attempt to define the concept
"unequal treaty," nor did he comment on its extent, nature, effect, or
theoretical basis. 
553
b. Non- Western Writers (Lesser Developed Countries).
Salonga (Philippines). Salonga, Professor of International Law at
the Far Eastern University in the Philippines, in 1966, rejected the
existence of a new rule and also the views of writers which supported
such a new rule.
554
However, where the duress is not against the person of
the negotiator but against the State itself, the treaty is not
thereby rendered invalid. Thus, a dictated treaty, such as a
peace treaty imposed by the victor upon the vanquished State,
has been regarded as valid legally as one entered into freely on
both sides.
555
Varghese (Pakistan). In 1952, the Pakistani legal writer, Payap-
pilly Itty Varghese, accepted the view that imposed treaties are not
valid.556 In his opinion, a manifestation of consent should be required,
which "must be a free expressed consent of the contracting parties." ,557
Varghese stated the following:
In all wars of conquest the treaties are imposed ones and
cannot be said to be valid.
58
Mookerjea (Indian). In 1968, an Indian legal scholar, Sobhanlal
550. Dabrowa, The Polish People's Republic and International Treaties Concluded by
Poland Before the [sic] World War II, 2 POLISH Y.B. INT'L L. 50 (1969).
551. Id. at 61.
552. Bierzanek, Legal Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Their Codification, I
POLISH Y.B. INT'L L. 17, 43 (1967).
553. See also M. JIRASEK, PRINCIPLES OF THE OLD AND NEW ORGANIZATION OF THE
WORLD (1945); notes 7-8 supra.
554. J. SALONGA & P. YAP, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 295 (3d ed. 1966).
555. Id.
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Mookerjea, accepted the newer rule.5" 9 Mookerjea stated that if force is
used against a state, the resulting treaty is void. 560 He illustrated his
proposition by pointing out that the Dolai Lama had declared the
Sino-Tibetan Treaty invalid, as being concluded under duress.
56 1
Mahajan (Indian). In 1973, another Indian legal scholar, Vidya
Dhar Mahajan, in PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, contended that not all
peace treaties were valid. 562 Those treaties concluded in violation of the
United Nations Charter lack the necessary mutual consent of the
states. 563 Mahajan emphasized the need for mutual consent. Although
he did not discuss the specific provisions of the Charter upon which his
conclusions were based, he cited article 2(3), which requires states to
settle disputes peacefully.
Elias (Nigerian). In 1971, at the Hague Academy of International
Law, T.0. Elias, the well-known Nigerian jurist, argued that a new rule
precluding the validity of imposed treaties had begun to develop in the
1920's and the 1930's. 564 Elias concluded that this rule was now extant
and that the United Nations Charter article 2(4) was its source. 565
In his 1974 book, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES, 5 66 Elias
discussed both Judge Nerro's dissenting opinion in the 1973 Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case,567 and the 1973 German-Czechoslovakian Treaty.
568
He argued that they contributed to the development of a rule of treaty
law invalidating treaties concluded by military duress on a contracting
state. 569
Varma (Indian). In a 1975 article, Prem Varma defined, in part,
the concept of unequal treaties as those brought about by the threat or use
of force, as well as those brought about by economic and political
pressure. However, he concluded that only those treaties brought about
by the illegal use of military force are invalid.
570
559. I S. MOOKERJEA, INTERNATIONAL LAW 799 (2d ed. 1968).
560. Id.
561. Id.
562. V. MAHAJAN, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 368 (5th ed. rev. 1973).
563. Id.
564. Elias, Problems Concerning the Validity of Treaties, 134 RECUEIL DES COURS 381
(1971).
565. Id.
566. T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES (1974).
567. Id. at 175.
568. Id. at 176.
569. Id. at 170.
570. Varma, Unequal Treaties in Modern International Law, 7 EASTERN J. INT'L L.
56, 73 (1975).
But the unequal treaties extorted by force or threat of force against a state
are illegal and void.
87
Malawer: Imposed Treaties and International Law
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
Such treaties have, in fact, been in existence from ear-
liest times. It is only the State's right to abrogate such treaties
that is of recent origin.
5 71
4. Note on Recent Views on the Legality of Economic and
Political Coercion in International Relations and the 1973-1975 Arab
Oil Embargo. The 1973-1975 Arab Oil Embargo has been the topic of a
number of recent articles discussing the legality in international rela-
tions of economic and political coercion under article 2(4) of the Charter
of the United Nations. 7 2 These articles have discussed the validity of
treaties resulting from the use of economic and political coercion, but
not in the context of treaty law.
While it may be premature to assess this growing body of dialogue,
a general observation may be made. If there is no consensus as to
whether political and economic coercion is unlawful, as a general rule of
international conduct, it is difficult to understand how that "rule" can
be utilized in assessing the juridical validity of a treaty.
5 73
The German lawyer, Hartmut Brosche, in his 1974 analysis of the
Arab oil embargo, presented a fair evaluation of the current state of the
law. 574 He also presented his hope, the crystallization of a new rule of
international law.
571. Id. at 73. Varma argued that unequal treaties ought to be illegal.
Therefore, there seems to be no valid reason why the treaties concluded as
a result of economic and political pressures should not be treated as illegal and
void.
Id. at 65. See also notes 7-8 supra.
572. A Symposium on the New International Economic Order, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 233
(1976); Brosche, The Arab Oil Embargo and United States Pressure Against Chile:
Economic and Political Coercion and the Charter of the United Nations, 7 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Brosche]; Paust & Blaustein, The Arab Oil
Weapon-A Threat to International Peace, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 410 (1974); Shihata,
Destination Embargo of Arab Oil: Its Legality Under International Law, 68 AM. J. INT'L
L. 591 (1974); Boorman, Economic Coercion in International Law: The Arab Oil Weapon
and the Ensuing Juridical Issues, 9 J. INT'L L. & Eco. 205 (1974); Muir, The Boycott in
International Law, 9 J. INT'L L. & Eco. 187 (1974). See M. GHUNAIMI, THE MUSLIM
CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WESTERN APPROACH 162, 184 (1968) for a
critical analysis of the traditional Islamic view of "Jihad" and of its concept of treaties as
only temporary events.
573. Many writers believe that the rejection at San Francisco in 1945, of a Brazilian
proposal to extend article 2(4) to cover "economic measures" was a rejection of a general
prohibition against economic force in international relations. SeeDoc. 784,1/1/27, at 4-5, 6
U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 336, 339 (1945). However, some argue that such a prohibition may be
found in the non-intervention principle. Lillich, Economic Coercion and the "New
International Economic Order": A Second Look at Some First Impressions, 16 VA. J.
INT'L L. 233 (1976). See also Bowett, International Law and Economic Coercion, 16 VA. J.
INT'L L. 245 (1976).
574. Brosche, supra note 572, at 30. Brosche argues that the trend is towards the
broader definition. Thus both the Arab action and the prior action are inconsistent with the
Charter. Id. at 34.
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Thus we have seen that the world is split on the question
of whether the general prohibition of the threat or use of force
as formulated in Article 2(4) of the Charter embraces pres-
sures of an economic or political nature. . . .Their strong
movement to outlaw economic and political pressure will
bring about new norms governing the limits of permissible
economic coercion; new rules of customary international law
will emerge.575
B. State Practice
State practice discloses a general acceptance of a rule against
imposed treaties, some inconsistent practice, and an uncertain position
concerning the effect of imposed treaties.
1. General Communist Chinese Theory of Imposed Treaties and
Practice of the People's Republic of China. Several recent works have
appeared in which writers for the first time discuss the Communist
Chinese attitude toward international law in general, and their concept
of imposed treaties in particular. This section examines the views of
non-Communist Chinese authors on the attitude of the People's Repub-
lic of China toward imposed treaties, and it examines the historical
events relied upon by both Communist Chinese and other writers.
a. Recent Views on the Attitude of the People's Republic of
China Regarding the Concept of Imposed Treaties. The most recent and
authoritative works to examine the attitude of the People's Republic of
China toward the concept of imposed treaties are by Professors J.
Cohen,5 76 H. Chiu 577 and J. Hsiung.1
78
575. Id. at 30.
576. 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (J. Cohen & H. Chiu eds. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as I PEOPLE'S CHINA]; reviewed, Leng, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 237,240 (1974).
577. Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal
Treaties, in CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES (J. Cohen ed.
1972, reviewed Tung, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (1974); LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY:
COMMUNIST CHINA & SELECTED PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (S. Leng & H. Chiu
eds. 1972); H. CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES (1972).
578. J. HSUING, LAW AND POLICY IN CHINA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS (1972) [hereinafter
cited as HsUING]. Other relevant works are the following: Ogden, China and International
Law: Implications for Foreign Policy, 49 PAC. AFF. 28 (1976) (hereinafter cited as
Ogden-China]; Ogden, Sovereignty and International Law: The Perspective of the People's
Republic of China, 7 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1974); W. TUNG, CHINA AND THE
FOREIGN POWERS (1970); L. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (1969); D.
JOHNSTON & H. CHIU, AGREEMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 1949-1967-A
CALENDAR (1968); TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND
OTHER POWERS, 1929-1954 (Y. Chen ed. 1957); 3 CHINESE L. & GOV'T (No. 1, 1970)
(special issue on international law); I TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS WITH AND CONCERNING
CHINA 1894-1919 (J. MacMurray ed. 1921); INSPECTOR GENERAL OF CUSTOMS, TREATIES,
CONVENTIONS, ETC. BETWEEN CHINA AND FOREIGN STATES (2d ed. 1917).
"The quality of research on international law in the PRC, even according to eminent
1977
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Cohen and Chiu (1974). Professors Cohen and Chiu have collabo-
rated in producing a documentary study of the Communist Chinese
views on international law, including the concept of imposed treaties 579
Professor Cohen, as the Director of the East Asian Legal Center at the
Harvard Law School, and Professor Chiu of the University of Maryland
School of Law, a Research Associate at the East Asian Legal Center in
1974, presented their views in the various edited portions of the book
which explain the translated documents.
Professors Cohen and Chiu, in reviewing the history of the term
''unequal treaty," note that: "[It] appears to have been coined by the
Chinese Nationalists in 1923, ' ' 580 and conclude that one of China's
reasons for entering World War I was to eliminate unequal treaties.
581
They also state that despite the doctrinal support within Communist
China for the legal invalidity of imposed treaties, the government of the
People's Republic "has not acted upon that assumption with respect to
boundary treaties," 582 and that in contrast to the Nationalist definition
and use of the concept of unequal treaties in a "relatively precise
fashion,''583 the People's Republic of China and Communist writers
have used it in a "flexible and broad manner." 584
Cohen and Chiu recite several examples of post-World War II state
practice of the People's Republic of China. The Communist Chinese
declared the 1956 United States-Swiss Treaty Concerning Civil Uses of
Atomic Energy as unequal, since it gave a right to the United States to
acquire or use Swiss inventions based on nuclear information supplied
by the United States. 585 The Communist Chinese also declared unequal
the existing 1956 British-Jordanian Treaty providing for the stationing
of British forces on Jordanian territory.5 86 They further pronounced as
unequal the 1946 Republic of China-United States Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigation, 587 not because the terms were unequal, but
because the operation of those terms was unequal in light of political and
economic considerations. 588 The Communist Chinese also contended
Chinese Communist legal scholars themselves, has been poor and rudimentary." Ogden-
China, supra, at 30.
579. 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA & INT'L LAW (J. Cohen & H. Chiu eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited
as 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA].
580. Id. at 1116.
581. Id. at 1115.
582. Id. at 1128.
583. Id. at 1145.
584. Id.
585. Id. at 1249.
586. Id. at 1250.
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that the 1960 Japan-United States Security Treaty was unequal since it
was imposed on Japan. 589 However, the People's Republic has not
declared unequal the veto system of the United Nations. 590
Hungdah Chiu (1972). In 1972, Hungdah Chiu published several
works discussing Communist China and imposed treaties.5 91 Compari-
son of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of Unequal
Treaties observed that Communist China has never publicly denounced
as unequal the 1945 Nationalist Chinese-Soviet Treaty Concerning
Manchuria.5 92 It was only in the 1960's, in the context of the seemingly
interminable Sino-Soviet border dispute, that the 1858 Sino-Russian
Aigun Treaty and the 1860 Sino-Russian Peking Treaty were criticized,
but were not abrogated.
5 93
In 1972, in his more general work, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES, Chiu offered more information on
this subject. 594 Chiu indicated that Communist Chinese scholars con-
tend that "just" and "equal" treaties are primary sources of interna-
tional law, 595 and regard the coercion of a state and the unequal nature of
treaty provisions as independent grounds for judging a treaty invalid. 596
In addition to coercion, Communist Chinese writers con-
sider the "unequal" or "aggressive and enslaving" nature of
a treaty a vitiating condition.
97
Chiu emphasized that the concept of unequal treaties is "flexible."
For example, Communist China has not abrogated as illegal all imposed
or unequal treaties to which it is a party, especially certain treaties with
the Soviet Union which are still in force.598 Chiu concluded that
although unequal boundary treaties are being observed, there is no
requirement that they be observed forever.
599
589. 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 579, at 1250.
590. Id. at 1254, 1314.
591. See Chiu, Comparison of the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views of
Unequal Treaties, in CHINA'S PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: SOME CASE STUDIES (J.
Cohen ed. 1972).
592. Id. at 264.
593. Id. at 265. Chiu argued that the Nationalists believed that imposed treaties were
at most subject to rebus sic stantibus, not to a rule against imposed or unequal treaties.
594. H. CHIU, THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE LAW OF TREATIES (1972).
595. Id. at 5.
596. Id. at 30.
597. Id.
598. Id. at 97. For example, boundary treaties with Hong Kong and Macao are
currently in force. Chiu further stated that "Application of the concept of 'unequal
treaties' by Communist China is flexible and seems largely determined by political
considerations." Id. at 68.
599. Id. at 96.
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The views of commentators other than the above are essentially
complementary to the views just described.
Shao-chuan Leng analyzed the recent Chanpao Island dispute
(Damansky Island) and concluded that, in theory, the Communist
Chinese regard treaties previously imposed on her as unequal and
illegal. 6°° Yet, in practice, Communist Chinese have been rather




In 1972, James Hsuing, then of New York University, contrasted
the Communist Chinese position with that of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion.62 He concluded that the Communist Chinese position has gone
further than the formulation of article 52 of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties.
6°3
The [Chinese People's Republic] position agrees with this
principle but goes beyond it. The concept of exploitation in
interstate relations sealed by treaties has much broader appli-
cation than coercion in the conclusion of treaties. Further-
more, mere nominal or verbal reciprocity, in [Chinese
People's Republic] views, does not make a treaty truly
equal. 604
b. Communist Chinese Theorists and Communist Chinese State
Practice. Chou Keng-sheng in 1955, adhered to the position that article
2(1) of the Charter proclaimed the principle of equality of states, which
was a fundamental principle of international law. 605 He then argued that
unilateral treaties, including both unequal treaties and those which are
imposed, violate article 2(1). 606 In 1950, Wang I-wang stated that
certain commercial treaties had been concluded under military threat
and were unequal. 607 As an example of this, he mentioned treaties
concluded during the Manchu dynasty which provided for consular
jurisdiction, leased territories and concessions such as tariff restrictions,
600. LAW IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: COMMUNIST CHINA AND SELECTED PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 244 (S. Leng & H. Chiu eds. 1972).
[S]he nevertheless reserves the right to differentiate between "equal" and"unequal" treaties and to proclaim their validity and legality according to her
interests.
Id.
601. Id. at 271.
602. HSUING, supra note 578, at 252. See also G. ScoT, CHINESE TREATIES 85-99
(1975). Scott stated: "The PRC has not always followed a logical and consistent pattern in
the abrogation of treaties under the unequal treaties principle." id. at 96.
603. HSUING, supra note 578, at 252.
604. Id.
605. 1 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 576, at 126, 131.
606. Id. at 131.
607. 2 PEOPLE'S CHINA, supra note 579, at 1168.
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navigation in internal rivers and construction of railways. 60 8
The state practice of the People's Republic of China regarding
imposed treaties is illustrated by its legal position in the Sino-Soviet
border dispute and the Sino-Indian border dispute.
As mentioned, China denounced both the 1858 Sino-Russian
Aigun Treaty and the 1860 Sino-Russian Peking Treaty. However, it did
not abrogate them. In 1963, Surya Sharma, an Indian international
lawyer, analyzed the Chinese recourse to military force against India in
a case study on peaceful coexistence. 6°9 Sharma concluded that the
Stimson Doctrine of non-recognition ought to have been applicable.
610
It appears that China's use of force to change its Indian borders on
the basis of alleged imposed treaties is not consistent with its position on
imposed treaties. In the Sino-Soviet border dispute, China does not
argue that imposed treaties constitute a continuing aggression, which
confers on a state the unilateral right to use military force in order to alter
its borders. The Sino-Indian border confrontation has highlighted the
central weakness of the concept of imposed treaties-the concept of
imposition is dependent upon the concept of aggression, and who
defines it.
2. General Soviet Theory of Imposed Treaties and Recent State
Practice. A review of Soviet theory of imposed treaties indicates that the
rule against imposed treaties, although quite often used, has not been the
subject of extensive analysis by either Soviet writers or Western writers
on Soviet international legal doctrine.
a. Western Writers on Soviet Theory. Western writers have
discussed the Soviet attitude toward international law, peaceful coexist-
ence and treaty law. They have rarely discussed the Soviet view of
imposed treaties, and almost never have actual Soviet state practice, or,
in particular, Soviet treaty practice been dealt with in this light.
Before presenting a discussion of imposed treaties and the Soviet
Union's practice and doctrine, it will be helpful to consider the view of
Butler on the current rudimentary state of Western scholarship concern-
ing Soviet international law doctrine and practice.
6 11
Butler argued that current scholarly efforts by Western writers are
amateurish but necessary attempts at history.6 12 He contended that it is
608. Id.
609. Sharma, The Chinese Recourse to Force Against India: A Case Study in Peaceful
Coexistence, 2 PHILLIPPINE INT'L L.J. 105 (1963).
610. Id. at 152.
611. Butler, Some Reflections on the Periodization of Soviet Approaches to Interna-
tional Law, in CONTEMPORARY SOVIET LAW-ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JOHN N. HAZARD 213
(D. Barry, W. Butler & G. Ginsburgs eds. 1974).
612. Id.
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essential to reconsider the existing periodization schemes for describing
the patterns of Soviet international law behavior and doctrine. For
Butler it is necessary to develop such schemes according to issue areas,
especially in order to evaluate "the platitudes concerning the determi-
nants of Soviet international legal doctrine and practice.'" 613 However,
he never discussed imposed treaties.
In 1972 and 1975, Richard Erickson investigated the Soviet view
of imposed treaties .614 He stated that Soviet doctrine precludes both
imposed and unequal treaties from the protection of the principle of
pacta sunt servanda,6 15 treating such treaties as void ab initio.
6 16
Erickson stressed that it is duress, economic, military or political, that
vitiates a treaty. 617 He then presented the following typology of unequal
treaties, a classification which includes treaties other than imposed
treaties: 1) treaties of economic assistance, for example, the Marshall
Plan; 2) treaties of military assistance; and 3) treaties forced upon newly
independent states, for example, the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. 618
b. Soviet Writers and State Practice. This section analyzes the
more recent writings of Soviet writers as they have appeared in the
SOVIET YEARBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW and other Soviet sources.
Also discussed are Soviet state practice and treaty relations, especially
613. Id. at 224. The author supports his position by reference to his prior research on
the Soviet approaches to the law of the sea.
My own studies of Soviet approaches to the law of the sea also have
demonstrated a close interrelationship between doctrine and practice which
standard periodizations would savagely distort.
Id.
614. R. ERICKSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW ANDTHE REVOLUTIONARY STATE 77-80 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as ERICKSON]. See also Erickson, Soviet Theory of the Legal Nature of
Customary International Law, 7 CASE WEST. RES. J. INT'L L. 148 (1975); Rao, Soviet
Approach to the Law of Treaties, 14 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 433 (1974). In this article the author
espoused the view that "[t]he treaties that derogate from the principle of sovereign
equality of States as also those forced upon States are unequal treaties." Id. at 436
(footnotes omitted).
615. ERICKSON, supra note 614, at 77. But seeTriska, Treaties, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIAOF
SOVIET LAW 689, 690 (F. Feldbrugge ed. 1973):
After World War II, however, coercion and force have been viewed as legal and
have not been considered an invalidating factor in treaty obligations.
616. ERICKSON, supra note 614, at 77.
617. Id. at 78.
618. Id. at 78-79. Also in 1972, Grzybowski traced the development of the Soviet
doctrine of unequal treaties in treaty practice; however, he never defined the term.
Grzybowski, Soviet Theory of Treaties, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 209-16 (S.
Agrawala ed. 1972). See also RAMUNDO, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE-INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THE BUILDING OF COMMUNISM (1969); J. TRISKA & R. SLUSSER, THE THEORY, LAW AND
POLICY OF SOVIET TREATIES 42, 135 (1962); Shapiro, The Post-War Treaties of the Soviet
Union, 4 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 130 (1950); 3 Soy. STAT. & DEC. (No. 4 1967). This Soviet
publication on public international law contains various recent Soviet statutes and judicial
decisions relating to public international law.
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the continuing Sino-Soviet border dispute and the 1968 Soviet-
Czechoslovakian Treaty.
G.L Tunkin. It is most significant to emphasize at the outset the
writings of Tunkin, since he is thought by many to be the most
significant Soviet international law writer. Hazard, in 1975, viewed him
as "a major force" in implementing into law the Soviet's policy of
peaceful coexistence. 619
In 1974, G.I. Tunkin, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
6 20
declared the following principles, which had been advanced initially by
the October Revolution, as having enormous potential force: the princi-
ples of equality, self-determination and sovereignty of nations.
621
Tunkin contended that the new Soviet state, at its birth, had broken
immediately with the colonial policy of Tsarism by repudiating treaties
having a colonial and an unequal character. 622 He argued that the dual
principles of equality and self-determination mandated such an
approach .623
The idea of the invalidity of unequal treaties set forth in
the Decree on Peace, the abrogation by the Soviet state of all
unequal treaties. . were an inspiring example for the depen-
dent countries. It has become much more difficult for
imperialist states to impose unequal treaties, although, taking
advantage of the weakness of some states, especially the new
ones, they also frequently compel them to sign such treaties at
the present time.
624
Two earlier articles by Professor Tunkin in 1968 and 1962, further
reveal this leading Soviet legal theoretician's views.
In 1968, in the REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,
6 25
Tunkin stated that in the half century since the October Revolution,
"some old principles of international law have disappeared; new
progressive principles have emerged and a whole body of international
619. Hazard, Book Review, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1044 (1975).
620. G. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (W. Butler transl. 1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as TUNKIN].
621. Id. at 7.
622. Id. at II. See also Tunkin, The Problem of Sovereignty and Organization of
European Security, 10 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1 (1974).
The principle of the prohibition of the threat or use of force, especially its
detailed applicability to the situation in Europe, will help to provide additional
legal guarantees against violations of the sovereignty of European states,
connected with the use or the threat of force.
Id. at 7.
623. Id.
624. TUNKIN, supra note 620, at 14.
625. Tunkin, The Prinicpal Developments in International Law During the Course of
the Last Half Century, 24 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1 (1968).
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law has undergone an essential transformation. "626 He argued that the
most important innovation had been the emergence of the principle of
prohibition against wars of aggression, 627 and that the principles of
peaceful co-existence and equality had been accepted as a result of the
activities of the Soviet state.
628
In 1962, Tunkin emphasized the essential role of state consent in
the formulation of new rules and principles of international law. 629 He
held that although modern Western views of international law often
varied as to the role of state consent, 630 nonetheless consent was the sole
means of establishing rules of international law.
63'
Tunkin argued that in both customary and conventional interna-
tional law, the agreement or consent of the states was essential.
Moreover, such agreement could not result from powers employing
"dictatorial methods in the process of creation of norms of international
law.' ' 632
Several Soviet lawyers have discussed imposed treaties in more
detail than Tunkin. These views are presented here along with the
doctrine of imposed treaties expressed in the Soviet law school text-
book, INTERNATIONAL LAW.
63 3
Vassilenko. In 1971, V.A. Vassilenko, in State Sovereignty and
International Treaty, set out to determine the circumstances under
which an international agreement would operate to restrict the
sovereignty of the contracting states.6 34 He concluded that unequal
626. Id. at 2.
627. Id. See also Tunkin, International Law: The Contemporary and Classic, in
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF KIRSHNA RAO 48, 50 (M. Nawaz ed. 1976).
628. Id.
629. Tunkin, The 22nd Congress of the CPSU and the Tasks of the Soviet Science of
International Law, I Sov. L. & Gov'T 18, 22 (1963) [hereinafter cited as The 22nd
Congress]. See also Tunkin, The United Nations: 1945-1965 (Problems of International
Law), 4 Sov. L. & Gov'T 3 (1966).
630. The 22nd Congress, supra note 629, at 22.
631. Tunkin stated:
Recognition of agreements as the sole means of establishing norms in
international law derives from the concept of peaceful coexistence ...
The Soviet concept of agreement stands opposed to the major tendencies
of the modern bourgeois science of international law . . . . [T]hey [the
bourgeois concepts] objectively create the possibility of justification of the
policy of "positions of strength", which is invariably interwoven with efforts
on the part of the imperialist powers to employ dictatorial methods in the
process of creation of norms of international law.
Id.
632. Id.
633. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE U.S.S.R., INSTITUTE OF STATE AND LAW, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (D. Ogden transl. F. Kozhevnikov ed. (195-).
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treaties would result in such restriction on sovereignty.
635
Vassilenko concisely defined an unequal treaty as one containing
both coercion and disproportionate rights and obligations:
A forcible creation of a disproportion of rights and duties
turns a treaty into a negative factor evidencing itself in a
violation of the voluntariness principle and in an uneven
correlation of rights and duties to the detriment of one of the
parties. Such a treaty is deemed to be an unequal treaty and,
naturally, in this case the sovereignty of the state subjected to
violence and waiving some of its major prerogatives would
undoubtedly be violated or restricted.
636
Talalayev. In 1970, A.N. Talalayev discussed, in the context of
the 1969 Vienna Convention, the relation of pacta sunt servanda to the
validity and separability of treaties. 637 He found these issues to be
among the "complicated theoretical problems of international law"
discussed at the Vienna Conference.
638
In the more serious instances of invalidity, absolute
invalidity above all, where the treaty as a whole is void ab
initio as contrary to the rules of jus cogens. . . the separabil-
ity principle cannot be applied.
639
Adjarov. In 1969, K.A. Adjarov described the early Soviet treaty
practice of abrogating treaties with countries of the East. 64° He believed
this practice to have been based upon Lenin's "attention to the relations
with the peoples fighting for the liberation from colonial
domination."
641
Lukashuk. In 1949, 1.1. Lukashuk indicated that the doctrine
concerning unequal treaties is based on the necessity of actual state
consent.
642
635. Id. at 79.
[T]o say that any treaty . . . is a factor restricting the sovereignty of a state
would mean to pay a hypertrophied attention to the only circumstance that in
assuming obligations a state foregoes some of its rights ....
Id.
636. Id.
637. Talalayev, Some Questions on the Theory on International Treaty at the U.N.
Vienna Conference, 1970 Sov. Y.B. INT'L L. 125.
638. Id.
639. Id. at 127.
640. Adjarov, V.L Lenin and the First Treaties of the Soviet State with Countries of
the East, 1969 Soy. Y.B. INT'L L. 67.
641. Id. See also Movchan, Codification of the International Legal Principles of
Peaceful Co-Existence, 1963 Sov. Y.B. INT'L L. 27; Talalayev & Boyarshinov, Unequal
Treaties as a Mode of Prolonging the Colonial Dependence of the New States of Asia and
Africa, 1961 Soy. Y.B. INT'L L. 169.
642. Lukashuk, The Soviet Union and International Treaties, 1959 Sov. Y.B. INT'L L.
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From the postulate that obligations cannot be placed
upon a state contrary to its will there of necessity flows the
demand that treaties should express the real will of their
signatories .64
Lukashuk argued that traditional international law had previously
required only formal expression of consent, but that the Soviet Union
had played a decisive role in the recognition of the illegality and
invalidity of many treaties. 6 " "From the point of view of the science of
law, unequal treaties are worthless. . . . ,,64 He supported the view of
the inter-relationship of coercion and inequality by repeating the often
heard phrase, "unequal treaty imposed by force.'"' He believed this to
be the correct interpretation of article 2(4) and article 103 of the United
Nations Charter.647
Academy of Sciences. INTERNATIONAL LAW does not clearly distin-
guish between imposed and unequal treaties. 648 It continues to use the
phrase "imposed by force, and which are unequal, ' 6 9 when it is
apparent that a treaty need not be both imposed and unequal in order to
be illegal under accepted Soviet doctrine. It emphasizes that the doctrine
of unequal treaties is based upon the principle of sovereign equality of
states.
650
The voluntary expression of the will of the parties and
equality and mutual advantage must be the basic legal princi-
ples underlying international treaties .... 651
The principle that international treaties must be observed
does not extend to treaties which are imposed by force, and
which are unequal in character....652
Equal treaties are treaties concluded on the basis of the
equality of the parties; unequal treaties are those which do not
fulfill this elementary requirement. Unequal treaties are not
legally binding; equal treaties must be strictly observed.
Treaties must be based on the sovereign equality of the
contracting parties. 653
643. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
644. Id.
645. Id. at 46.
646. Id.
647. Id. See also Talalayev, The Termination of International Treaties in the History
and Practice of the Soviet State, 1959 Soy. Y.B. INT'L L. 155.
648. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES OF THE U.S.S.R., INSTITUTE OF STATE AND LAW, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW (D. Ogden transi. F. Kozhevnikov ed. 1959).
649. Id. at 248.
650. Id.
651. Id. at 247.
652. Id. at 248.
653. Id. (emphasis added).
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Two of the most important events in Soviet post-war state practice
provide significant examples of state practice that does not support the
doctrine espoused by Soviet writers.
The 1968 Soviet-Czechoslovakian Treaty. In 1938, Czecho-
slovakia signed the infamous Munich Pact, under the threat of Nazi
military force. Thirty years later, Czechoslovakia was forced by actual
Soviet military action into signing the Soviet-Czechoslovakian Treaty
of 1968.654 Unlike the Munich Agreement of 1938, the 1968 Agreement
was viewed by most states as being illegal because military force was
used against the contracting state in order to bring about the conclusion
of the treaty.
Article 1 of the 1968 Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty on Stationing of
Soviet Troops states that the Treaty was brought about by the "consent"
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. 655 That the consent resulted
from the military occupation of Czechoslovakia by Soviet and Warsaw
Pact forces, provoked the statement made by the United States Repre-
sentative to the September 12th meeting of the United States Special
Committee on Principles of International Law656 and prior statements of
the United States Representative to the Security Council, explicitly
condemning the events in Czechoslovakia as an illegal act of
aggression. 657
These statements were similar to the views of other countries
condemning the Soviet action. The Czechoslovakian National Assem-
bly Proclamation of August 28, 1968, had previously condemned the
Czechoslovakian occupation. It declared the occupation "as illegal and
contrary to international treaties.'"658
The Soviet Union justified its intervention in Czechoslovakia as
being authorized by "socialist international law.''659 This was not
assented to by either Western states or the People's Republic of
China.
6 W0
Soviet state practice is in sharp conflict with the Soviet Union's
claim of being the champion of the rule against imposed treaties.
However, by 1968, it was too late for Soviet state practice to prevent the
654." For a collection of documents on this subject see 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
1265-339 (1968) [hereinafter cited as 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS].
655. Id. at 1334.
656. Id. at 1317.
657. Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, Supp. 1966-68, at 171-73, U.N.
Doc. ST/PSCA/l/Add.5. For a statement by the Secretary of State of the United States,
see 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 654, at 1326.
658. 7 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS, supra note 654, at 1313.
659. Id. at 1323.
660. Id. at 1326.
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development of a new rule of treaty law. It was simply a violation of
such a rule.
Sino-Soviet Border Dispute. The Soviet Union claims that the
Sino-Russian Treaty of Aigan of 1858 and the Sino-Russian Treaty of
Peking of 1860, as well as the 1945 Sino-Soviet Treaty, 66' are equal and
valid. The government of the People's Republic of China, as indicated
previously, contends that these treaties are imposed and unequal.
Soviet author V.S. Miasnikov argued, in a 1974 article, 662 that the
19th century treaties in fact corrected an earlier invalid treaty. He stated
that the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk had been imposed by the Ch'ing
Government on the Tsarist Government, 663 and that it was Chinese
coercion against both Russia and the Russian delegation which had
brought about the conclusion of the 1689 Treaty. 664
[T]he "Ch'ing government entered into struggle with Russia
for the Amur when this territory was a part of Russia, and
hence the military seizure of the Amur by the Ch'ing govern-
ment was aggression vis-A-vis Russia.-665
The Treaty of Nerchinsk, and in particular its territorial
articles, was signed in an abnormal circumstance-under the
threat of the physical extermination of the Russian delegation
and the detachment escorting it by the enormously superior
forces of the Manchus. In view of this the treaty should be
considered coercive, i.e., concluded under the threat of the
application of force. .... 666
3. The 1973 German (Federal Republic)-Czechoslovakian Trea-
ty. The 1973 German (Federal Republic)-Czechoslovakian Treaty
declared the 1938 Munich Agreement void on the grounds that had been
imposed by force, however, it retained as valid certain consequences of
the 1938 Munich Agreement, thus giving it limited effect. The Preamble
and article 1 respectively state:667
RECOGNIZING that the Munich Agreement of 29 Sep-
tember 1938 was imposed on the Czechoslovak Republic by
the National Socialist regime under the threat of force.668
661. See generally Miasnikov, The Manchu Invasion oftheAmurRiver Valley and the
1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk, 6 CHINESE L. & Gov'T 22 (1974).
662. Id.
663. Id.
664. Id. at 88.
665. Id. This was Miasnikov's quote of a previous study by lakovleva.
666. Id. at 89.
667. Text of German-Czechoslovak Treaty, 13 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 19 (1974)
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The Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak
Socialist Republic, under the present Treaty, deem the
Munich Agreement of 29 September 1938 void with regard to
their mutual relations. 9
At the drafting of the 1973 Agreement, the Czechoslovakian
government urged that the Munich Agreement be declared void as of its
inception, but the German government refused to concede this point,
6 70
being concerned about legal complications which might arise regarding
the Sudeten Germans. Many had gained German citizenship, either
during World War II, or when they were expelled by the post-war
Czechoslovakian government. Germany wanted to avoid problems of
inheritance, land ownership, status of marriages and divorces, and other
civil acts contracted under German law.6 7 1 This was the main issue
throughout the drafting of the Agreement, although a problem as to the
right of the Federal Republic to act on behalf of interests located in West
Berlin developed in the later stages of the negotiations, which right the
Federal Republic conceded.672
Article 2 expressly preserved legal rights and nationalities esta-
blished under the Munich Agreement, and protected the Federal Repub-
lic from any claims that might otherwise be based upon this new 1973
Agreement:
1) The present treaty shall not affect the legal effects on
natural or legal persons of the law as applied in the period
between 30 September 1938 and 9 May 1945.
This provision shall exclude the effects of measures
which both Contracting Parties deem to be voidowing to their
incompatibility with the fundamental principles of justice.
2) The present treaty shall not affect the nationality of
living or deceased persons ensuing from the legal system of
either of the two Contracting Parties.
3) The present treaty, together with its declarations on
the Munich Agreement, shall not constitute any legal basis for
669. Id. (emphasis added).
670. Financial Times, Dec. 12, 1972, at 7, col. I; The Times (London), Feb. 24, 1973,
at 4, col. 4; id., May 31, 1973, at 7, col. 2; Kopinski, Prague-Bonn Treaty Paves Way,
Financial Times, June 20, 1973, at 7, col. I; The Times (London), June 21, 1973, at 6, col. 6.
See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1973, at 1, col. 6; id., Dec. 2,1973, at 22, col. 1; id., Dec. 12,
1973, at 3, col. 4.
671. Kopinski, Prague-Bonn Treaty Paves the Way, Financial Times, June 20, 1973,
at 7, col. 1.
672. N.Y. Times, Nov. 19, 1973, at I, col. 6; Judgment of July 31, 1973, [1973] Neue
Juristiche Wochenschrift 1539 (treaty held constitutional under the Basic Law). See also
Note, Application of Bavarian State Government and [German] Federal Government, 70
AM. J. INT'L L. 147 (1976). This article proposed that the treaty was constitutional under
the Basic Law.
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material claims by the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and
its natural and legal persons.
673
Walter Schell, as the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, after
initialing the Treaty in Bonn on June 23, 1973, declared that the Treaty
was a clear rejection of past policies that were based upon coercion.
674
Bohuslav Chfioupek, the Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister, declared
the 1973 Treaty "a victory for the reason and realism both contracting
parties have shown."675 In an address to a combined session of the
Czechoslovakian legislative body on July 15, 1974,676 Chfioupek con-
tended that the 1973 Agreement confirmed the nullity of the Munich
Agreement which had been concluded against Czechoslovakia's will
and had caused the country "immense moral and material harm. "677
Chfioupek stated "that both sides were able in an acceptable way to
embody as law in the Treaty the nullity of the so-called Munich
Agreement. "678 He did state that for "humane reasons," under article II
of the 1973 Agreement, some acts were declared valid which stemmed
from the use of German law in Czechoslovakia, from 1938 to 1945.679
One may conclude that the 1973 Agreement continued to recognize
previously created rights, rather than instituting new rights
retroactively.
4. 1975 Iranian-Iraq Treaty. In March, 1975, at a summit
conference of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) in Algiers, Iran and Iraq agreed to revise the 1937 London
Treaty, 680 which had been denounced by Iran in 1969,68 1 as being both
673. German-Czechoslovak Treaty, supra note 667, at 19 (emphasis added).
674. Statement by Walter Scheel, June 20, 1973, in Treaty on Mutual Relations
Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of 11
December 1973, 27-28 (Press and Info. Office, Federal Republic of Germany 1974).
675. Statement by Bohuslav Chfioupek, id. at 28, 29.
676. Speech by Bohuslav Chfioupek, on file at the International Legal Studies
Library, Harvard Law School, July 15, 1974.
677. Id. at 5.
678. Id. at 7.
679. Id. at 8. The Czechoslovakian statute of limitations still remains in effect to
preclude criminal prosecutions.
In practice, this means that such war crimes and such crimes against
humanity which the present Czechoslovak penal law qualifies as crimes of
murder, or general intimidation resulting in death would come under the statute
of limitations.
Id. at 9. Regarding the 1972 Treaty see generally Bretton, Les Nbgociations Germano-
Tchicoslovakques surL "Accord de Munich du29Septembre 1938, 19 ANNUAIRE FRAN(tAIS
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 189 (1973); German Unity-Documentation and Commentaries
on the Basic Treaty (F. Hess ed. East Europe Monog. No. 4, Governmental Research
Bureau 1974).
680. Boundary Treaty and Protocol Concerning the Schatt-al-Arab Waterway, July 4,
1937, 190 L.N.T.S. 241 [hereinafter cited as Boundary Treaty]. For several documents on
this dispute see 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 478 (1969).
681. Statement by Khosrow Afshar of Iran, 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 481 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Statement by Afshar].
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unequal and imposed by force.6 82 The 1937 London Treaty established
the Iraqi border as including the east bank of Shatt al-Arab River. 683 The
1975 Algiers Agreement declares that the river frontier was to run down
the middle of the navigational channel. 684 It is significant that this major
Middle-Eastern dispute centered on an imposed treaty, and was resolved
by that treaty's revision.
685
In 1969, Amir Khosrow Afshar, Deputy Foreign Minister of Iran,
in a speech to the Senate of Iran, declared the 1937 Treaty to be both
imposed and unequal. He argued that the 1937 Treaty was forced upon
Iran, 686 and that the agreement violated the international legal principle
of equality because of its one-sided terms. 687
As to the use of force, Afshar stated:
Considering the principle which has been mentioned, it
must be noted that the Frontier Treaty of 1316 (1937 A.D.)
between Iran and Iraq was concluded in a time when the
British colonial system was at its height of power, and was
keeping Iraq under its protecting wings, using force and
bringing pressure upon Iran to sign that treaty which ceded all
Shatt-ul-Arab, except two sections of it to Iraq. 6 8
As to the unequal nature of the treaty, Afshar stated:
Furthermore, in accordance with the established canons
of International Law, one of the important principles in
concluding any agreement, is the equality of rights of the two
contracting parties. The question is whether the principle of
equality of rights has been observed in the case of
Shatt-u-Arab. 69
Afshar conclude that the 1937 Iran-Iraq Treaty was abrogated.
"[A]s far as the Imperial Government is concerned, it is valueless and
682. N.Y. Times, March7, 1975, at 1, col.5;id. March 8,1975, at 3, col. 5; id. March
I1, 1975, at I, cal. 7; id. March 12, 1975, at 34, col. 1; id. at 35, col. I.
683. Boundary Treaty, supra note 680, art. 1.
684. N.Y. Times, March 8, 1975, at 3, col. 2; Iran-Iraq: Treaty on International
Borders and Good Neighborly Relations, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1135 (1975).
685. The political significance is that Iraq changed its position. N.Y. Times, March
11, 1975, at 8, col. 4. As a result, there was increased cooperation between these two
oil-producing states, both members of OPEC. N.Y. Times, March 12, 1975, at 35, col. 1.
This strengthened the Arab-Persian cooperation and weakened the Iranian-Israeli tie. Id.
For a general study of the Persian Gulf states see H. AL-BAHARNA, THE ARABIAN GULF
STATES (1975). See also Cases, Conflicting Attitudes on Shatt El-Arab, 2 ISRAEL L. REV.
431 (1967).
686. Statement by Afshar, supra note 681, at 483.
687. Id. at 484.
688. Id. at 483-84 (emphasis added).
689. Id. at 484 (emphasis added). See also Pace, Iran Assuming Britain's FormerRole
as Guardian of Persian Gulf States, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
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null and void.' '690 Iraq contested the abrogation in a letter to the Security
Council,69 1 claiming that boundary treaties could never be unilaterally
abrogated.692
Over the years Iran had developed valuable oil facilities near the
waterway. By supporting the rebellious Kurdish forces within Iraq, Iran
had pressured the Iraqi Government for a change. 693 Even though the
1975 Algiers Agreement came about as a compromise in this larger
political context, the juridical significance of the 1969 abrogation and
the 1975 Algiers Agreement still remains.
5. German Border Treaties of the 1970's. In 1970, Federal
Republic of Germany concluded two treaties recognizing Polish
sovereignty over former German territory. Article 3(3) of the 1970
German-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty694 and article 1 of the 1970
German-Polish Treaty Concerning Basis for Normalizing Relations
695
recognized the Oder-Neisse line as forming the western frontier of
Poland. The Preamble of the 1970 German-Polish Treaty recognized
that Poland was the "first victim" of the Second World War. 696 Article
3(2) of the 1972 Treaty between the Federal Republic of Germany and
the German Democratic Republic recognized also the Oder-Neisse
border. 697
690. Id. at 485.
691. U.N. Doc. S/9185 (1969).
692. Id.
693. See note 682 supra.
694. Federal Republic of Germany-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Non-
Aggression Treaty of 1970, 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1026 (1970).
Article 3. [T]hey regard today and shall in future regard the frontiers of all States
in Europe as inviolable . . . including the Oder-Neisse line which forms the
western frontier of the People's Republic of Poland ....
Id. See generally Steinberger, International Law Aspects of the German-Soviet Treaty of
August 12, 1970, 31 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLAkNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKER-
RECHT 147 (1971). Steinberger argued that the treaty does not create a territorial guarantee,
but only a pledge not to use force.
695. German-Polish Treaty Concerning Basis for Normalizing Relations, Nov. 18,
1970, 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 127 (1971).
Article I. [Germany and Poland are] in mutual agreement that the existing
boundary line. . . the Oder River. . Neisse. . shall constitute the western
State frontier of the People's Republic of Poland.
Id.
696. Id.
697. Federal Republic of Germany--German Democratic Republic Treaty, Dec. 21,
1972, 12 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 16 (1973).
Article 3. They reaffirm the inviolability now and in the future of the border
existing between them and undertake fully to respect each other's territorial
integrity.
Id. See generally Skubiszewski, The Western Frontier of Poland and the Treaties with
Federal Germany, 3 POLISH Y.B. INT'L L. 53 (1970). See also Note, Recognition of the
DDR: Some Legal Aspects of West German's Foreign Policy and the Quest for German
Reunification, 7 CASE W. RES. INT'L L. 94, 119 (1974).
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These treaties are significant because they recognize that an
agreement acknowledging a transfer of territory might resolve problems
resulting from past aggression. However, it should be noted that these
treaties have not been declared by any state as having been invalidly
imposed on an aggressor state.
The treaties served as a model for the more general Helsinki
Declarations, concluded in 1975, by the European Security Conference.
That treaty confirmed the legitimacy of post-World War II borders in
eastern and central Europe. 698
6. Current United States-Panama Negotiations. The mid-1970's
have seen the continuation of negotiations, concerning control of the
Canal Zone, between the United States and Panama, which have
centered around the 1903 Treaty. 699 Panama's position, expressed as
early as 1962, in the United Nations, is that the 1903 Panama-United
States Treaty is unequal. 7°1 Solis of Panama stated:
Because of the form and the circumstances in which this
Treaty of 1903 was signed, and because of the humiliating,
injurious, unjust and inequitable terms for Panama which
were included in it . . . [Panama has] the specific object of
preserving the necessary moral authority which would enable
it to seek a better understanding.
701
Panama itself has not declared the 1903 Treaty as void. Panama
asserts that the circumstances related to the conclusion of the Treaty, as
well as the unequal nature of its provisions, have given Panama the
moral authority to renegotiate the treaty, but not the legal right of
unilateral abrogation.
Article 1 of the 1974 joint United States-Panama statement indi-
cates that the 1903 Treaty is to be replaced only by mutual consent in the
form of a new interoceanic canal treaty. 702
698. Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, 14 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1292 (1975). Article II of Part A prohibits the use of force in settling disputes,
and article III declares that the frontiers are not to be assaulted. Id. at 1297.
699. Treaty with Panama as to the Canal, Nov. 18,1903, 33 Stat. 2234 (1905), T.S. No.
431. For a historical summary see U.S. Policy Toward Panama, 1903-Present: Questions
of Recognition and Diplomatic Relations and Instances of U.S. Intervention, 70 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 433 (1974). See also The Times (London), May 5, 1975, at 4, col. 3; Hearings
on the Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations Before the Subcomm. on the Panama Canal
Zone of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine & Fisheries, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
700. 17 U.N. GAOR 109 (1962). The United States argues that the treaty is valid.
Bunker, Panama and the United States: A Design for Partnership, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL.
453 (1974).
701. Id. at 113 (emphasis added).
702. Text of Joint Statement, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 184 (1974). "The treaty of 1903
and its amendments will be abrogated by the conclusion of an entirely new interoceanic
canal treaty." Id. For additional recent articles see Breden, The Reopening of the Panama
Canal (Controversy), 18 SAIS REV. 20 (1974); Kissinger, U.S. and Panama Agree on
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C. International Legislation
An analysis of international legislation from 1945 to 1975, indi-
cates that the rule against imposed treaties has been accepted. This
acceptance was implicit by the Charter in 1945, and explicit by article
52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in 1969. The rule
was supported by the 1970 Declaration of Friendly Relations, and
further clarified by the 1974 Declaration on Defining Aggression. These
documents, a draft treaty and two General Assembly resolutions, were
intended to interpret and develop the rules of law as contained in the
1945 Charter. 703
Principles for Negotiation of New Panama Canal Treaty, 70 DEP'T STATE BULL. 181
(1974); Note, Panama: The Proposed Transfer of the Canal and Canal Zone by Treaty, 5
GA. J. INT'L & COMp. L. 195 (1975).
703. Professor Sohn strongly supports the interpretation of the Charter by the organs
of the United Nations as a means of creating new international law. Sohn, The Develop-
ment of the Charter of the United Nations: the Present State, in THE PRESENT STATE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND OTHER ESSAYS 39, 50-53 (M. Bos ed. 1973).
The organs of the United Nations can by their interpretation of the Charter
broaden the scope of the United Nations, especially when there is unanimous
agreement on the subject, or at least no open disagreement.
Nevertheless, there is a wide consensus that these declarations actually
established new rules of international law binding upon all States. This is not
treaty-making but a new method of creating customary international law.
Thus the United Nations has made possible the creation of "instant
international law."
Id. at 50, 52, 53 (footnote omitted).
The General Assembly, in a bootstrap manner, recognized that "the development of
international law may be reflected, inter alia, by declarations and resolutions of the
General Assembly... "G.A. Res. 3232, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, at 141, U.N. Doc.
A/9631 (1974). As to unratified codification conventions, Professor Eustathiades stated in
1973:
[W]here codification conventions are concerned, these rules [in the
conventions] may gain ascendancy after all by establishing themselves in the
codification process and thus becoming binding on States.
C. EUSTATHIADES, UNRATIFIED CODIFICATION CONVENTIONS 1 (1973). Professor Paolillo
has stated:
[I]nternational law benefits from the conclusion of multilateral codification
treaties, whether they have been accepted or not, by eliminating inconsistencies
and ambiguities that normally characterize international custom.
Paolillo, Some General Reflections on the Acceptance of Treaties as a Means of Expanding
the Body of International Law, 10 J. INT'L L. & Eco. 355, 357 (1975). See also Suy,
International Law-Making in the United Nations: A Look at the Future, in PROCEEDINGS
AND COMMITTEE REPORTS OFTHE AMERICAN BRANCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSoCI-
ATION, 1975-1976, 23 (1976). But Sinclair has stated:
The fact that relative success was eventually achieved should not blind one
to the dangers inherent in the process-in particular, the danger that the more
permanent needs of the international community might be sacrificed to short-
term political objections or considerations.
Sinclair, Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation
among States, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF KRISHNA RAO 107, 138
(M. Nawaz ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Sinclair].
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1. Drafting the United Nations Charter. During the drafting of
the United Nations Charter, mention of imposed treaties occurred as part
of the discussion on treaty revision. Numerous amendments were
suggested which would have included a provision for treaty revision,
especially in the context of articles 11 and 14. None of them were
adopted.
Express rejection of the world body's power to revise treaties
would have been a significant retreat from the Covenant of the League of
Nations. However, an analysis discloses conflicting evidence. The
ordinary meaning of the terms used 7" and subsequent United Nations
practice suggest that a power of treaty revision was conferred on the
General Assembly. An analysis of the Security Council's authority
under Chapter VI, providing for the pacific settlement of disputes, and
Chapter VII, governing enforcement measures, indicates that the Coun-
cil was given powers sufficiently broad to recommend specific revisions
as well as to impose such revisions.
a. The Drafting of Articles 11 and 14. At the outset of the United
Nations Conference on International Organization, held in 1945, at San
Francisco, Bodawi Pasha of the Egyptian delegation declared that it was
"a duty of the Conference to prescribe principles for the revision of
treaties which have become inconsistent with the new concept of world
conditions and collective security.''705 This comment reflected the
sentiment behind several provisions for treaty revision suggested as
amendments to the original Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.
Mexico, Brazil and Egypt, among other states, suggested amend-
ments that would have included a specific reference to treaty revision;
none were adopted.
In paragraph 36 of a lengthy memo concerning the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposals, Mexico urged that the Assembly should have the power
to recommend the revision of treaties which could not be fulfilled or
which would endanger the international order. 70 6 This proposal would
govern a broad class of international agreements, including imposed or
unequal treaties.
704. Article 31(l), 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, provides,
A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose. (emphasis added).
705. Doc. 22, P/7, at 7, I U.N.C.I.O. Docs. 157, at 236 (1945). For ageneral guide to
the proposals and amendments to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals see Doc. 288, G/38, at
39, 3 U.N.C.I.O. at 677.
706. Doc. 2, G/7(c), at 42, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 2, at 94 (1945). Paragraph 36 states:
The Assembly shall recommend to the members the revision of those
international treaties or agreements which it may not be possible to fulfill, or
which may endanger international order . . ..
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Mexico also suggested in another proposal, that the General
Assembly be empowered to discuss and make recommendations con-
cerning "treaties proving inapplicable . . having become unjust."
70 7
This proposal would have altered article V-B-1 ,708 which emerged as
article 11(1), providing for Principles of Co-operation and
Disarmament.709
The Brazilian delegate believed that the power of treaty revision
was desirable, 710 and closely related to rebus sic stantibus. He warned
that rebus sic stantibus was dangerous, but the absence of revision could
lead to unjust or disastrous consequences.71 The Brazilian suggestion
applied only to a continuing injustice arising from executory treaties,
not to treaties which had been totally executed.71 2 Brazil had suggested
that the General Assembly by a two-thirds vote be allowed to recom-
mend to the States concerned that they come to an agreement. 713 The
Brazilian proposal in part stated:
At the request of any of the contracting parties to an
executory treaty claiming the total or partial termination of
such treaty, or an injustice in its continuation, the Assembly
by a majority of two-thirds, may invite either of the contract-
ing parties to come to an agreement with the former for the
revision or termination of such treaty.
714
Prior to the San Francisco Conference, Brazil had made a similar
proposal at the 1945 Inter-American Conference on Problems of War
and Peace, held in Mexico.
715
Egypt suggested that the General Assembly be given the power to
recommend "the reconsideration of treaties which have become inap-
plicable." 716 This proposal relied upon language essentially similar to
that contained in article 19 of the League Covenant. The Egyptian
707. 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 489, at 181 (1945).
708. Doc. 1, G/i at 3, 3 U.N.C.I.O. (1945).
709. U.N. Charter art. 11, para. 1. The amendment would have inserted after the
word "disarmament" the following: "[t]he treaties proving inapplicable and any interna-
tional situations having become unjust." Doc. 2 G/7(c), at 42, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 2, at 94
(1945).
710. 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 254, at 238 (1945).
711. Id.
This doctrine is dangerous, but the absence of the possibility of revision of
certain treaties can lead to disastrous or at least unjust, consequences.
3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 56, at 406 (1945).
712. 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 254, at 239 (1945).
713. Id.
714. Id. (emphasis added).
715. INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF WAR AND PEACE, RESOLUTION
XXX ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A GENERAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION 50 (1945).
716. 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 735, at 580 (1945).
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delegate emphasized that his proposal concerned international agree-
ments which "create unjust situations or maintain a state of affairs
which is onerous to one of the parties."
717
Venezuela supported the inclusion of treaty revision, but urged that
it be limited to a change of circumstances, as determined by an
international court .718 The Philippines, during the drafting of article
102, governing Treaty Registration, argued that no state should con-
clude a treaty which would violate the "spirit" and principles of the
Charter. 719 This was similar to a suggestion made in 1930, by Peru
concerning the League Covenant .720
The Ethiopian delegation during debate on the text of article 103,
which expresses the supremacy of the Charter, suggested that the
Charter should abrogate all obligations which were found by either the
Security Council or the General Assembly to be inconsistent with the
Charter.721 It also suggested that states should agree not to enter into any
such agreements.
The Venezuelan proposal was relatively restrictive, but the Philip-
pine and Ethiopian proposals were very broad. The Philippine proposal,
by relying on the "spirit" of the Charter as a basis of invalidating
agreements, presumably would have extended article 2(4) to treaty
relations. The Ethiopian proposal would have given the United Nations
the authority to declare a treaty invalid, without requiring that it specify
particular grounds.
Several delegates at the San Francisco Conference commented
upon the status of treaty revision and the language of the various
proposals. The most instructive were those comments made by the
delegates from Bolivia, France, Belgium, Columbia, Egypt and Chile.
Andrade, of Bolivia, discussing the provision that was to become
article 14, contended that the language, "peaceful adjustment of any
situation, regardless of origin," included the revision of treaties. 722 He
quoted the views of Senator Vandenberg who also believed that the
phrase did not preclude the Assembly's right to recommend treaty
revision.723 Andrade further stated:
717. Id.
718. Doc. 2, G/7(d)(1), at 35, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 281, at 233 (1945).
719. Doc. 2, G/14(k), at 6, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 498, at 540.
720. See note 1017 infra.
721. Doc. 2, G/14(n), at 1, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 586, at 561 (1945).
722. Doc. 1151,11(17), at 8,8 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 5338, at 197 (1945). Foracollectionof
proposed amendments see Doc. 223, IV/2/8, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 1072 at 743 (1945).
723. Id.
[Tihe phrase "the peaceful adjustment of any situation regardless of origin"
should not be interpreted to mean that the subject of the revision of treaties
would be foreclosed to the Assembly.
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Bolivia has always respected the treaties and pledges to
which she has subscribed. If we favor their revision, it is
because some countries had no alternative than to accept
them, and because their enforcement would endanger peace.
We believe that in drawing up the Charter we should make it
possible to review any case of injustice whether deriving from
a treaty or not.
724
Aglion, of France, argued that article 14 did not include the power
to recommend treaty revision,72 5 citing the Second Commission's
positive action of rejecting all amendments containing such authority. 726
He stated:
On the other hand, all the amendments concerning revi-
sion of treaties have been brushed aside by the Committee,
after discussions which took place during three meetings, and
the answers given to questions asked. . . . Therefore, we
have definitely discarded all possibilities for the revision of
treaties in the Assembly.
727
Aglion believed the power of the Assembly to recommend treaty
revision to be non-existent, even though its general power of discussion
was very broad. 728 He based his position upon his belief that Hitler had
used article 19 of the Convenant as a basis for his territorial demands.
"[I]f the Assembly were competent to revise treaties at any time, you
might have agitation for revision of this or that treaty, and there would
never be any stability in the treaties.' '729
The Belgian delegate, R1in, disagreed with both the French
rationale and interpretation. 73 ° R1in thought it historically inaccurate to
assert that article 19 of the Covenant played any part in Germany's
aggression.7 31 R1Min was critical of France's political position, and
concluded that Belgium "hopes that no such restrictive interpretation
will be adopted."
'732
724. Id. He also stated the following:
Weak countries feel equally or more acutely than strong countries the negative
significance of insecurity and of unjust situations which, sooner or later,
demand solution. . . . Hence the principle, exhaustively discussed and
approved here, opens broad possibilities of fruitful development for the future
Id. at 7.
725. Id. at 12-14, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 1072, at 201-03 (1945).
726. Id. at 13, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 1072, at 202 (1945).
727. Id. (emphasis added).
728. Id. "Its powers of discussion are limited only by the limits of the very vast sphere
of subject matters enumerated in the Charter." Id.
729. Id.
730. Id. at 17-18, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 1072, at 206-07 (1945).
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Zuleta, of Columbia, contended that the draft of article 14 "rejects
• . . revision of treaties." 733 Andraous, of Egypt, rejected Columbia's
position,734 stating that "the revision of treaties . . . would advance
international law." 735 Maza, of Chile, upon reviewing these positions
stated that Chile's understanding was "that the General Assembly will
not directly or indirectly have the power of recommending the revision
of existing treaties.' '736
Even though the General Assembly was not specifically granted
the authority to recommend the revision of treaties, the ordinary
meaning of the terms used in articles 11 and 14 leads one to conclude
that the General Assembly was given the implicit authority to recom-
mend the revision of treaties. Article 11(2) specifically authorizes the
discussion of "any question," and article 14 permits recommendations
concerning the "peaceful adjustment of any situation, regardless of
origin." In 1965, the General Assembly adopted Resolution 2021 (XX),
which drew the attention of the member states "to the desirability of
adapting" a number of specified multilateral agreements concluded
under the auspices of the League of Nations "to contemporary condi-
tions." ,737 Thus, the General Assembly, by its own interpretation of the
Charter, has determined that it has authority to recommend to member
states the need to examine treaties with the purpose of determining any
necessity of their revision.
b. Drafting Chapter VI and Chapter VII.
The Security Council and the Pacific Settlement of Disputes.
Bolivia suggested that, in accordance with the Security Council's
authority to implement the pacific settlement of disputes if there were no
agreement among the states concerned, then the Security Council
should be obligated to recommend the revision of treaties. 738 However,
the consent of the states would be required to impose any Security
Council recommendation under Chapter VI.
The Security Council shall recommend the revision of all
733. id. at 21, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 1072, at 210 (1945).
734. Id.
I do not stand up to revive the corpse of the revision of treaties. . . .I do not
rise to resuscitate the principle which was born long before we met in San
Francisco, and which will live so long as people think that adjustments of
situations must be done by brains and right and not by strength and might.
Id.
735. Id. at 22, 13 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 1072, at 211 (1945).
736. Doc. 1207, 11/17(1), at 5, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 5505, at 218-22 (1945).
737. G.A. Res. 2021, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 87, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
738. Doc. 2, G/14(r), at 8, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 735, at 577 (1945). For a recent and a
general analysis of Chapter VI of the U.N. CHARTER see Murphy, The Obligation of States
to Settle Disputes by Peaceful Means, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 57 (1973).
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international treaties or agreements whose continued exist-
ence would endanger a good understanding between states
. . . . Where the agreement of the parties cannot be
obtained, the Security Council shall decide on the expedience
of the said revision .... 739
The Bolivian proposal was not adopted. However, the revision of
treaties was not expressly forbidden by the text of the Charter, as
proposals directly aimed at precluding treaty revision were rejected.
The French government suggested that the provision which was to
become article 34, governing the Security Council's Investigation of
Disputes, 74 should be guided by the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
74 1
France proposed, as a preamble to the text of that article: " [t]he Security
Council, while bearing in mind that treaties must be respected
... ,742 This attempt by the French to assure the observance of
treaties and to preclude treaty revision was rejected.
The ordinary meaning of the text of article 37(2), "such terms of
settlement as it may consider appropriate," permits the conclusion that
in the right circumstance, a treaty revision might be deemed the most
appropriate term of settlement. Such a recommendation by the Security
Council could concern an existing imposed treaty and include specific
proposals for revision. This is unlike article 19 of the Covenant which
only allowed recommendations to states that they revise their treaties.
The Sponsoring Governments, the United States, the Soviet Union
and China, had sought the amendment of that article of the Dumbarton
Oaks Proposal 743 which was eventually to become article 37 of the
Charter. 7 ' The original proposal empowered the Security Council to
739. Id. (emphasis added).
740. U.N. CHARTER, art. 34.
The Security Council may investigate any dispute, or any situation which
might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine
whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the
maintenance of international peace and security.
Id.
741. Doc. 2, G/7(o), at 3, 3 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 97, at 385 (1945). The amended article
would have read as follows:
The Security Council, while bearing in mind that treaties must be
respected, should be empowered to investigate any dispute or any situation
Id.
742. Id.
743. Doc. 188, 111/2/3, at 2, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 978, at 9 (1945).
744. U.N. CHARTER, art. 37, para. 2 states:
If the Security Council deems that the continuance of the dispute is in fact likely
to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, it shall decide
whether to take action under Article 36 or to recommend such terms of
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recommend only "appropriate procedures or methods of adjust-
ment." 74 5 The amendment would broaden this to include: "recommen-
dations as to the actual terms on which the dispute should be settled." ,746
The Sponsoring Governments gave assurances that such a recommenda-
tion of the Security Council would not be binding on the parties.7 47 The
amendment prevailed, and this view was reflected in the final text of
article 37.
Bolivia had requested that the provision which emerged as article
35, allowing the notification by any member of the United Nations of
"any dispute, or any situation," 748 should include the term "agree-
ment." ,749 This suggestion was not accepted. Bolivia was apparently
once again mindful of the problem of the treaty with Chile, which
Bolivia believed and still believes to be imposed. An earlier attempt to
deal with this problem under the League Covenant had also met with
failure.
Belgium had suggested that the Security Council, under the pacific
settlement provisions, be authorized "to impose on the Parties, in case
of need, such temporary methods (procedures) as it may deem neces-
sary," 750 and "to take whatever equitable decision [which] could settle
the difference peacefully." 751 These suggestions were not adopted.
Early in the proceedings Brazil had proposed a treaty revision
measure. 752 However, theprimary incentive for this had been the desire
745. Doc. I, G/i at 12, 3 U.N.C.I.O. 13 (1945).
746. Doc. 188, 111/2/3, at 2, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 978, at 9(1945). The proposal, inpart,
reads:
The Security Council would thus not only recommend procedures; it might
make recommendations as to the actual terms on which the dispute should be
settled.
Id.
747. See generally Doc. 1020, 111/2/31 at 4, 12 U.N.C.1.O. Doc. 4836, at 145 (1945).
As the result of this amendment, the Security Council may, in the cases
envisaged, "recommend" terms of settlement as well as procedures and
methods of adjustment. In the course of discussion on an amendment offered
by the Delegation of Belgium, the Delegates of the United Kingdom and the
United States gave assurances that such a recommendation of the Security
Council possess no obligatory effect for the parties.
Id.
748. U.N. CHARTER, art. 35, para. I reads:
Any Member of the United Nations may bring any dispute, or any situation
of the nature referred to in Article 34, to the attention of the Security Council or
of the General Assembly.
749. Doc. 207, 1I1/2/A/3, at 5, 12 U.N.C.I.O Doc. 1030, at 183 (1945). Article 35(l)
would have read, "Any Member of the United Nations may bring any such dispute,
siutation, or agreement."
750. Id. at 6, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 1030, at 184 (1945).
751. Id. at 8, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 1030, at 186.
752. Doc. 748, 11/2/39 at 2, 9 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 3128, at 127 (1945).
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to stay anticipated radical proposals aimed at solving the same
problem. 
753
The delegate of the United States stated that the broader language
adopted by the conference was intended to incorporate treaty revision
754
and was certainly not intended to foreclose the authority of the
Assembly .
755
[A]lthough he had originally contemplated a specific allusion
in the Charter to the question of revision of treaties, he had
foregone this in favor of the broad version. . . put forward
by the four sponsoring governments and France. . . . He
recognized the objections to identifying treaties as such...
and held the concern of the Assembly was not with treaties per
se, but with adjusting conditions. . . . The phrase "the
peaceful adjustment of any situations, regardless of origin,"
in his view, should not be interpreted to mean that the subject
of treaty revision was foreclosed to the Assembly.756
The delegate from Belgium had hoped that the United Nations
would have explicit authority to impose necessary treaty revisions, but
settled for the adopted formulation.
75 7
Security Council and the Enforcement Powers. During the San
Francisco Conference, Australia suggested that the Security Council be
given, under the provision which was to emerge as article 39, the
authority to "lay down just terms for the settlement of the dispute."
75 8
This suggestion was withdrawn because its particular wording was
thought to place it within the pacific settlement section of the Charter. 
759
Under article 39, the Security Council has authority to "decide
what measures shall be taken . . . to maintain or restore international
peace and security." Article 42 provides that in order to give effect to
the Security Council's decisions, "it may take such action by air, sea, or




756. Id. (emphasis added). See also R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OFTHE UNITED NATIONS
CHARTER-THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES 1900-1945, 755 (1958).
757. Doc. 748, 11/2/39 at 3, 9 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 3128, at 128 (1945).
758. Doc. 199, 111/3/7, at 2, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 1010, at 289 (1945). The proposed
amendment read as follows:
[I]t shall, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,
lay down just terms for the settlement of the dispute, and take any measures
necessary for carrying out that settlement and for maintaining international
peace and security.
Id. See also Doc. 289, 111/3/I1 at 2, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 1285, at 610 (1945).
759. Id. This suggestion was also introduced at that point, but was not accepted. Doc.
2, G/14 at 9, U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 474, at 551 (1945).
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whether or not a treaty may be imposed, nor does it specify the measures
which might be taken. There is no indication in the language of article 39
that the imposition of a treaty might not be an appropriate "mea-
sure, '" 760 since the measures authorized under article 39 are left to the
discretion of the Security Council.
The Security Council is authorized to take enforcement measures
under article 39 when the Council determines "the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.
This empowers the Security Council to impose treaties not only when
there is an act of aggression, or when states are permitted to exercise
their right of self-defense, but also within the larger class of hostilities,
including threats and breaches of the peace.
Consider the following illustrations:
Illustration 1:
State A attacks State B. State B is successful in defeating
State A. State B is authorized to impose an agreement on State
A.
Illustration 2:
State A and State B are on the verge of military conflict. The
Security Council may impose an agreement between both
states (with or without the United Nations as a party), and
without one or both of the states' consent.
In the first illustration, a treaty is being imposed only as a result of
an actual armed attack. In the second illustration, the United Nations
imposes a treaty on the basis that the existing military confrontation
under article 39 is a "threat" or a "breach of the peace." This
authorization would allow the Security Council, if it had the necessary
support of the super-powers, to impose its will on the less powerful
states, regardless of whether or not it had the consent of those states.
It is interesting to note that the apparent power of the Security
Council under article 39 to impose treaties, is possibly as extensive as
the same power held by individual states in the nineteenth century. This
makes possible a circumstance in which a treaty may be imposed, yet
valid, despite development of the rule generally invalidating imposed
treaties.
2. United Nations Practice. This section discusses certain arti-
cles of the Charter and General Assembly resolutions which relate to the
rule against imposed treaties.
760. See generally Seyersted, Can the United Nations Establish Military Forces and
Perform Other Acts Without Specific Basis in the Charter?, 12 6STERREICHISCHE
ZEITSCHRIF-r FUR OFFENTLICHES RECHT 188 (1963).
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a. Article 102. Article 102 of the United Nations Charter pro-
vides for the requirement of treaty registration. 761 Article 102 states:
1. Every treaty and every international agreement
entered into by any Member of the United Nations after the
present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be
registered with the Secretariat and published by it.
2. No party to any treaty or international agreement
which has not been registered in accordance with the provi-
sions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that treaty or
agreement before any organ of the United Nations.
762
Early in the history of the United Nations, General Assembly
resolutions implemented article 102 by adopting Regulations Governing
Treaty Registration. 763 Article 2 of the Regulations requires a "certified
statement regarding any subsequent action."
764
1. When a treaty or international agreement has been
registered with the Secretariat, a certified statement regarding
any subsequent action which effects a change in the parties
thereto, or the terms scope of application thereof, shall also
be registered with the Secretariat.
765
Although the types of "subsequent actions" which are to be
registered are not specified, it is arguable that actions included are only
those consented to by all parties concerned. However, in 1947, the
Director of the Division of Registration of Treaties provided, on behalf
of the Secretary-General, an interpretation, approved by the Sixth
Committee, which rendered article 2 applicable to the traditionally
unilateral acts of denunciation and abrogation.766 Beckett of the United
Kingdom thought that article 102 "imposed a continuous obligation on
all Member States." 767 A treaty denounced on the grounds of its
imposed origin, therefore, would be subject to the requirements of
article 102.
b. Article 103 and Article 107. Article 103 provides that the
Charter takes precedence over inconsistent treaties of member states
and, presumably, both prior and subsequent treaties.
768
761. U.N. CHARTER art. 102.
762. U.N. CHARTER art. 102, paras. 1, 2 (emphasis added); 4 Repertory of Practice of
United Nations Organs, Supp. 3, 192 (1959-1966).
763. 4 Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Supp. 3, 191 n. 1 (1959-1966).
764. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 ; 4 Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs,
Supp. 3, 192 (1959-1966).
765. 4 Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs, Supp. 3, 191 n.I (1959-1966)
(emphasis added).
766. 2 U.N. GAOR, Sixth Comm. 112-15 (1947).
767. Id.
768. U.N. CHARTER art. 103.
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In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the
Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement,
their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.
769
Article 103 simply affirms the supremacy of the Charter, and
provides for its application when a conflict is found to exist. It is not a
source of the rule against imposed treaties, or of any other substantive
rule.
Article 107 states:
Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or pre-
clude action, in relation to any state which during the Second
World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present
Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the
Governments having responsibility for such action.
771
The prevailing view is that article 107 was intended to ensure the
validity of the then still to be concluded peace treaties. It was not
intended to provide the ex-enemy states with a legal basis for claiming
that such treaties could not be concluded. 7 '
Article 107 also provided some precedent for article 75 of the 1969
Vienna Convention which allows treaties to be imposed on an aggres-
sor. While article 107 requires the "action" to be "as a result of that
war," article 75 of the 1969 Convention requires treaties to be "with
reference" to the aggression.772
c. General Assembly Resolution of December 14, 1946. During
the first session of the General Assembly on December 14, 1946, a
resolution was passed which called for the mutual balanced reduction of
armed force and the withdrawal of armed forces stationed in member
states without the freely given consent from those states. 7
The Military Occupation Paragraph of the 1946 Disarmament
Resolution states:
[The General Assembly recommends] the withdrawal
769. Id. art. 103 (emphasis added). 4 Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs,
Supp. 3, 212 (1959-1966).
[U]nequal treaties, treaties imposed by force or fraud, or treaties lawfully
terminated, would not be covered by the principle of good faith.
Consequently, the rule of pacta sunt servanda could not redeem an
international agreement which violated the provisions of the Charter, since
Article 103 stated that the obligations arising from the Charter should prevail
over obligations assumed under any other international agreement.
Id. at 213.
770. U.N. CHARTER art. 107 (emphasis added).
771. Doc. 889, 111/4/12, at 2, 12 U.N.C.I.O. Doc. 4144, at 702 (1945).
772. Article 75 of the 1969 Convention requires the reference to be to the state's
aggression. Article 107 uses the broader formulation: "result of that war."
773. G.A. Res 41(1), U.N. Doc. A/267, at 5-6 (1946).
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without delay of [Member States'] armed forces stationed in
the territories of Members without their consent freely and
publicly expressed in treaties or agreements consistent with
the Charter and not contradicting international agreements
774
During debate on the resolution, E1-Sanhoury of Egypt contended
that article 2 of the Charter, which proclaims the principle of sovereign
equality, was the juridical basis of the Military Occupation
Paragraph .
77
It was with this principle in view that paragraph 7 of the
resolution under discussion recommends the immediate with-
drawal of foreign troops stationed on the territory of Member
States.
776
The Egyptian delegate argued that an exception to the prohibition
against foreign bases, as indicated in the resolution, was state consent
freely and publicly expressed.7 77 E1-Sanhoury contended that this con-
sent needed to be embodied in an international agreement, 778 and could
not be the result of violence or pressure against the consenting state. He
argued that consent would not be valid if extracted by intimidation,
constraint or the use of armed force. 779 A state can only by "a freely
negotiated treaty renounce an essential attribute of sovereignty. "780
Bevin of the United Kingdom stated:
We had a ten-year treaty between Egypt and our-
selves. . . . But when we were approached to revise it we
readily agreed, and negotiations are going on for the same
results.
I apologize to nobody for our conduct. . . . [B]ut I have
been as I said, both in the Committee and elsewhere,
cautious. 781
Bevin argued that the 1936 Egyptian-British Treaty782 was not
invalid for lack of state consent or for the unlawful use of British
influence in fostering the conclusion of the agreement or for any other
reason. Since the treaty was sound, its revision was possible only with
the consent of both states.
774. Id. (emphasis added).
775. Id. at 1299.
776. Id.
777. Id.
778. "According to this principle.., the said Member State cannot, but by a freely
negotiated treaty, renounce an essential attribute of its sovereignty." Id.
779. Id.
780. Id.
781. Id. at 1304 (emphasis added).
782. U.K.-Egypt Treaty of Alliance, done Aug. 26, 1936, 173 L.N.T.S. 402.
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While Bevin did not expressly accept the resolution as a statement
of accepted customary international law, he did not reject it.783 Nor did
he provide any guidance on the sort of action which would vitiate state
consent, whether it might be military or non-military force, or the type
of military action which constitutes an unauthorized action.
784
d. 1947 Security Council Debate on the 1936 Egyptian-British
Treaty. Nobrashy Pasha, the Egyptian delegate, argued that the 1936
Egyptian-British Treaty was imposed. 785 Pasha understood himself to
be challenging the basic assumptions of nineteenth century imperial-
ism, 786 which included the nineteenth century Western view of interna-
tional law. 787 He asserted that the 1936 Treaty allowed a military
occupation of Egypt during peace-time, without Egypt's consent, 788 and
that continued existence of the treaty represented a violation of the
Charter.
Relying upon the Military Occupation Paragraph of the 1946
Disarmament Resolution, 789 Pasha stated, "Egypt has not given such
consent to the occupation by the United Kingdom forces," ,790 and cited
an alleged verbal intimidation of "serious consequences" by the British
High Commissioner to the King, and Prime Minister of Egypt. Pasha
further argued that, in addition to being imposed, 791 the 1936 Treaty was
also unequal. Pasha stated: "As a free nation, Egypt cannot tolerate
such an unequal relationship. "792 He concluded that since the 1936
Treaty was invalid under the Charter, 793 its abrogation was authorized
by article 103.
Sir Alexander Cardogan of the United Kingdom objected to
Pasha's analysis, 794 stating: "If this Treaty is valid, as I shall hope to
783. Some might conclude that he did reject such a principle.
784. Even today British writers take a very cautious view of the existence of a new
rule of law against imposed treaties.
785. 2 U.N. SCOR 1747 (1947). -[T]he burdensome and objectionable military
conditions imposed in the 1936 Treaty." Id.
786. Id. at 1749. "In all frankness, we are here to challenge the basic assumptions of
nineteenth century imperialism." Id.
787. Id. at 1755.
788. Id. at 1756.
Nor is the Treaty of 1936 consistent with the Charter. I have already explained
that the military occupation for which the Treaty provides is in itself a
contradiction of the Charter.
Id.
789. Id. at 1754-755.
790. Id. at 1755.
791. Id.
792. Id. at 1756.
793. Id. at 1757.
794. Pasha contended that the Security Council was not the appropriate forum to
argue fully the juridical merits of its case. "In this high forum, I shall not argue the juridical
position of the 1936 Treaty, but my country has no hesitation in placing its reliance on the
Charter." Id. at 1753.
119
Malawer: Imposed Treaties and International Law
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1977
CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL
show it is, Egypt has no case at all to bring before the Council." , 795 Sir
Alex agreed that article 103 brings into effect the 1946 Resolution, but
rejected the Egyptian position that Egypt's consent was not freely and
publicly given.
796
It is clear from this debate that the principle that state consent must
be freely given in order to have a valid agreement was accepted by both
Egypt and the United Kingdom. The parties disagreed, however, over
what type of force might vitiate state consent. Egypt alleged that mere
intimidation would be sufficient, and that an unequal treaty would be
invalid. The United Kingdom rejected the first argument and did not
even mention the unequal argument, presumably believing it to be
legally insignificant.
e. 1961 General Assembly "France-Bizerta Base" Resolution
(Tunisia v. France). The General Assembly resolution passed in
response to the French attack on Bizerta in July, 1961, emphasizes the
proposition that military forces can be stationed on foreign territory only
with the consent of the host state, and such consent cannot be coerced by
military force. 
79 7
The French forces had been stationed at a military base at Bizerta in
Tunisia. 798 Tunisia had requested their withdrawal, but the French used
military force in a surprise attack engineered to maintain their military
position and provide sufficient leverage to coerce renewed Tunisian
consent. The General Assembly resolution reaffirmed the requirement
of state consent, and precluded the use of military force in coercing it.
The resolution states in part:
[ The General Assembly] Recognizes the sovereign right
of Tunisia to call for the withdrawal of all French armed
forces present on its territory without its consent. 799
3. International Codification: The 1970 General Assembly
Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly
Relations and Co-operation. General Assembly Resolution 2625 was
adopted at the General Assembly's 25th Anniversary Session, in
795. Id. at 1771.
796. Id. at 1779. Sir Alex also rejected the Egyptian reliance on rebus sic stantibus. Id.
at 1776.
[Ilt must be stated that the extent to which treaties can be held to be invalid on
rebus sic stantibus grounds . . . is certainly very limited as well as being
controversial. There is no decision of an international tribunal where this...
has been applied in any remotely similar case . ...
Id. at 1778-779.,
797. G.A. Res. 1622, 16 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 7, at 3, U.N. Doc.
A/4860 (1961). See also 8 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 1960-1962,220 (D. Djonovich ed.
1974).
798. See generally 16 U.N. GAOR, 3rd Spec. Sess., at 2-13 (1961).
799. See note 797 supra.
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1970.800 The drafting of this resolution and the attached declaration
involved an extensive discussion of imposed treaties. The major provi-
sions had been adopted in 1967, but formal adoption occurred in 1970.
The 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations emerged after almost a
decade of preparatory work by a specially constituted General Assembly
committee, the Special Committee on Friendly Relations and the
permanent Legal Committee (the Sixth Committee). 80 1 However, a
number of delegates believed that the International Law Commission in
its drafting of the Convention on the Law of Treaties should have
primary responsibility in drafting a rule regarding imposed treaties.
80 2
a. The 1970 Declaration: Provisions. The 1970 Declaration
codified seven principles of international law and several subsidiary
rules, which the drafters of the Declaration believed to govern friendly
relations among states.
80 3
The 1970 Declaration accepted "good faith in international obliga-
tions" as one of the seven principles. A subsidiary rule under this
general principle was that only "valid" treaty obligations were to be
honored in good faith .81 It was essentially under this rule that the major
discussion of imposed treaties took place.
The seven principles of international law enumerated by the
Declaration are: a) the prohibition against the threat or use of force in
international relations; b) the settlement of international disputes by
peaceful means; c) non-intervention in domestic matters; d) the duty of
cooperation; e) the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples; f) the principle of sovereign equality of states; and g) the
principle that states shall fulfill in good faith their obligations in general.
Under each principle a number of more specific rules were enumerated.
The Declaration reads as follows:
800. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971). A
recent analysis of the "Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations" contended that the
two principles of that declaration investigated in this article did not require "any extended
analysis." Sinclair, supra note 703, at 136.
801. See generally Malawer, International Law Studies and the Social Sciences:
Foreign Policy Analysis and International Law, 2 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 23,29(1972),
wherein the author states that "[T]he multilateral treaty process is the primary means of
generating new law which allows a diversified world to manage common global prob-
lems." Id.
802. See note 850 infra.
803. G.A. Res. 2625,25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, at 124, U.N. Doc. A/8028(1971). See
also [1970] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 104 (1972).
It [the Declaration Concerning Friendly Relations] represents on many
points as the negotiating history amply demonstrates. . . pressures for recog-
nition of an emerging lex-ferenda and, above all, between the antrimonies of
stability and change.
Sinclair, supra note 703, at 137.
804. Id.
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PREAMBLE
The General Assembly
Recalling the duty of States to refrain in their interna-
tional relations from military, political, economic or any other
form of coercion aimed against the political independence or
territorial integrity of any State.
Reaffirming, in accordance with the Charter, the basic
importance of sovereign equality.
1. Solemnly proclaims the following principles:
(B) The Principle that States shall settle their interna-
tional disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that
international peace and security and justice are not
endangered.
International disputes shall be settled on the basis of the
sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the princi-
ple of free choice of means [settlement procedures].
(F) The Principle of sovereign equality of states.
(e) Each State has the right freely to choose and develop
its political, social, economic and cultural systems;
(G) The Principle that States shall fulfill in good faith
the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the
Charter.
(c) Every State has the duty to fulfill in good faith its
obligations under international agreements valid under the
generally recognized principles and rules of international law.
GENERAL PART
2. Declares that:
In their interpretation and application the above
principles are interrelated and each principle should be con-
strued in the context of the other principles.
Nothing in this Declaration shall be construed as
prejudicing in any manner the provisions of the Charter. ..
Vol. 7
122
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1977], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol7/iss1/2
IMPOSED TREATIES
taking into account the elaboration of these rights in this
Declaration.
3. Declares further that:
The principles of the Charter which are embodied
in this Declaration constitute basic principles of international
law .... 805
The Preamble states that it is a duty of states to refrain from the use
of either military or economic coercion in international relations, and
the Declaration itself proclaims three principles of international law
particularly significant to the present discussion.
First, states shall settle their disputes by pacific means. This
incorporates a subsidiary rule which provides that states may freely
choose among various settlement procedures. Second, the Declaration
proclaims the principle of sovereign equality. This incorporates a
subsidiary rule which provides that states have a right to choose and
develop their various societal systems freely. Third, states shall in good
faith observe all international obligations. This includes, as a subsidiary
rule, the obligation of good faith enforcement of international agree-
ments if they are valid under generally recognized principles and rules of
international law.
b. Drafting the 1970 Declaration. The 1970 Declaration enu-
merates principles of international law not fully elaborated in the
Charter, and based to a large extent upon the prohibition in article 2(4) of
the Charter, against the threat or use of force in international relations.
As early as 1965, members of the drafting committee urged that the
good faith obligation should relate specifically to treaty obligations,
80 6
and, moreover, that pacta sunt servanda should relate only to treaties
freely entered into, 80 7 and not to obligations sanctioning aggression,
colonial domination, or to unequal treaties or treaties imposed by
force.
808
In the 1966 meetings of the Special Committee, Czechoslovakia
proposed an amendment to the principle declaring sovereign equality,
which would give states the right to dispose freely of their national
wealth and natural resources." The Cameroon proposed a more
805. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971)
(emphasis added).
806. U.N. Doc. A/6165, at 26 (1965). For a general discussion of the work of both the
Special Committee and the Sixth Committee see [1967] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 182 (1969).
807. Id.
808. Id.
809. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/4, at 2 (1966). The Czechoslovakian proposal read:
Each State has the right freely to choose and develop its political, social,
economic and cultural systems and to dispose freely of its national wealth and
natural resources.
Id. See also Czechoslovak Amendment, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/L.8 (1966).
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detailed sub-amendment, 810 and Kenya suggested an amendment
adding that any such agreements entered into would need to have been
valid pursuant to rules of international law.811 These natural resources
amendments were never adopted, and the sovereign equality principle
and its subsidiary rule of free choice of societal systems were limited in
the Declaration to a general statement.
812
In the 1966 meetings of the Special Committee, Egypt proposed an
amendment which would incorporate under the principle of sovereign
equality an entirely new rule. 813 This amendment, although not adopted,
would have given any state the right to remove any foreign military base
from its territory at any time, on the grounds that military base location
agreements are inherently unequal. Unlike the natural resources amend-
ment, this amendment cannot be said to be incorporated implicitly in
any of the subsidiary principles.
814
As to the principle of good faith, an amendment was proposed
which would have introduced equality as a criterion in determining the
810. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/L.8 (1966). The Cameroon's proposal read:
Each State has the right to freely choose and develop its political, social,
economic and cultural systems, and to enter into treaty or convention with any
State or States of its choice for the disposal of its national wealth and natural
resources within the territorial limits of the contracting States.
Id. See also Kenya Amendment, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/L.7 (1966).
811. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/L.7 (1966).
Each State has the right to freely dispose of its national wealth and natural
resources. In the exercise of this right, due regard shall be paid to the applicable
rules of International Law and to the terms of agreements validly entered into.
Id. See also Cameroon Amendment, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/L.10 (1966).
812. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, at 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
International disputes shall be settled on the basis of the sovereign equality
of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.
Id.
In 1972, the International Law Association, at its New York conference, drafted the
General Treaty for the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. Article 2, para. 3,
states:
International disputes shall be settled on the basis of the sovereign equality
of States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means ...
INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE FIFTY-FIFTH CONFERENCE 357, 358
(1972). For other developments see Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in
the Domestic Affairs of States and in the Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty, G.A. Res, 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 14, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965)
(note especially art. 2); Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281,
29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc A/9629 (1974); 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 251
(1975) and Implementation of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A.
Res. 3486, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 34, at 60, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975); 15 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 175 (1976).
813. See note 809 supra. Egypt's proposal read: "Each State has the right to remove
any foreign military base from its territory." Id.
814. Statement by the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, U.N. Doc. A/AC.
125/L.33, at 3 (1966): "On the topic of foreign military bases, the progress made can only
politely be described as negligible." Id.
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validity of a treaty. 815 The amendment stated:
1. Every State shall fulfill, in good faith, its obligations
ensuing from international treaties, concluded freely and on
the basis of equality .... 816
This "Nine-State Amendment" did not make clear the meaning of
equality. Both it and a similar amendment, using the terms "freely" and
"basis of equality," and proposed by Czechoslovakia were rejected.
817
An alternative amendment was proposed by the United States and the
United Kingdom, 818 and the final version substantially reflected that
amendment.8 19 It did not refer to equality.
In his capacity as the Yugoslav representative to the Special
Committee, Sahovi6 contended that the good faith principle is based
upon and expands Charter articles 2(2) and 103.820
Movohan of the Soviet Union mentioned, in regard to the good
faith principle, that leonine agreements were of particular concern to the
Soviet Union.
8 21
[A]II too often [imperialist countries] attempted to impose the
implementation of spoliatory measures set forth in agree-
ments they had concluded with the Czarist regime.
The Committee must therefore help to ensure com-
pliance with treaty obligations and at the same time assist
developing countries which sought to reject inequitable agree-
ments that had been imposed on them. 822
Narbrit, the United States delegate, denied that the United States
amendment was intended to preclude a rule against imposed treaties. On
the contrary, the United States sought a more general formulation of that
rule.823 Narbrit believed that neither the Czechoslovakian proposal nor
815. Joint Proposal, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/L.35 (1966); U.N. Doc. A/AC.
125/L.35/Corr. 1 (1966). The Nine-State Amendment was introduced by Burma, Madagas-
car, Ghana, Nigeria, Syria, Lebanon, the United Arab Republic, India and Yugoslavia.
816. Joint Proposal, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/L.35 (1966) (emphasis added). Para. 2 of
the amendment would have reinforced Charter article 103. Para. 2 states: "Any treaty
which is in conflict with the Charter of the United Nations shall be invalid, and no State
shall invoke or benefit from such treaties." Id.
817. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/L. 38/Add.7, at 2 (1966), U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/1L.16, at
para. vii (1966).
818. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/L.37 (1966). Pechota of Czechoslovakia thought that the
amendment reflected the changes which had taken place since the Second World War.
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/SR.45, at 7 (1966).
819. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
820. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/SR.45, at 4 (1966).
821. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/SR.46, at 6 (1966).
822. Id. at 6-7.
823. Id. at 8. Mr. Reis, of the United States, in 1967, stated that "unequal" treaties
prior to 1945, must remain in effect. This, he contended, was based upon sound policy.
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/SR. 61, at 15 (1967).
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the Nine-State Amendment showed any large area of disagreement .824
The use of the phrases "freely concluded," and "on the basis of
equality," as he understood them, were not objectionable, but too
limited, in that they might inadvertently omit other rules of invalidity.
825
"[A]ny such reference should logically be a complete incorporation of
all the rules of treaty law."
826
Darwin of the United Kingdom commented on the general princi-
ple of good faith, the subsidiary rule of treaty validity, and imposed
treaties. 8 27 He agreed with the United States that there was no reason to
mention one asserted ground rather than another, 828 but added that this
"controversial point" should await the conclusions of the International
Law Commission. 829 He also suggested that the discussion of imposed
treaties be taken up again when the Declaration was reviewed as a
whole.830
The above statements of the United States and the United Kingdom
delegations is strong evidence that their amendment as adopted did not
preclude establishment of a rule against imposed treaties.
The views of other delegates at the 1967 meetings of the Special
Committee are also significant. Sinclair of the United Kingdom viewed
imposed treaties as a "technical rule" of international law, which
should not be discussed then. 831 The Czechoslovakian delegate argued
that a rule against unequal treaties would not weaken pacta sunt
servanda, but would make its limits more precise. 832 The Syrian8 33 and
Kenyan834 delegates spoke in favor of a rule against all imposed treaties,
824. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/SR. 46, at 8 (1966).
825. Id.
826. Id. "The references . .. did not appear to meet that standard and would
therefore require some revision." Id.
827. Darwin stated that the principle of good faith was based upon Charter article
2(2). Id. at 10.
828. Id. at 12.
829. Id.
830. Id. El-Reedy of the United Arab Republic insisted that in numerous Asian and
African treaties freedom of consent had not been present. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/SR.47, at
10 (1966). He also insisted upon the right to freely dispose of natural resources and the
right to remove foreign military bases. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/SR.50, at 5 (1966).
831. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/SR.59, at 3 (1967).
832. Id. at 6-7. Myslil of Czechoslovakia stated:
The principle pacta sunt servanda was naturally only applicable to treaties
and other obligations accepted freely . . . .Unequal treaties, in particular
treaties which were the product of colonialism, and treaties which had not been
concluded in accordance with international law. . . were examples of treaties
to which the principle could hardly be applied.
Id.
833. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/SR.60, at 3 (1967).
834. Id. at 5-8.
[A] provision should be included to recognize the possibility of abrogating
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as did the Polish delegate835 who declared that although the subject of
unequal treaties was controversial, that was no reason to avoid it.836
The Canadian delegate, Miller, stated that the United Kingdom
delegate in 1966, had acted wisely in omitting from the Declaration the
controversial points837 as there was agreement that only treaties which
were coerced by military force should be invalidated. 838 The Swedish
delegate, Blix, a well-known international law expert on treaty termina-
tion, pointed out that the failure to enumerate imposed treaties did not
suggest the juridical intent that they be excluded by the Declaration. 839 It
merely avoids the possibility of a legal argument a contrario which
might inadvertently require the good faith observance of all non-
imposed treaties, even if they should be void pursuant to other substan-
tive rules governing treaty termination. 84 The general formulation was
merely a cautious one.
84 1
The Czechoslovakian delegate accepted the concept of treaty
"validity" based upon "generally recognized principles and rules of
international law" since this embodied the idea that international
treaties must be concluded freely and on the basis of equality .842 The
United Kingdom then narrowed its objection to the excluded language
and argued that such language might be uliderstood to apply to certain
controversial questions relating to treaty succession. 
843
treaties which had been concluded in bad faith, which could be deemed to
include such elements as force, duress, coercion and fraud.
Id. at 7.
835. Id. at 3-5.
836. Id. at 5.
837. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/SR.61, at 6 (1967). "The delegation of the Ufiited
Kingdom had acted wisely in omitting those controversial points from its draft." Id.
838. He contended that the International Law Commission had taken no decision on
the question of whether a new state could avoid a prior, unjust or inequitable treaty. Id. at
7.
839. Id. at 13.
840. "[Tlhere was no need for the statement concerning 'unequal treaties' in the
elaboration of the principle under discussion whereas there might be some danger in
including it." Id.
841. "That formulation was thus more comprehensive and at the same time more
cautious than the other." Id.
842. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/SR. 79, at 9 (1967): "His delegation would accept the text
on the understanding that the reference in paragraph 3 . . must be concluded freely and
on the basis of equality in order to be valid."
843. Id. at 10.
His delegation had regarded the proposal to add the words "freely concluded on
a basis of equality" to paragraph 3 as open to objection on the grounds that it
might be taken to apply to certain controversial questions relating to treaty
succession.
Id. See also Draft Report of the 1967 Special Committee (Milan Sahovi6, Rapporteur),
U.N. Doc. A/AC. 125/L.53/Add.4 (1967); Report of the Special Committee, 22 U.N.
GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 87, U.N. Doc. A/6799 (1967).
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In a lengthy working paper presented to the 1970 meeting of the
Special Committee, Italy contended that the principle of sovereign
equality, as expressed, was "too vague" and "tautological." 844 Italy
had wanted the search for agreement to continue, especially in regard to
the transfer of national wealth in accordance with treaties validly entered
into, 845 as Kenya had previously suggested.846 However, Italy did not
mention, either in its working paper or in statements during the 1970
meetings, imposed treaties. The delegates did not attempt to further
revise their 1967 formulation of the validity principle, even in light of
the conclusion of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
In summary, there was agreement that the use of military force
would invalidate a treaty, 847 but there was no agreement on whether
economic force should have a similar effect.848 This problem was left to
the International Law Commission. Only a few Western states were
hesitant to incorporate the broader rule favored by the Communist and
non-aligned states. There was substantial support for the belief that
invalidity might be extended in the future to unequal treaties.
The impact of the 1970 Declaration on the rule against imposed




847. The Venezuela representative stated:
The body of rules the Committee had formulated could legitimately be
regarded as the most up-to-date expression of the scope and interpretation of
the Charter of the United Nations . . . and as a most effective contribution to
the future codification of principles which were authoritatively regarded as
authentic examples of jus cogens ....
Id. at 77. The Japanese delegate argued that the Declaration was "a most significant
elaboration." Id. at 115. The delegate of the U.A.R. viewed the Declaration as a great
moment in the history of the whole process of codification of the principles of peaceful
coexistence. Id. at 116. R61ing stated that the 1970 Declaration represented a merging of
various interests.
The different roots of peaceful coexistence merged in the United Nations
debates which led to the adoption of the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law Concerning Friendly Relations and operation among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations ....
Roling, International Law and the Maintenance of Peace, 4 NETH. Y.B. OF INT'L L. I
(1973).
848. The Dutch representative argued that the Declaration ought not to be viewed as
if it is a carefully drafted legal document, thus argumentation a contrario is not to be
determinative. Id. at 95. This view is contrary to the view that precision in rules of law
represents a guarantee for all countries, particularly small and developing countries.
[1968] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 117 (1970).
Subsequently, the 1972 General Assembly Resolution on Renunciation of Force and
Use of Nuclear Weapons merely recited the 1970 Declaration and declared the renuncia-
tion of force "in all its forms. . . in accordance with the Charter. ... G.A. Res. 1926,
27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30, at 5-6, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972). SeealsoUNITED NATIONS, THE
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treaties was discussed in two 1972 studies by Milan Sahovi. 849 Sahovi6,
the representative from Yugoslavia, stated that a number of delegates
contended that the International Law Commission should clarify certain
aspects of the legal principle governing unequal treaties, 'M a principle
believed by many to be the most important restriction on the principle of
pacta sunt servanda.
851
4. International Codification: The 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties. The 1969 Vienna Convention adopted a vague rule
regulating the use of force in treaty relations. Ambiguities were inten-
tionally included as a compromise, with the expectation that future
practice would resolve them. The Convention, even though not yet in
force, is significant as being the first multilateral agreement to contain a
rule addressed to the use of force against a state in the treaty-making
process. 852
a. Article 52 and its Drafting.
Articles 26, 52, 75, the Declaration on Economic Coercion and
the Dissemination Resolution. Article 52 of the 1969 Vienna Conven-
tion states the general rule that treaties coerced by the threat or use of
force are void. The phrase, "the threat or use of force" is directly from
article 2(4) of the Charter. Neither that phrase, nor the term "void" are
defined in the text of the Convention. Article 52 states:
A treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the
threat or use of force in violation of the principles of interna-
tional law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.
849. M. SAHOVIt, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELA-
TIONS AND COOPERATION 394-407 (1972) (hereinafter cited ag SAHOVI1t], reviewed, Rosen-
stock, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 750 (1974); Sahovid, Codification des Principles du Droit
International des Relations Amicales et de la Coopiration entre les Etats, 137 RECUEIL DES
COURs 306-08 (1972).
850. SAHOVIt(, supra note 849, at 399. See also [1966] U.N. JURIDICAL Y.B. 125 (1968).
851. SAHOVI¢, supra note 849, at 404. See also Morawiecki, Lenin's Concept of
Peaceful Coexistence, 3 POLISH Y.B. INT'L L. 11 (1970); Raghaven, The United Nations
Charter and the Use of Force in Inter-State Relations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
[THE] UNITED NATIONS 161 (R. Hingorani ed. 1972); R. Baxter, Study of the Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1965 (unpublished study). The 1975
Helsinki Declaration uses essentially the same language as that contained in Principle
G(c). Article 10(1) of Part A states, "The participating States will fulfill in good faith their
obligations. . . arising from treaties or other agreements in conformity with international
law." Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, 14 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 1292, 1296 (1975).
852. Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Convention]. "It [Article 52] is perhaps the boldest and most decisive
innovation in the history of the law of treaties." S. AGRAWALA, Introduction, in ESSAYS ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES XV, xxxiii (1972).
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Article 75 addresses treaties concluded with an aggressor state. Article
75 states:
The provisions of the present Convention are without
prejudice to any obligation in relation to a treaty which may
arise for an aggressor State in consequence of measures taken
in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations with
reference to that State's aggression.
A treaty imposed on an aggressor state need only be in conformity
with the Charter. This requirement allows a state, presumably the
aggrieved state, in lieu of the United Nations, to conclude such a treaty.
There is no definition of the requirement of "reference to that State's
aggression" or of an "aggressor."
Article 26 states the general principle of pacta sunt servanda:
Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith.
Included in the "Final Act" of the Conference, which was a
resolution accompanying but not a part of the text of the convention, was
the Declaration on the Prohibition of the Threat or Use of Economic or
Political Coercion in Concluding a Treaty, 853 and the Dissemination
Resolution 854 which required widespread dissemination of that
declaration.
855
The Declaration emphasizes the freedom of state consent:
The United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties
. . . condemns the threat or use of pressure in any form,
whether military, political, or economic, by any State in order
to coerce another State to perform any act relating to the
conclusion of a treaty in violation of the principles of the
sovereign equality of States and freedom of consent .... 856
Certain other articles of the Vienna Convention are of importance
to the present discussion. Article 4 of the Convention provides that the
Convention is not to be retroactive, although article 52 is certainly
regarded as retroactive to at least 1945.857 Article 42 provides that the
853. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Documents (1968-
1969), at 285, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/l/Add.2 (1971).
854. Id.
855. The resolution in part stated, "Member States [are] to give the Declaration the
widest possible publicity and dissemination." Id.
856. Id. (emphasis added).
857. The prohibition contained in article 52 is independent of article 4. Article 52 is a
'codification" rather than an actual example of "progressive development" of the law.
Article 4 states:
Without prejudice to the application of any rules set forth in the present
Convention to which treaties would be subject under international law indepen-
dently of the Codvention, the Convention applies only to treaties which are
concluded by States after the entry into force of the present Convention with
regard to such States.
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validity of a treaty might "be impeached only through the application of
the present Convention." 858 Articles 69859 and 71860 state the general
consequences of a treaty being held void. Especially, article 69 provides
that a treaty voided under article 52 may not have even a limited
effect. 
861
Drafting Articles 26, 52, and 75. The Vienna Convention was
drafted under the auspices of the International Law Commission.
Although the initial efforts of the Special Rapporteurs had begun in the
early 1950's, the emphasis of this analysis is on the suggestions made by
the state representatives during the 1968-1969 Conference and, where
relevant, on the views expressed by members of the International Law
Commission and the Special Rapporteurs.
The convention did not provide exact definitions of "force" and
"aggressor." Ambiguities were created by the drafters intentionally,
since they were the essence of a compromise which made agreement on
the text of these articles possible. It was intended that future practice of
the United Nations would clarify these terms.
Article 26 of the Convention was subject to several proposed
amendments. One of the most important was the Five-State Amendment
proposed by Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Spain and Tanzania,
862
which would have replaced the phrase, "Every treaty in force," with
the phrase, "Every valid treaty." The Congo proposed using the
Convention, supra note 852, at 236. However, some "codification" may not be a
'progressive development" of international law.
858. Article 42 states:
I. The validity of a treaty or of the consent of a State to be bound by a treaty
may be impeached only through the application of the present Convention.
2. The termination of a treaty, its denunciation or the withdrawal of a party,
may take place only as a result of the application of the provisions of the treaty
or of the present Convention. The same rule applies to the suspension of the
operation of a treaty.
Convention, supra note 852, at 249.
859. See note 896 infra.
860. Article 71 states:
I. In the case of a treaty which is void under article 53 the parties shall:
(a) eliminate as far as possible the consequences of any act
performed ...
2. In the case of a treaty which becomes void and terminates under article 64,
the termination of the treaty:
(b) does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties
created through the execution of the treaty prior to its termination. . . [if]
their maintenance is not in itself in conflict with the new peremptory norm
of general international law.
Convention, supra note 852, at 259-60.
861. It is arguable that if article 52 is a jus cogens, and even if an agreement is void
under article 52, then states may keep in force consequences of that agreement under
article 71(a), as long as it is not possible to do otherwise.
862. Five-State Amendment, supra note 853, at 145, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.
39/C. 1/L. 118 (1968).
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phrase: "treaties which have been regularly concluded.- 86 3 Neither
amendment was accepted, but the debates clearly indicate that the
delegates believed only valid treaties to be within pacta sunt servanda.
It was decided for drafting reasons only that the word "valid"
should be left out of article 52. The debates make it clear that the validity
of treaties was generally understood to be a qualification of pacta sunt
servanda. Moreover, the prime concern was with invalidity stemming
from unequal and imposed treaties.
Talalayev of the Soviet Union specifically criticized treaties pro-
cured by force, such as colonial treaties. 64 Mercado of Bolivia
criticized both imposed and unjust treaties.8 65 Mercado stated:
The expression "treaty in force" would then serve the
purposes of States which were more concerned to defend
rights arising from unjust treaties than to make concessions in
the interests of justice. 866
Harry of Australia867 and De Bresson of France8 68 warned against
burdening the text with unnecessary language. Rosenne of Israel found
the amendments unnecessary,8 69 and the Cuban delegation understood
the words "treaty in force," as meaning "valid treaty, ' 8 70 a view
shared by other delegates, including those from Czechoslovakia,
871
Spain, 872 Nepal873 and Rumania.
874
863. Id., U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/C.1/L.189 (1968).
864. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Summary Records,
First Session (1968), at 152, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/Add. 1 (1970). "[The Soviet Union]
was firmly opposed to treaties procured by force to obtain colonial possessions." Id.
865. Id. at 154.
866. Id. He also stated:
A treaty which had been imposed by force, or a treaty which sanctioned a
defacto situation, was contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter
and could not be binding upon the parties.
Id.
867. His delegation could support the International Law Commission's text, and
believed that attempts to burden the convention with unnecessary qualifications
should be avoided.
Id. at 156.
868. Id. at 156-57.
869. Id. at 157.
870. Id. at 150-51. Tabio of Cuba stated:
The pacta sunt servanda rule was intended to ensure the stability of law;
not stability at any price, but stability based on justice. A treaty cloaked in false
legality to conceal an unlawful aim was a kind of offence and could not be
covered by the pacta sunt servanda rule any more than a treaty to which a
State's consent had been obtained unjustly or by coercion.
Id. at 150. See also U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Summary
Records, Second Session (1969), at 44-45, where Tabio restated his earlier views.
871. Id. at 46.
872. Id. at 47.
873. Id. at 48.
874. Id. at 49.
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Virtually all states believed that pacta sunt servanda referred only
to valid treaties, and many declared that treaties which were imposed by
force, or were unequal, should be regarded as invalid.
Article 52 of the Convention, sparked considerable debate con-
cerning whether it invalidated only imposed treaties, or unequal treaties
as well. The debates did not resolve this issue. The term "force", in the
context of the Declaration on the Prohibition of Using Economic and
Political Force, permits the conclusion that article 52 is a rule against
unequal treaties. However, the Declaration was not made a part of the
text of article 52 or of the Convention. Most of the developed states
contended that if one were to rely on the text only, economic force
would not be included.
In 1969, this author, in the VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNA-
TIONAL LAW, analyzed the drafting of article 52,875 and noted that an
amendment8 76 was proposed by the Afro-Asian, Latin American and
Communist states. 8 77 The amendment proposed that article 52 explicitly
mention economic and political pressure as grounds for treaty invalida-
tion. This amendment failed, but as a compromise, the Declaration on
Economic and Political Force, a simple Conference resolution, was
adopted8 78 and bolstered by passage of the Dissemination Resolution, a
compromise which called for the widespread dissemination of the
Declaration.879
The Commentary to the draft text by the International Law Com-
mission stated that the Commission deliberately left the phrase "threat
or use of force" undefined in the anticipation that the acts covered by
this term should be determined by subsequent United Nations' interpre-
tations of the relevant provisions of the Charter.
880
A study of the views of the Special Rapporteurs, Sir Humphrey
Waldock, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, and Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, indi-
875. Malawer, A New Concept of Consent and World Public Order: "Coerced
Treaties" and the Convention on the Law of Treaties, 4 VAND. J. TRANS'L L. 1 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Malawer].
876. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/C.l/L.370/Rev. I/Vol. II, at 5 (1969).
877. Malawer, supra note 875, at 18.
878. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Documents (1968-
1969) at 285, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/l/Add. 2 (1971).
Solemnly condemns the threat or use of pressure in any form, whether
military, political, or economic, by any State in order to coerce another State to
perform any act relating to the conclusion of a treaty in violation of the
principles of the sovereign equality of States and freedom of consent.
Id.
879. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Documents (1968-
1969) at 285, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/l/Add. 2 (1971). "Requests Member States to give
the Declaration the widest possible publicity and dissemination." Id.
880. Id. at 64.
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cates that they believed that article 52 only codified an existing rule of
law. Sir Humphrey Waldlock argued in 1963, that article 52 did not
involve undue legal risks unless the concept of "force" was extended to
include economic and political force. 88' The Special Rapporteurs
argued against giving article 52 a broad definition 882 which might
encourage unfounded treaty denunciation. One may conclude mini-
mally that a rule against imposed treaties was adopted in 1969. This
writer concluded in 1970, that:
An analysis of the work of the Commission-Conference
codification process that treated the question of defining
force in the context of coerced treaties highlights the conflict
between the developed states and undeveloped states ...
Clearly, the underdeveloped states supported a broad defini-
tion of "force," while the more industrialized states favored a
restrictive definition proffered by the three Special
Rapporteurs.
883
b. Recent Writings. Since the late 1960's, a number of writers
have discussed the general problems of imposed treaties in the context of
article 52.884
In 1971, Shabtai Rosenne presented a thorough study of the
procedural provisions of the Vienna Convention, 885 including those
provisions which apply to the rules governing the invalidity, termination
and suspension of the operation of treaties. He noted that these pro-
cedural rules "had become from the political point of view the most
sensitive issue which the diplomatic conference would have to face.'" 886
881. [1953] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 36, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/60 (1953).
882. Malawer, supra note 875 at 22-23.
883. Id. at 24.
884. See generally Rozakis, The Conditions of Validity of International Agreements,
26-27 REV. HELLtNIQUE DROIT INT'L221 (1973-1974); 1. SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CONVEN-
TION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES (1973); G. SILVA, CONFERENCIA DE VIENA SOBRE o DIREITO
Dos TRATADOS (1971); Elreedy, The Main Features of the Concept of Invalidity in the
Vienna Convention on Treaties, 27 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 13
(1971); Partridge, Political and Economic Coercion: Within the Ambit of Article 52 ofthe
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties?, 5 INT'L LAWYER 755 (1971); Kearney &
Dalton, The Treaty on Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970); Murphy, Economic Duress
and Unequal Treaties, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 51 (1970); E. GUARIDA & M. DELPECH, EL
DERECHO DE LOS TRATADOS Y LA CONVENCION DE VIENA (1970); Dhokalia, Nullity of
Invalidity of Treaties, 9 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 172 (1969); Comment, A Background Report on
Codification of the Law of Treaties at the Vienna Conference, 43 TULANE L.R. 798 (1969);
Note, United Nations Law of Treaties Conference, 19 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 59 (1969);
Stone, De Victoribus: The International Law Commission and Imposed Treaties of Peace,
8 VA. J. INT'L L. 356 (1968); Detter, The Problem of Unequal Treaties, 15 INT'L COMP.
L.Q. 1069 (1966).
885. Rosenne, The Settlement of Treaty Disputes Under the Vienna Convention of
1969, 31 ZEITSCHRIFr FOR AUSLNDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 3
(1971).
886. Id. at 7.
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These rules, especially articles 42, 65, 69 and the Annex (and this writer
would add article 71), reflect delicate political compromises on cardinal
issues.88 7 Rosenne concluded that the procedures established by the
treaty apply to all grounds of invalidity, including coercion of a state.
888
The 1969 Vienna Convention established procedures to be fol-
lowed when terminating an agreement in reliance on specified grounds.
It incorporated in article 65,889 the pacific settlement provisions of the
Charter, and in article 66, the requirement of non-compulsory judicial
settlement by the International Court of Justice and compulsory jurisdic-
tion when relying upon a jus cogens.890 It also established an optional
Conciliation Commission under the authority of the Secretary-
General. 891 If a state relies upon the rule against imposed treaties, it will
not be faced with compulsory judicial settlement, unless that rule is
determined to be an existing or a new jus cogens under either article 53
or 64.
In 1967, Michael Bothe discussed the earlier but essentially
identical version of the prohibition against coercion, which appears in
articles 52 and 75.892
Bothe presented a discussion of the dichotomy between the law of
war and the impact of the threat or use of force on the law of treaties. He
stated that, "this new concept of the prohibition of force cannot be
considered as generally accepted between the wars," 893 but went on to
argue that today, despite existing objections, there is a rule against the
887. Id. at 8.
888. Id. at 59. Rosenne stated:
The outcome would seem to be that the differences between the jurispru-
dential characteristics of the various grounds for the invalidity or the termina-
tion of a treaty are not in themselves sufficiently serious to affect the operation
of the procedure laid down in the Vienna Convention, as far as concerns the life
of the treaty itself.
Id.
889. Convention, supra note 852, art. 65, para. 3 states:
If, however, objection has been raised by any other party, the parties shall
seek a solution through the means indicated in article 33 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
890. Convention, supra note 852, art. 66, para. (a) states:
Any one of the parties to a dispute concerning the application or the
interpretation of article 53 or 64 may, by a written application, submit it to the
International Court of Justice for a decision unless the parties by common
consent agree to submit the dispute to arbitration.
Convention, supra note 852, at 257. If the abrogation involves a jus cogens, compulsory
jurisdiction is provided. This jurisdiction may be avoided if the parties agree to submit
their dispute to arbitration.
891. Annex to the Convention, paras. 1-7.
892. Bothe, Consequences of the Prohibition of the Use of Force-Comments on Arts.
49 and 70 of the ILC's 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 27 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR
AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 507 (1967).
893. Id. at 508.
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use of force in treaty law. "[Ilt must be concluded from doctrine and
practice that positive international law does not take into account these
objections.' "'94 However, Bothe emphasized the necessity of showing a
causal relationship between the illegal use of military force and the
conclusion of a treaty, in order to invalidate that treaty.8 95 He was
critical of the repetitive nature of article 75, the "Aggressor State
Exception",896 and concluded that this exception was clear in the United
Nations Charter, especially in article 103.
In 1970, Frankowska, a Polish international lawyer, contended
that article 52 of the Vienna Convention was so basic as to need no
commentary.8 97 Lachs on the other hand, another Polish international
lawyer and former member of the International Court of Justice, argued
in 1968, that the draft article did deserve special attention.
8 98
c. Article 75 (The Aggressor State Exception). Article 75 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states a general exception to
the law governing the validity of treaties. A review of the debates makes
it clear that the drafters viewed article 75 essentially as a restriction on
the rule stated in article 52.899 A treaty is void under article 52 if it is
coerced by the "threat or use of force." An exception is permitted by
article 75 if such coercion is directed against an aggressor state by either
a member state or the United Nations in conformity with the Charter.
Such measures must be in "reference" to the aggressor state's aggres-
sion, and would presumably be implemented when the aggressor were
defeated. The text of article 75 defines neither "aggression" nor the
class of measures which might be characterized as being in "reference"
to a state's aggression.
Amendments were unsuccessfully proposed by both Japan900 and
894. Id. at 509-10.
895. Id. at 513.
896. Id. at 517. See also Convention, supra note 852, art. 69, para. 3, which states, "In
cases falling under articles 49, 50, 51 or 52, para. 2 ["good faith reliance"] does not apply
with respect to the party to which . . . the coercion is imputable."
897. Frankowska, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 3 POLISH Y.B.
INT'L L. 239 (1970).
898. Lachs, The Law of Treaties-Some General Reflections on the Report of the
International Law Commission, in RECUEIL D'tTUDES DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL: EN
HOMMAGE A PAUL GUGGENHEIM 393 (Geneva University ed. 1968).
899. See text accompanying notes 910-11 infra "Legal consequences of war for a
State-victim of aggression do not as well depend on its victory. . . .They are determined
by legal relationships created by an act of aggression between an aggressor State and a
State-victim of agression." Tunkin, International Law: The Contemporary and Classic, in
ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF KRISHNA RAo 48, 50 (M. Nawaz ed. 1976).
900. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Documents, (1968-
1969), at 200, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/C.I/L.366 (1968).
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Thailand. 90 1 Japan sought to omit any reference to "aggression" and to
allow only the Security Council to take measures otherwise invalid
under the terms of the Convention. 90 2 This would have prohibited states
from acting individually and would have authorized collective action
only by the Security Council, presumably under its enforcement
powers.
Thailand's amendment was more limited than Japan's amendment.
It sought only to omit any reference to an "aggressor" state. 90 3 This
would have retained the right of states to act individually. Thailand
desired to broaden the exception to cases not involving aggression. 9°4
The debates relating to the Japanese and Thai amendments indicate
that the delegates intended article 75 to be, essentially, a limitation on
the rule against imposed treaties. The term "aggression" was not
defined, and there was no discussion concerning the ambiguity of the
"reference back" requirement. For example, should transfer of terri-
tory be regarded as a reference to the original aggression?
Fujisaki of Japan argued that the existing draft was both too
narrow, because it dealt with cases of aggression, and too broad,
because "measures taken in conformity with the Charter" might be
interpreted as including measures taken unilaterally by a state. 90 5 He
contended that the article should not be limited only to cases of
aggression. Suphamongkhon of Thailand argued that reference to
"aggression" should be eliminated because of the League's and the
United Nation's failure in defining that term.' This is an example of
the familiar position that only when there is an accepted definition of
"aggression" should the term be incorporated into a rule of treaty law.-
Sir Francis Vallat of the United Kingdom believed article 75
unnecessary in light of its implicit inclusion in article 103 of the
Charter.9 ' 7 Bindschedler of Switzerland stated that as drafted, article 75
simply referred to measures which might be taken by the Security
Council under Chapter VII, and by member states as measures of
self-defense, under article 51 of the Charter. 90 8
Talalayev of the Soviet Union claimed that his delegation "had a
901. Id. See also U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/C.I/L.367 (1968).
902. See note 900, supra.
903. See note 901, supra.
904. Id.
905. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Summary Records,
First Session (1968), at 453, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/1 l/Add. 1 (1970).
906. Id. at 453-54. See also statement by the West German delegate, id. at 454.
907. Id. at 454. Accordingly, he was to abstain in voting on the amendments.
908. Id. at 454-55. He was in favor of the Japanese amendment.
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very special moral right to speak with wrath of aggression.' ' 9 He
opposed both the Japanese and Thai amendments on the grounds that
they equated a peace treaty imposed by an aggressor with one imposed
on an aggressor. 910 He stated that:
[The amendments were] placing on the same footing a
peace treaty imposed by an aggressor on the victim of the
aggression, and a treaty imposed on the aggressor after its
defeat.
War of aggression was the most serious international
crime. They were not dealing with any rights or benefits which
an aggressor might claim, but only with the aggressor's
obligations. 91'
Kearney of the United States was in favor of the Japanese amend-
ment on the grounds that article 75 was too limited. He desired to
provide a clear statement of the rule intended by the Charter, especially
as to the Security Council's authority.
912
The Japanese delegation abstained from voting on article 75 when
it became clear that its amendment would not be adopted. 913
d. The 1974 General Assembly Declaration on Defining Aggres-
sion: Articles 1, 2 and 5(1)- "Armed Force " and Its "Threat. "The
1974 Declaration on Defining Aggression further clarified the
ambiguity which had existed since 1969, by providing a definition
which covers both "force" in article 52, and "aggression" in article
75. The definition apparently resolved this ambiguity in favor of a rule
against imposed treaties.
The 1974 Declaration on Defining Aggression, in article 1, defines
aggression as the use of "armed force.' 914
Article 1. Aggression is the use of armed force by a state
915
909. Id. at 455.
As a consequence of the aggression of which it had been the victim during
the Second World War, the Soviet Union had suffered human and material





912. Id. at 456. Kearney may not have taken this position if he were more fully aware
of the significance of its adoption in broadening the prohibition as contained in article 52.
913. U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties, Official Records, Summary Records,
Second Session (1969), at 127, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/1 I/Add. 1 (1970).
914. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR 31, at 142-43, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); 2
DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION-THE SEARCH FOR WORLD PEACE 14 (B. Ferencz
ed. 1975). See generally Comment, The United Nations Definition of Aggression: A
Preliminary Analysis, 5 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 171 (1975).
915. G.A. Res. 3314, Annex Agenda Item No. 86, at 2 (1974).
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Article 2 defines the "first use of armed force" as "prima facie" but
rebuttable evidence of aggression.
Article 2. The first use of armed force by a State in contraven-
tion of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an
act of aggression although the Security Council may, in
conformity with the Charter, conclude that a determination
that an act of aggression had been committed would not be
justified in the light of other relevant circumstances including
the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not
of sufficient gravity.
916
Article 5(1) of the Declaration states:
Article 5(1). No consideration of whatever nature, whether
political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a
justification for aggression.
917
Since "use" in article 2 is broader than "actual attack", it seems
reasonable to conclude that the threat or use of military or armed attack
is "aggression." One concludes that this view governs the determina-
tion of an "aggressor" under article 75 of the Vienna Convention, and
also identifies certain treaties as imposed by "force" and hence, invalid
under article 52 of the Convention.
918
In 1974, Andrew Bennett of the United States stated that the
Declaration "is one of the positive achievements of this 29th General
Assembly. "919 However, Robert Rosenstock, also of the United States,
viewed the Declaration as a compromise intended simply to provide
916. Id. However, article I does not use the term "threat or use of force," but only
the term "use of force."
917. Id. at 3.
Article 5(3) states: "No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from
aggression is or shall be recognized as lawful." Id. But see articles 10 and 32 of the 1974
General Assembly Resolution ("The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States")
which declares all states "juridically equal" and that "[n]o State may use ... economic,
political or any other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it the
subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights." G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
918. The definition forms part of a consistent effort of the United Nations to
develop a code of basic rules of international law, implementing the cryptic
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. Adopted unanimously or by
consensus, these rules are binding on the world community as authoritative
interpretations of the Charter.
The end of one story is, of course, only the beginning of another, and we
have to wait many years before we will know what impact this document has had
on the development of international relations.
Sohn, Introduction, in I DEFINING INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION-THE SEARCH FOR
WORLD PEACE 1, 2 (B. Ferencz ed. 1975).
919. DEP'T STATE BULL. Spec. Rep. No. 13, at 16(1975); N.Y. Times, April 13, 1974
at I, col. 4.
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guidance to the Security Council in defining the term "aggression" as
used in article 39 of the Charter.
920
The interest of the Soviet Union in defining "aggression" was
more limited than that of other states. During the debates of the Special
Committee, Kolesnik of the Soviet Union, by emphasizing the right of
self-defense conferred under article 51 of the Charter, made it clear that
for a definition to be favored by the Soviet Union, it would have to
identify the degree of force which would justify a state's exercising its
right to defend itself.
921
5. A Note on the Recent Activities of Some Regional Organiza-
tions. Regional organizations have only barely begun to consider the
problem of imposed treaties.
The Organization of African Unity has denounced only in general
terms the threat or use of economic and political pressure in international
relations insofar as it hampers their political and economic develop-
ment. 922 In 1972, the O.A.U. declared that a proposed agreement
between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia would be invalid because it
would lack valid state consent on behalf of Rhodesia, since Rhodesia
920. Id.
921. U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/SR. 100-09, at 16(1973). The United States' representative
rejected the multidefinition of aggression as suggested by the Soviet delegate. Nelson
stated:
[T]he views expressed by the Soviet representative seemed to indicate some
confusion over the Special Committee's task. According to the Soviet.represen-
tative, the concept of aggression as set forth in Article 39 of the Charter was not
the same as the concept of aggression in Article 51 and a distinction had to be
drawn between aggression which conferred the right of self-defence and that
which did not. But the task was to define aggression, not the right of
self-defense.
Id. at 17. See also Report of the Sixth Committee, U.N. Doc. A/9890, at 2 (1974); Report of
the Working Group, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 19, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 134/L.46 (1974);
Report of the Special Committee, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 19, U.N. Doc. A/9019
(1973). This writer's position is analogous to the view that Charter article 2(4) and article 39
should be understood in terms of article 51 of the Charter, so as to limit the Security
Council's authority to use military force under article 39 to cases only of military attack.
Julius Stone argues that the Charter must be interpreted in light of the relative ineffective-
ness of the United Nations, any other view being a "vulgar understanding." Stone, Force
and the Charter in the Seventies, 2 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 1, 5 (1974). On inter-war
efforts to define aggression, see Eagleton, The Attempt to Define Aggression, 264 INT'L
CONCIL. 579 (1930); Official Documents, Soviet Conventions on Defining Aggression, 27
AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 192 (1933).
922. 2 ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY: RESOLUTIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND
STATEMENTS ADOPTED BY THE ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY SESSIONS OF THE COUNCIL
OF MINISTERS: Resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty of African Countries over their
Natural Resources, CM/Res. 245 (XVII), 146, 147 (1973).
[The Council of Ministers] Denounces the economic and political pressures
which certain developed countries are attempting to bring to bear on African
countries with a view to threatening their development efforts and hampering
them in the exercise of their sovereignty over their natural resources . . ..
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was not being governed by the consent of the majority of its
population.923
In 1966, a sub-committee of the Asian-African Legal Consultative
Committee declared in Bangkok, that although the general principle of
peaceful coexistence requires the observance of all international law
obligations, this requirement does not include "unjust" treaties. 924 In
1969, in Karachi, the Consultative Committee did not agree on any of
the major aspects of article 52.925 A difference of opinion existed
regarding whether article 52 was lex lata,926 whether it encompassed
economic and political pressure, 927 and regarding the merits of ambigu-
ously drafting article 52, thus leaving it to be interpreted by subsequent
practice .928
In 1971, the Inter-American Juridical-Committee of the Organiza-
tion of American States, while discussing treaties conflicting with the
United Nations Charter,929 never mentioned article 52. In 1970, the
committee also discussed the revision of treaties, as requested by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, and again never raised the
problem of illegal military duress against a state. 930
923. Id. Resolution on Zimbabwe, CM/Res. 267 (XIX), at 176, -para. 3.
[The Council of Ministers] Calls Upon the Government of the United
Kingdom not to transfer or accord. . . and urges it to promote the country's
attainment of independence by a democratic system of Government in accord-
ance with the aspirations of the majority of the population ....
Id.
924. ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE EIGHTH
SESSION (BANGKOK) 78 (1966).
3) Where the performance of an existing treaty obligation has become unduly
burdensome or unjust, such obligation shall no longer be binding.
Id.
925. ASIAN-AFRICAN LEGAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE TENTH SES-
SION (KARACHI) 237-40 (1969).
926. Id. at 237 (delegate of Iraq); id. at 238 (Member of the I.L.C.).
927. Id. at 238-39 (delegate of Pakistan); id. at 240 (delegates of Japan and Indonesia).
The delegate of Pakistan argued that an anomaly would exist if one accepts the rule that
economic coercion of a representative would invalidate a treaty, but economic coercion of
a state would not. Id. at 238-39.
928. Id. at 238 (delegate of Japan); id. at 238-39 (delegate of Pakistan). The delegate of
Pakistan stated that "the I.L.C. instead of making the matter specifically clear, decided to
leave it to be worked out by interpretation, which was hardly satisfactory." Id. at 238.
929. ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES: WORK ACCOMPLISHED BY THE INTER-
AMERICAN JURIDICAL COMMITTEE 39 (1972); OEA/Ser. Q/IV.3, CJI-6 (1972).
930. Opinion on the Revision, Updating and Evaluation of Various International
Conventions, id. at 3. For a general study of international law and the inter-American
system see J. CASTILLA, EL DERECHO INTERNATIONAL EN EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO
(1970).
Even more than the United Nations Charter, the OAS Charter, April 30, 1948, art. 5,
para. e, & art. 16, [19511 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, at the minimum, represents an
implicit acceptance of the rule against imposed treaties. Article 5(e) declares that a victory
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D. Jurisprudence
National jurisprudence first dealt with imposed treaties in the
post-war era. The International Court of Justice has discussed this topic
to its greatest extent most recently in the 1970's.93
1
1. International Jurisprudence. In the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case 932 before the International Court of Justice, the United Kingdom
in a war of aggression "does not give rights." Article 16 declares that the use of coercive
measures of an economic or political character cannot result in "advantages of any kind."
In 1975, an amendment to article I of the OAS Charter was drafted which declared a
prohibition of the threat or use of force, in any manner inconsistent with the provisions of
the U.N. Charter or the Rio treaty. Protocol of Amendment of the Rio Treaty, 14 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 1121, 1123 (1975).
Neither the International Law Association nor the Institute of International Law (two
private groups), have analyzed the question of imposed treaties. However, the Institute of
International Law has discussed the modification and termination of multilateral treaties,
e.g. Modification et Terminaison des Traitis Collectifs, I ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 5 (1961).
931. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland v. Iceland), [1973] I.C.J. 4 (jurisdiction), [1974] I.C.J. 3 (merits); Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1973] I.C.J. 49 (jurisdiction),
[1974] I.C.J. 175 (merits); Belgium-Spain Barcelona Traction Case, [1970] I.C.J. 3;
Advisory Opinion on Interpretation of Peace Treaties, [1950 I.C.J. 65.
Most recently the issue of imposed treaties was raised, seemingly, by counsel in the
Western Sahara Case, but it was not reached by the International Court. Advisory Opinion
on the Western Sahara, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1355 (1975); Judicial Decisions, 10
INT'L LAWYER 199 (1976). Morocco proposed "to carry out an examination [of] both of
these treaties and of the motives which led to their conclusion, and the circumstances in
which they were concluded." CR 75/10, July 1, 1975, I.C.J. 4 (emphasis added). Morocco
claimed that Spain's "intention [was] to impose a protectorate on the region." Id. at 8. The
treaties were concluded "in peculiar circumstances." Id. at 2. Morocco concluded that the
protectorate of 1884 was not in conformity with international law. Id. at 13. Mauritania and
Morocco signed an agreement on April 14, 1976, dividing the Western Sahara between
them and providing for joint exploitation of the territory's phosphate deposits. Financial
Times, Apr. 15, 1976 at 5. See generally Comment, The March on the Spanish Sahara: A
Test of International Law, 6 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POL. 95, 111 (1976).
Hamed Sultan has recently analyzed the principle of restrictive treaty interpretation
and concluded that it is complementary to the principle of effectiveness, since both
attempt to effectuate the intent of the parties. Sultan, The SpecialFunction of the Principle
of Restrictive Interpretation, in M9LANGES OFFERTS A JURAJ ANDRASSY 294 (V. Ibler ed.
1965). After an analysis of the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice, Sultan
concluded:
[C]ontradictions in the agreement should be confined to what is necessary to
achieving the essential purposes of the Parties and should not be extended to
imposing new purposes and unnecessary detailed obligations upon the Parties.
Id.
Carbone argued that a unilateral act such as a promise in international law is to be
restrictively interpreted and that the Court supports this proposition. Carbone, Promise in
International Law: A Confirmation of its Binding Force, I ITALIAN Y.B. OF INT'L L. 166,
171 (1975).
932. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland v. Iceland), [1973] I.C.J. 4 (jurisdiction), [1974] I.C.J. 3 (merits). The Court gave
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and the Federal Republic of Germany contested Iceland's extension of
its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction, implemented in the 1960's and the
1970's. The dispute was submitted to the Court, and afforded it an
opportunity to address the issue of the validity of a treaty alleged by one
state as being imposed. The case involved an international agreement
binding the parties to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, and which was declared to have been concluded
as a consequence of unlawful military duress. Since the inception of the
Permanent Court of International Justice in 1920, this was the first time
the international tribunal had been confronted with and decided such an
issue.
Iceland, in 1958, proclaimed a 12-mile fisheries zone. 9" A number
of incidents occurred between Iceland, and the United Kingdom and
Germany, leading to a series of negotiations and, finally, an exchange of
notes. The Anglo-Icelandic Exchange of Notes took place on March 11,
1961, and the German-Icelandic Exchange of Notes took place on July
19, 1961 . 9 34 These diplomatic exchanges were registered with the
Secretary-General under United Nations Charter article 102.
The Exchange of Notes specified that the United Kingdom and
Germany would no longer object to a 12-mile fisheries zone, and
provided for six-months notice of any further extension. By the terms of
the Exchange of Notes, the parties accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the International Court in case of a dispute with regard to any such
future extension. In 1971, Iceland announced the termination of the
1961 Agreements and, in 1972, extended to 50 miles the limit of its
exclusive fisheries jurisdiction. The United Kingdom and Germany
complained to the Court of the unilateral denunciation and extension. In
1972, the Court granted interim measures. 9 5 In February 1973, the
judgment in the companion case brought by the Federal Republic of Germany at the same
time. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1973] I.C.J.
49 (jurisdiction), [1974] I.C.J. 175 (merits). The decisions and opinions were almost
identical.
933. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1973]
I.C.J. 49, 58 (jurisdiction). See generally [1973-1974] I.C.J. Y.B. 109-21. See also
Note, The Icelandic Fisheries Dispute: A Decision Is Finally Rendered, 5 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 248 (1975); Note, Law of the Sea-Exclusive Economic Zone, 16 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 474 (1975). In 1975, Iceland extended its fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles. Regula-
tions Concerning the Fishery Limits off Iceland, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1278 (1975).
934. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1973]
I.C.J. 49, 51 (jurisdiction). Iceland-United Kingdom Exchange of Notes, March 11, 1961,
397 U.N.T.S. 275; Iceland-German Exchange of Notes, July 19, 1961,409 U.N.T.S. 47.
935. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland v. Iceland), [1972] I.C.J. 12 (Order of Aug. 17, 1972).
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Court rendered its decision on its jurisdiction. 936
In late 1973, there was another exchange of notes providing for a
temporary two year arrangement pending a settlement of the dispute. In
1974, the Court rendered its decision on the merits, 937 which declared
that Iceland's claims were "not opposable" to the United Kingdom or
Germany.938 It did not declare Iceland's extension to be generally
invalid, but held that Iceland's preferential rights in the contested areas
had to be balanced by the historic rights of the United Kingdom and
Germany.
A central issue of the 1973 decision on the Court's jurisdiction was
whether the 1961 Agreements were void because of the threat or use of
military force directed at Iceland by the Royal Navy. 939 The Court in
1973, decided that the 1961 Agreements were not void9' and were not
imposed in violation of article 52 of the 1969 Vienna Convention. 941
The Court went on to state that the doctrine rebus sic stantibus had not
terminated the 1961 Agreements. 942 This view was reaffirmed by the
Court in 1974. 943 Though Iceland never appeared before the Court in
any of the proceedings, it did submit letters and documents as to its
position, especially concerning the lack of validity of the 1961
Agreements.
The cases brought by the United Kingdom and Germany were not
joined because of some differences as to their respective positions.
Although the issues were essentially the same, separate decisions were
rendered in the 1973 case.
The Icelandic letter of June 27, 1972, declared that the 1961
936. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland v. Iceland), [1973] I.C.J. 4 (jurisdiction), [1974] I.C.J. 3 (merits); Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1973] I.C.J. 49 (jurisdiction),
[1974] I.C.J. 175 (merits).
937. Id.
938. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland v. Iceland), [1974] I.C.J. 3 (merits).
939. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1973]
I.C.J. 49 (jurisdiction).
940. Id. at 59.
941. Id.
942. Id. at 16. "While changes in the law may under certain conditions constitute
valid grounds for invoking a change of circumstances affecting the duration of a treaty, the
Icelandic contention is not relevant to the present case." Id.
943. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1974]
I.C.J. 175 (merits). Compare, dissenting opinion of Judge Nervo, Fisheries Jurisdiction
Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v. Iceland), [1973] I.C.J. 4,
46 (jurisdiction), with dissenting opinion of Judge Nervo, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
(Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1973] I.C.J. 49, 91 (jurisdiction).
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Agreements "'took place under extremely difficult circumstances.'944
Germany, in its memorial, interpreted this statement as questioning the
initial validity of the 1961 Agreements. Germany believed that Ice-
land's position was that Iceland was "under some kind of pressure and
[concluded the agreements] not by its own free will." 94 5
The Court's discussion on this vital question was limited to only a
few sentences:
There can be little doubt, as is implied in the Charter of
the United Nations and recognized in Article'52 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, that under contemporary
international law an agreement concluded under the threat or
use of force is void. It is equally clear that a court cannot
consider an accusation of this serious nature on the basis of a
vague general charge unfortified by evidence in its support.
The history of the negotiations which led up to the 1961
Exchange of Notes reveals that these instruments were freely
negotiated by the interested parties on the basis of perfect
equality and freedom of decision on both sides. No fact has
been brought to the attention of the Court from any quarter
suggesting the slightest doubt on this matter.
946
The Court concluded as a matter of law that "an agreement
concluded under the threat or use of force is void," and found this
principle to be implied in the Charter of the United Nations. 947 This
statement itself is very significant in that it shows that the Court accepted
as of 1945, if not earlier, that a rule against imposed treaties existed and
was "recognized" by article 52 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties.
After stating that it could not consider such a serious charge if it
were "unfortified by evidence," the Court analyzed the history of the
negotiations which led to the 1961 Exchange of Notes, and concluded
that the negotiations revealed that the Agreements were freely
negotiated on the basis of perfect equality. No facts were found even to
suggest the slightest degree of coercion. 948 In light of the actual facts of
the case, as indicated in the separate and dissenting opinions of the
944. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1973]
I.C.J. 49, 58-59 (jurisdiction).
945. Id. at 59.
946. Id. (emphasis added).
947. Id. Briggs, Unilateral Denunciation of Treaties: The Vienna Convention and the
International Court of Justice, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 62 (1974), stated:
What is significant . . . is the Court's unhesitating acceptance as a princi-
ple of contemporary international law of the rule "recognized" in Article 52 of
the Vienna Convention . . ..
948. Id.
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Court, it is clear that the mere presence of military force in the contested
area was not sufficient to constitute "force" under the Court's formula-
tion of the rule.
The dissenting opinion of Padilla Nervo in the British case asserted
that the British Royal Navy had been using illegal force to oppose the
new fishery limit. 949
The Court should not overlook the fact, and does not
need to request documentary evidence as to the kind, shape
and manner of force which was used (Article 52, Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties).
A big power can use force and pressure against a small
nation in many ways . . . . The Royal Navy did not need to
use armed force, its mere presence on the seas inside the
fishery limits of the coastal state could be enough pressure.
* ' * There are moral and political pressures which can-
not be proved by the so-called documentary evidence .... 950
Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in his separate opinion, contended that the
1961 Agreement was based upon a quid pro quo.951' The United
Kingdom and Germany immediately recognized Iceland's exclusive
12-mile fishery zone, and Iceland agreed to compulsory jurisdiction of
the International Court if the United Kingdom or Germany contested
any future extension by Iceland of its fisheries limit.952 As to the
question of equality, Sir Gerald argued that the agreement was recip-
rocal. Iceland was given the right to have recourse in the future if it
objected to naval protection used to contest any new Icelandic
extension. 953
In the Barcelona Traction Case,954 there was a discussion of the
significance of a validly imposed treaty and the development of a new
rule of customary international law. The conclusion reached was that
such a treaty cannot be used as evidence to support the development of a
949. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland v. Iceland), [1973] I.C.J. 4, 46 (jurisdiction, dissenting opinion of Judge Nervo).
950. Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added). If the Royal Navy was within a 3 mile zone, the
Court's response may have been different.
951. Separate Opinion of Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (Fed-
eral Republic of Germany v. Iceland), [1973] I.C.J. 49, 73 (jurisdiction).
952. Id. "The quid pro quo was Iceland's acceptance of recourse to the Court if at
anytime she claimed further to extend her fishery limits." Id. at 73-74.
953. [Flor if one of the other Parties should react to Iceland's purported
extension of her fishery limits, not by recourse to the Court but by measures of
naval protection, it would then have been open to Iceland to invoke the
adjudication clause, which was in consequence a safeguard for her, as well as
for the other two Parties. Where then was the element of "duress"?
Id. at 34.
954. Belgium-Spain Barcelona Traction Case, [1970] I.C.J. 3 (merits).
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new rule of customary international law. This conclusion was not a
holding of the Court, but merely the conclusion of one judge in his
separate opinion.
955
The issue in the Barcelona Traction Case was whether the Interna-
tional Court of Justice would pierce the corporate veil of a Canadian
incorporated enterprise, and allow Belgium, the state of its majority
shareholders, standing to bring a question before the Court. The
question concerned the takeover by the Spanish government of the
corporation's foreign subsidiaries' property in Spain.956 The Court held
that there was no rule of customary international law which required it to
interfere in order to allow the shareholders, such standing.
957
The Court examined the provisions of the peace treaties of World
War I and World War II. It concluded that "lifting the corporate veil"
was provided for, but it did not support the finding of a generally
recognized rule in that or other situations. 958 The Court declared that the
drafters of those treaties intended only to provide for the seizing and
pooling of enemy property in order to cover reparation payments. The
question before the Court in 1970, was that of the complaining party's
standing to sue in an action requesting compensation for a taking of
property. These two situations were considerably different.
Judge Ammoun in a separate opinion argued that, generally,
validly imposed peace treaties would not be viewed as supportive of
"nascent international custom," because the treaties were imposed
upon defeated states.9 59 They did not evidence any real state consent by
the defeated. However, Ammoun believed that these treaties, under the
1969 Treaty on the Law of Treaties, "must be respected by virtue of the
rule pacta sunt servanda."960
So far as the Peace Treaties more particularly are con-
cerned, whether these be bilateral or multilateral, they are not
such to amount ipso facto to an element of custom. The
clauses of these treaties, imposed upon the defeated states,
must be respected by virtue of the rule pacta sunt servanda.
But can the reasoning be pressed so far as to say that their
provisions reflect the consent of, or the genuine and effective
acceptance by, the defeated State, which acceptance or con-
955. Id. at 305 (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun).
956. Id. at 7-11. This was by the use of bankruptcy procedures. Id. at 9.
957. Id. at 38, 48-49, 51. The Court refused to find such a right when one was not
explicitly denied. The Court refused to extend the right of diplomatic protection in order to
guard against confusion.
958. Id. at 40-41. It also looked at enemy-property legislation. Id.
959. Id. at 305 (separate opinion of Judge Ammoun).
960. Id.
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sent would, on this hypothesis, give rise to the opiniojuris?96
The 1950 Interpretation of Peace Treaties was an advisory opinion
which decided that Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania were required to
name representatives to commissions established under the World War
II peace treaties.962
Fitzmaurice, Counsel for the United Kingdom, argued that under-
lying the case was the opinion of the ex-enemy states that the peace
treaties were not valid because of the non-reciprocity or inequality of
obligations. 963 Fitzmaurice rejected the validity of such an argument as
"nonsense."964
I am of course aware, and my Government is aware, that
underlying the ex-enemy attitude there is probably a feeling,
hinted at if not overtly expressed, that because the human
rights clauses of the Peace Treaties are not reciprocal in
character, this justifies the ex-enemy Governments (if not in
actually studying to evade them) at any rate in representing
the efforts of my Government. . . as an attempt to interfere
in the internal affairs of these countries and to keep them in
some form of permanent subjection. Now, in fact, that would
be nonsense, but nevertheless there may be something here
that needs comment . ... 965
Fitzmaurice contended that if a plea of non-reciprocity were able to
invalidate a peace treaty, it would be impossible ever to conclude a war
by the use of a treaty. He stated that peace treaties by their nature usually
contain a number of unilateral and unequal provisions.
966
[I]f this argument [plea of non-reciprocity] were to be
admitted as valid the result would be destructive of the whole
force and obligatory character of treaties of peace, and it
would become useless to try and put any formal end to a state
of war by means of such treaties. . . since no finality would
in fact have been reached, and everything could be reopened
at any time of the plea of non-reciprocity. . . . By their very
nature and the circumstances in which they are made, treaties
of peace usually contain a number of clauses of a unilateral or
961. Id. He also went on to state the following:
It will be observed first of all that the clauses concerning war reparations
only apply against one party, for the benefit of the party which imposed them.
Of course it would not be otherwise in a treaty marking the end of a victorious
war even one which was waged for just cause.
Id.
962. Advisory Opinion on Interpretation of Peace Treaties, [1950] I.C.J. 65, 77.
963. Interpretations of Peace Treaties, I.C.J. Pleadings 329 (1950).
964. Id.
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non-reciprocal character. But such treaties and clauses are
not thereby juridically invalidated.
967
Post-war international jurisprudence on the rule against imposed
treaties also includes international arbitration cases. The German Exter-
nal Debts Arbitration,968 decided in 1972, involved a dispute between
Greece and Germany. The origin of the dispute was Germany's failure
to pay compensation for violations of Greek neutrality prior to Greece's
entry into World War 1.969 The case concerned Germany's obligations
under both the Versailles Treaty and the 1924 London Debt Agree-
ment. 970 The Tribunal held that debts arising from World War I were to
be included in the current German-Greek negotiations. 971
Germany agreed that a rule of restrictive treaty interpretation
existed, although it was not applicable in this case. Germany conceded
that an ambiguous treaty provision ought to be interpreted against its
drafters, but argued that Greek representatives, nevertheless, were
present during the drafting of the 1924 London Debt Agreement .972
It is difficult to reach any firm conclusions on the significance of
this case for the topic under discussion, except insofar as it indicates the
persistent view of states that a treaty is to be interpreted as imposing the
least burden--even if the treaty is imposed. 9
The following five cases decided by the Allied-Italian Conciliation
Commissions between 1952 and 1965, indicate acceptance of a restric-
tive rule of treaty interpretation of peace treaties. These cases collec-
tively agreed that the principle of legal equality was not violated, and
967 Id. (emphasis added). India-Pakistan Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the
ICA0 Council, [1972] I.C.J. 46, while not dealing with an imposed treaty, further indicates
the continuing dispute between states as to the existence of a restrictive rule of treaty
interpretation. See Argument by Polkhivola (India), India-Pakistan Appeal Relating to the
Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council, [1972] I.C.J. Pleadings 506. See also Memorial by India,
id. at 49; Reply of India, id. at 427. It is important to mention that the International Court in
Barcelona stated that general arbitral jurisprudence "cannot therefore give rise to
generalization going beyond the special circumstances of each case." Interpretations of
Peace Treaties, I.C.J. Pleadings 77 (1950).
968. Greece v. Germany, 47 INT'L L. REP. 418 (1974).
969. Id.
970. German Reparations, Aug. 16, 1924, 41 L.N.T.S. 429.
971. Greece v. Germany, 47 INT'L L. REP. 418, 421 (1974). The negotiations were to
be under the Agreement on German External Debts, done Feb. 27, 1953, 333 U.NT.S. 3.
972. Germany v. Germany, 47 INT'L L. REP. 444 (1974).
[I]t was permissible to interpret international treaties to the prejudice of those
who formulated them only when every other rule of interpretation had been
tried without success. The guiding principle was that a provision must be so
interpreted as to inflict the least burden . ...
Id.
973. Id. Recent state practice supports a restrictive rule of treaty interpretation.
Malawer, The Withdrawal of UNEF-A New Notion of Consent, 4 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 25
(1970).
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that the lack of free consent by Italy did not vitiate the validity of the
Peace Treaty. Most of these cases treated the problem of whether an
individual was entitled to reparations under the terms of the Peace
Treaty, and several involved problems of dual nationality.
The 1965 Droutzkoy Claim974 involved a claim by a United
Nations' national for tax exemption under the 1947 Peace Treaty. The
Commission, in upholding the claim, held that a restrictive rule of treaty
interpretation existed, but would be applicable only if a treaty provision
were ambiguous. In the words of the Commission:
The Commission feels obliged to stop at the point where a
so-called restrictive interpretation would be contrary to the
plain terms of this Treaty . .. .97
The Commission suggested that it is not always best to rely upon
interpretation as a method of alleviating unduly heavy burdens in
imposed treaties.976
Undoubtedly, when one is concerned with a treaty of
peace which was imposed-rather than discussed and
negotiated-by a group of victorious Powers, the principle of
safeguarding the greatest possible freedom of the contracting
States as regards the alleviation of too heavy burdens, can
best be invoked by means of new negotiations . . . rather
than by leaving to the constituted judicial body the task of
making a revision of its own through the channels of
interpretation. 9
7
The United States-Italian Conciliation Commission in the 1961 De
Pascale Case, discussed the restrictive rule of interpretation in relation
to the mutual consent of the contracting parties .978 The Commission
ruled that a restrictive interpretation was permitted since it reflected the
mutual consent of all the contracting parties, 979 and it awarded
reparations 980
This-restrictive-interpretation to Article 78, para-
graph 4(c) of the Treaty of Peace is not, in any event, in
conflict with the preparatory work of the Peace Conference,
which should, however, be given consideration in the
interpretation of an international treaty only insofar as it
974. Droutzkoy Claim (United States v. Italy), 16R. Int'l Arb. Awards 276(1965),40
INT'L. REP. 442 (1965).
975. 40 INT'L L. REP. 442, 458 (1965).
976. Id. at 459.
977. Id.
978. De Pascale Case (United States v. Italy), 16 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 233,234(1961).
979. Id. at 234.
980. Id. at 235.
Vol. 7
150
California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 [1977], Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol7/iss1/2
IMPOSED TREATIES
reflects a mutual consent of all the contracting parties to a
given text .... 981
The United States-Italian Conciliation Commission in the 1955
Mergri Claim decided that the 1945 Peace Treaty was not invalid for
lacking consent or for violating the principle of equality. 982 However,
the Commission did not award any reparations, 983 even though it held
the 1947 Peace Treaty valid.9 84
The Anglo-Italian Commission decided in the 1954 Cases of Dual
Nationality (Case No. 22), against a dual national. 985 The Commission
held that the 1947 Peace Treaty was to be interpreted pursuant to the
general rules of treaty interpretation.
986
Notwithstanding the unilateral genesis of Peace Treaties,
imposed on the vanquished by the victors, they are really
bilateral conventions and their interpretation is regulated by
the general rules of interpretation of treaties .... 987
The Franco-Italian Conciliation Commission in the 1952 Re Rizzo
case, discussed the need to determine the intent of the contracting parties
and the need to restrict the obligations of the vanquished. 988 The
Commission held that the Italian plaintiff's property in Tunis was
exempt from liquidation. 9 89 As in the other cases, there was no discus-
sion of the circumstances under which a peace treaty may be regarded as
invalid. However, this arbitration more than any other, did discuss
imposed treaties, consent and restrictive interpretation.
But even in the case of a treaty of peace imposed on a
defeated state . . . the ascertaining of the intention of the
parties, and not of one party only, remains the principal aim of
interpretation. Although the defeated State gave its consent
under constraint, it nevertheless gave it, and the agreement
arises from that consent. It is true that the defeated State
submitted itself to the will of the victorious States, but only to
981. Id. at 234.
982. Mergr6 Claim (United States v. Italy), 22 INT'L L. REP. 443, 448 (1958).
983. Id. at 456.
984. Id. at 448. "The defeated State can, in the peace treaty itself, accept limitations,
more or less temporary, on the exercise of its sovereignty." Id.
985. Cases of Dual Nationality (Anglo-Italian Conciliation Commission), 14 R. Int'l
Arb. Awards 27, 36 (1954).
986. Id. at 33.
International Jurisprudence normally interprets the provisions of interna-
tional treaties in a restrictive manner, as it considers them as limitations of the
sovereignty of the State. ...
Id. at 36.
987. Id. at 36.
988. Re Rizzo, 19 INT'L L. REP. 478, 480-82 (1957).
989. Id. at 479.
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that will as it was manifested in the Treaty of Peace submitted
for its signature. The victorious States cannot, therefore,
require that the Treaty of Peace,, although it was not
negotiated, shall be interpreted according to their undisclosed
wishes; it must be interpreted according to the will of the
victorious States as they have expressed it. . and reduced it
to writing . . . and as it appears objectively in the Treaty.
[O]bligations contained in conventions must be inter-
preted in such a way as to impose the minimum burden on the
debtor party. .. m
The Commission contended that since the vanquished state's
consent was not given through a process of negotiation, the Commission
had to interpret the terms of the peace treaty in favor of the defeated state
and not expand upon those terms in any manner, so as to impose the
minimum burden on the defeated state.
2. National Jurisprudence. Three Dutch cases and one German
case discussed the validity of the 1938 Munich Agreement under
international law. Two Dutch cases held that the Munich Agreement
was void because of the threat of military force against Czechoslovakia
during its negotiation; one Dutch and one German case raised the
question but left it unresolved.
The Dutch case, Nederlands Beheers-Instituut v. Nimwegen and
Mdnner,991 was decided by the District Court of Arnhem in January,
1952, 992 and in November, 1952, by the Court of Appeals of Arnhem.
993
The Nederlands Beheers-Instituut was the Dutch agency which adminis-
tered enemy property. 994 It claimed a right to have the defendant treated
as a German national.
The defendant (Manner) was a Czech national at the time of the
Munich Agreement, but was subsequently given German nationality as
a consequence of the German-Czechoslovakian Treaty of November 20,
1938 (the "Berlin Treaty"). The District Court refused to recognize the
imposed German nationality on the basis that the 1938 Munich Pact and
the subsequent 1938 Berlin Treaty were void because of the threat of
aggression. 995
990. Id. at 481-82 (emphasis added).
991. Nederlands Beheers-Instituut v. Nimwegen & Minner, 18 INT'L L. REP. 249
(1957).
992. Id. at 250.
993. Id. at 251.
994. Id. at 249.
995. Id. at 250. "The subsequent acceptance of this arrangement by Czechoslovakia
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The Court of Appeals reversed by stating that the Czechoslovak
Republic in 1945, had recognized the effect of the aforementioned
treaties upon former Czechoslovak citizens of German and Hungarian
origin. 996 Later in 1945, this position had been confirmed by a decree of
the Czechoslovakian President. 97
Another Dutch case, Ratz-Lienert and Klein v. Nederlands
Beheers-Instituut,998 was decided in 1956, by a Special Chamber of
Revision of the Judicial Division of the Council for the Restoration of
Legal Rights. It was called on to decide whether the Netherland's
legislation on enemy property applied to certain individuals, Sudeten
Germans upon whom the 1938 Treaty of Berlin imposed German
nationality. The Court decided that the German threat of force invali-
dated both the Munich and Berlin treaties, 99 rendering the imposition of
German nationality invalid. This was held to be the case in spite of the
1945 Czechoslovakian Presidential Decree. 100
The validity of the Treaty [of Berlin] as a whole cannot be
accepted; it was concluded by Czechoslovakia under clear,
inescapable and unlawful duress. Czechoslovakia adhered to
the Treaty only after she had under protest consented to the
transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany, who was threatening
war if she did not. . .. 1001
The last Dutch case to be discussed, Amato Narodni Podnik v.
Julius Keilwerth Musikinstrumentenfabrik,1002 was decided by the Dis-
trict Court of the Hague in 1956. It involved a question of ownership of
various trademarks. The Court held that the trademarks did not pass
under the Dutch enemy property legislation because the defendant did
not possess German nationality.1003
996. Id. at 25 1.
997. Id.
[T]he Presidential Decree of 1945 . . .nevertheless implied recognition and
confirmation, at least indirectly, of the German-Czechoslovak Treaty of
November 20, 1938, and of the attribution therein contained of German citizen-
ship to the inhabitants of the part of Czechoslovak territory occupied by
Germany.
Id.
998. Ratz-Lienert & Klien v. Nederlands Beheers-Instituut, 24 INT'L L. REP. 536
(1961).
999. Id. at 539.
1000. Id. at 540.
1001. Id. at 538. The Court stated that this invalidity was evidenced by the repeated
declarations of nullity by the Allies after the outbreak of World War II. Of course, no such
declarations were made during the time of the negotiation of the Munich Agreement. At
that time, the lack of such declarations evidenced an acceptance of the Agreement.
1002. Amato Narodni Podnik v. Julius Keilwerth Musikinstrumentenfabrik, 24 INT'L
L. REP. 435 (1961).
1003. Id. at 436.
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This was a question similar to the one presented in the above two
cases, and here the Court held that the 1938 Treaty of Berlin and the
prior Munich Agreement were void.' °" Thus, they could not have
granted valid German nationality to a Czech national.1005
The Court agrees with the argument of the defendant.
The German-Czechoslovak Nationality Treaty was invalid
because it was concluded under clear and unlawful
duress .... 1006
Land Registry of Waldsassen v. The Town of Eger (Cheb) and
Waldsassen was decided in 1965, by the Supreme Court of Bavaria, in
the Federal Republic of Germany. 10 )7 The two lower courts held that
Czechoslovakia had illegally expropriated German real property and
that the property could not be sold in Germany. The Supreme Court of
Bavaria reversed, 10 8 after discussing the question of the validity of the
1938 Munich Agreement from two points of view. Either the Agreement
was void ab initio because of illegal duress, or it was valid but
destroyed by the forcible incorporation of Czechoslovakia into Ger-
many in 1939. The Court decided that "these questions do not require
final decision here," 1009 since in any case, the Munich Agreement was
invalid. 1010
IV. CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY
In order to determine, analyze and assess the current state of the
international law rules relating to imposed treaties, this study has
analyzed case law of international and national tribunals, treaty practice
and international legislation in the context of managing interstate
conflict.
The following is a summary of the salient conclusions of this study.
Several suggestions are put forward with the intention of assisting the
international community in better managing the problem of interstate
conflict and increasing the political viability of treaties, that is, enabling
treaties to be used as a means of limiting the outbreak of new hostilities.
This outlook is apposed to those which emphasize logical consistency,
1004. Id. at 437.
1005. Id. at 438.
1006. Id. at 437.
1007. Land Registry of Waldsassen v. The Towns of Eger (Cheb) and Waldsassen, 44
INT'L L. REP. 50 (1972).
1008. Id. at 51.
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neo-naturalist law precepts or a merely mechanical approach to ter-
minating hostilities.
The evidence in the preceding discussions gives rise to three
categories of conclusion: 1) what the rule against imposed treaties is,
and what it is not; 2) propositions related to the rule; and 3) existing
problems with the rule.
A. What the Rule Is and What It Is Not
The evidence assessed in this research indicates that the rule
accepted by the international community prohibits the threat or use of
aggressive military force against a state in order to bring about a treaty.
The rule is a restriction on the general principle of pacta sunt servanda.
The new rule allows a treaty to be imposed only upon an aggressor
state by the aggrieved state or by collective action, which may include
action by the Security Council. At present, the Security Council is
permitted to take action in more cases than is a state acting individually.
While the limits of the authority of the Security Council in imposing a
treaty on a state as an enforcement measure are not clear, there is no
doubt that the Security Council does have such authority. However, this
is not because the Charter or the drafters provided explicitly for such
authority, for they did not. The authority exists because the language of
certain provisions of Chapter Seven of the Charter is so broad as to
require that such authority be inferred from the ordinary meaning ol the
terms used.
The evidence cited does not support the contention of many writers
and commentators that there is a rule precluding the validity ot unequal
treaties. A number of representatives from various states argue that the
phrase "the threat or use of force" in article 52 of the Vienna
Convention should be broadly construed as a prohibition against the use
of economic force in treaty relations. They point out subsequent acts of
the Conference and the broad language of article 2(4) of the Charter.
However, they do not consider article 75 of the Convention, nor do they
consider the compromise of the 1968-1969 Conference which excluded
from the treaty text the precise language which those representatives
now rely upon as a rule of law. The raison d 'tre of the compromise was
to preclude exactly the claims currently being put forward in regard to
economic force.
The articles of the Convention must be interpreted, by the terms of
the Convention, in a manner consistent with the Charter. The drafters of
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the Convention intended that the prohibition against coerced treaties
would develop as the law of the Charter was clarified. Indeed, this intent
has been fulfilled. Now, in light of the passage of the 1974 General
Assembly Declaration on Aggression, the broad claim that the rule
prohibiting the use of force in treaty negotiations includes economic
force is even less persuasive in that the Aggression Declaration pre-
cludes economic justification for an act of self-defense. The better
interpretation is that the current rule views the general prohibition of
articles 52 and 75 in the context of, and limited by the 1974 Declaration.
B. Related Propositions
The rule against imposed treaties, as indicated in the Fisheries
Jurisdiction Case (1973), was implicitly accepted in 1945, by the
Charter of the United Nations. It was not explicitly accepted until the
adoption in 1969, of article 52 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, and it was not substantially clarified until the 1974 Declaration
on Defining Aggression.
In terms of legal concepts, most observers agree that the rule
against imposed treaties is based upon the principles of sovereign
equality, 01 I its derivative concept of state consent, and the prohibition
against the use of force in international relations. The development of
the rule against imposed treaties by the international community has
required that various interests be balanced. In formulating the rule, the
following objectives have been emphasized: making the law of treaties
logically consistent with the law of war; providing a practical means of
terminating hostilities; precluding the use of peace treaties as a pretext
for renewed hostilities; and precluding fictitious state consent from
serving as a basis of international treaty obligations.
The overriding objective has been to develop a new rule of law
based on actual state consent, and to discourage the renewal of hos-
tilities by making it known beforehand that treaties imposed by unlawful
force are not to be observed. This latter policy is viewed by the
supporters of the new rule as a causal consequence of the former; that is,
when states agree freely to their treaty obligations, those commitments
are less likely later to become a source of friction between them, thus
reducing the chances of new military hostilities. This policy attempts to
create a new rule of law to supplant an older one which all too often had
served as an incentive to enter into new military hostilities. The new rule
can be viewed as particularly implementing "the foremost legal obliga-
1011. For a recent article on the nature of the principle of sovereign equality, see
Anand, Sovereign Equality of States in the United Nations, 7 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 185 (1967).
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tion of states" not to resort to war.
10 12
The replacement of the old rule by the new reflects a difference in
the policies which lie behind those rules. The older policy emphasized
the expedient conclusion of hostilities, even if it involved the recogni-
tion of a treaty imposed upon a state as a result of an aggressive war.
Although the newer policy also favors the earliest possible termination
of conflict, it attempts to regulate the conclusion of hostilities by
establishing general guidelines governing the conclusion of treaties
ending hostilities. The guidelines state that a peace treaty should be
drafted in reference to the aggressive acts, if the treaty is one validly
imposed upon an aggressor.
A paradox lies in the newer rule in that the rule, when interpreted in
light of the Charter, gives the Security Council authority which, in
effect, is almost as extensive as the rights of states in the nineteenth
century. These rights allowed the stronger powers to impose, in the form
of treaties, their will upon the weaker states. This imposition of treaties
followed the practice of the Congress of Vienna which allowed the
imposition of treaties without the actual consent of states.
The tension that has accompanied the newer rule's development is
still apparent. Many dissatisfied states wish to expand the rule further at
the cost of restricting even more the principle of pacta sunt servanda
0 13
by invalidating treaties which are imposed by non-military force.
1012. Fried, War-Exclusive or War-Inclusive Style in International Conflict, I I TEXAS
INT'L L.J. 1 (1976).
[I]nternational law has fully endorsed the universal moral condemnation of
war and has translated the latter into the foremost legal obligation of states
... .International law has created a vast network of treaties and arrange-
ments, as well as an elaborate institutional framework designed to prevent war.
Id.
It is also of importance that such democratic principles of classic international
law which have been inherited by contemporary international law (respect of
State sovereignty, equality of states. . . ) have considerably developed in line
with the progressive development of international law as a whole.
Substantial changes have taken place in all parts of international law: law of
treaties ....
• .. Classic international law was in many parts a law imposed. . . .The
legal foundation of contemporary international law is the agreement of States
resulting from the harmonization of their wills.
Tunkin, International Law: The Contemporary and Classic, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN HONOUR OF KRISHNA RAO 48, 56 (M. Nawaz ed. 1976).
1013. Pollack in 1884, warned against the acceptance of rules which, in fact, have not
been recognized by the international community.
But this . . . leaves it an open question whether ius gentium really
coincides with ius naturale. There may possibly be rules that deserve to be
recognized by all mankind, but in fact are not ...
Pollack, Appendix, in H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 399 (10th ed. 1884). For an analysis of
pacta sunt servanda and the United Nations, see Papacostas, Le Principe "Pacta Sunt
Servanda" et l'Organisation des Nations Unies, 6 REV. HELLNIQUE DROIT INT'L 231
(1953).
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Statesmen have analyzed the existing rule against imposed treaties, but
have not fully recognized the role of the rule in managing interstate
conflict. They have insisted that the rule be broadened without realizing
its potential as a disruptive force, especially in light of the absence of
compulsory third party review, judicial or otherwise.
The evidence also indicates that a validly imposed treaty, such as a
peace treaty imposed on an aggressor state at the end of a war, should be
interpreted restrictively in order to minimize any imposed obligation on
the vanquished state. This interpretation is favored because the consent
of the vanquished aggressor state is not freely given. This view accepts
the proposition that freely given state consent should be the basis of
treaty obligations, but that when it is not, any construction extending
such obligations is to be restricted. This proposition is a narrow
exception to the general principle that treaties should be interpreted in a
broad and liberal manner.
C. Existing Problems With the Rule Against Imposed Treaties
Several problems exist regarding the current state of the rule
against imposed treaties. Three significant problems that need to be
resolved in order for the rule to be developed further are: 1) defining
exactly what is entailed by the requirement that the initial aggression be
referred to in determining which terms may be validly included in a
treaty lawfully imposed on a state by a state acting in self-defense; 2)
clarifying the effect of rendering void an invalidly imposed treaty, and
specifically determining whether there should exist a right to a subse-
quent agreement protecting the rights of the aggrieved state and indi-
viduals under such treaties; 3) determining the most effective role of the
Security Council in imposing agreements on states. The problem of
determining the precise category of acts that would fall within the phrase
"threat or use of military force" is significant. However, it goes beyond
the area covered by this study. It would be a proper subject for a more
detailed study of the 1974 General Assembly Declaration on Aggression
which attempts to treat this problem and enumerate such acts.
Possible solutions to the three problem areas are essentially politi-
cal decisions of the international c6mmunity. As such, they represent
the "further development" of international law, rather than a juridical
detrrnination of their merits.
1. "Reference to. " Article 75 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties provides that a treaty may be 'imposed on an
aggressor with reference to that state's aggression, and that a state may
impose such a treaty with or without the participation of the United
Vol. 7
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Nations. 10 14 Does reference to a state's aggression here mean reference
to the actual military positions, to other aspects of the aggression, or to
the underlying causes?
It is important to establish what an imposed treaty under article 75
may provide. An imposed treaty might attempt to provide for several
significant or strategic matters such as the transfer of territory,
demilitarization of such territory, reparations or transit rights. The
evidence presented within this study does not establish specifically the
range of terms which a validly imposed treaty may contain. One view is
that the provisions of the treaty ought to refer only to actual military
aspects of the initial aggression, or perhaps only to the consequences of
that aggression, such as, to the location of the aggressor's troops within
the attacked state, for example. Another view is that such a treaty ought
to take into account all of the actual and immediate causes of aggression,
for example, the existence of an unmarked border. It seems reasonable
to favor the first view, that is, to limit a validly imposed treaty to dealing
with the immediate consequences of the aggression in order to establish
the ante quo. If the other solution is chosen, a state may be given too
much discretion which may result in the imposition of an undesirably
burdensome treaty. This, in effect, would have very little reference to
the immediate causes of aggression and would lead to a new set of
grievances on behalf of the aggressor state. Such a situation existed
under the older rule and was a consideration in the development of the
newer one.
2. "Void" Treaties and Subsequent Acts. Article 52 of the 1969
Vienna Convention characterizes all treaties falling within its terms as
void. There is a need to define the exact consequences of such treaties.
For example, the People's Republic of China in its border dispute with
the Soviet Union involving certain boundary treaties, and the Federal
Republic of Germany and Czechoslovakia in their 1973 treaty, do not
view the abrogated treaties as absolutely without effect. The People's
Republic of China appears to view the existing borders as lawful; both
West Germany and Czechoslovakia have declared various rights of
individuals, established under the "void" treaty, as remaining in effect.
Both of these are examples of subsequent acts undertaken consistent
with a "void" treaty, but voluntarily given present effect by the state
against whom that treaty was imposed. There is an important difference
between the two examples, however, giving rise to two categories of
1014. It is suggested that states ought to continue to have the right to conclude these
agreements outside of the United Nations structure, given the current state of the
development, or lack of development, of the United Nations' authority and responsibility
in the interstate use of force.
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subsequent acts. In the first category the acts recognized, such as the
Chinese acceptance of the existing border, are characterized as "pub-
lic". In the second category, the acts, such as the West German-
Czechoslovakian declarations on individuals' rights, are best described
as "private."
The difference between "public" and "private" acts often serves
as the basis in civil law countries for recognizing the effects of an illegal
act. Although this difference is not discussed here, it is suggested that a
new formulation of the rule perhaps ought to allow an aggrieved state the
right to declare at least some parts of an invalidly imposed treaty to be
valid and binding. Evidence does not support-the rule as formulated in
article 52 which declares all coerced treaties to be void. Even if a treaty
is invalid from its inception, the effects of some of its terms ought to be
subject to continuing recognition from the date of the imposition. This
continuing recognition would not establish new rights prospectively,
but simply would observe rights contained or created under the original
imposed treaty.
This suggested rule is not just a codification of existing practices
for codification's sake. It is based upon the policy consideration of not
imposing additional hardships on individuals or nations. For example, if
Mr. X in State B is granted a divorce under the terms of a statute passed
or adopted under the authority of a treaty imposed upon State B by State
A, he ought not to find himself in the position of a bigamist when State B
renounces the treaty and acts done under it, because of the unlawful use
of military force in bringing about the agreement. An aggrieved state
may believe that part, if not all of a settlement imposed upon it,
nevertheless, may meet its standard of fairness in the context of both law
and politics. Once a state is in a position to exercise its consent freely, it
ought to be allowed to give continued recognition to as much of the
existing situation as it finds suitable. Once the defective consent of a
state is rectified, the underlying policy behind article 52 is satisfied since
that policy seeks only to make actual state consent the basis of treaty
obligations. 1
015
One argument against the above view is that it would be too
difficult to specify as a general rule of international law which acts
1015. Rozakis, The Law on Invalidity of Treaties, 16 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS 151,
156 (1974). Rozakis argued that article 52 is subject only to "relative nullity" rather than
"absolute nullity," since the interest protected is that of the coerced state and not a more
general public interest. Id. at 170 n.38.
Dhokalia contended that international law is mature enough to avoid the acceptance
of only a doctrine of absolute nullity. Dhokalia, Nullity or Invalidity of Treaties, 9 INDIAN
J. INT'L L. 177, 192 (1969). -[E]very system of law has to some extent met the tension
between nullity and the legal effects of unlawful acts." Id.
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should be observed and which should not. Taking this problem into
account, an alternative is a rule that would allow a state, when it is able
to exercise free consent, to declare its intention to recognize certain acts
that confer rights and benefits to it and to the former aggressor state.
These might be categories of acts or specific acts such as those relating
to marriage, divorce, inheritance or other acts which the state might
determine to be consistent with its own view of fairness and national
security. This recognition ought not to require a new agreement, but
should be achievable through unilateral action. Thus, the acts in
question would be recognized as lawful from the date of the invalidly
imposed treaty. It would be the recognition or the subsequent consent of
the aggrieved state that would give the necessary validity to acts already
performed.
Even if the aggrieved state expresses no interest in preserving any
of the effects of an imposed treaty, it may be best to uphold certain
private acts undertaken in accordance with that treaty on the basis that
not to do so would be inconsistent with minimum "due process', or
recognized international human rights. However, there is a convincing
objection to this position. There is little possibility of general interna-
tional agreement on which rights and interests ought to be selected for
special protection. In the area of international human rights, there is no
current consensus as to which classes of rights should be regarded as
fundamental.
3. The Role of the Security Council. This research has analyzed
the rule against imposed treaties from a juridical and developmental
perspective, rather than from the perspective of the United Nations'
authority to utilize imposed treaties under its enforcement powers.
While the term self-defense might be broadly interpreted, in light
of the 1975 Declaration on Aggression, as including anticipatory
self-defense, article 52 nevertheless requires there be a prior threat or
use of military force. Article 52 does not allow a state to impose a
solution because it believes itself confronted with a mere threat to the
peace. On the other hand, the Security Council does have such authority
under article 39. The authority of the Security Council to impose
agreements in cases of aggression and threats to the peace needs
substantial study and clarification to determine its extent and to deter-
mine the necessity of relying upon the actual consent of states, a
desirable element in normal bilateral treaty relations, but not necessarily
as desirable for the development of a vertically organized international
society.
4. Compulsory and Binding Third-Party Determinations. The
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procedures for treating a claim of invalidity established by the 1969
Vienna Convention provide for compulsory jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court only if an issue is one of jus cogens. Thus it becomes
important to determine whether the rule against imposed treaties under
article 52 is most correctly construed as a jus cogens under article 53.
Being such an important instance of the general prohibition against the
use of force in international relations, a cardinal principle of the United
Nations Charter, the rule itself becomes a cardinal mandate of treaty
law. To the extent that states cannot act contrary to the rule in the
exercise of their consent, the rule seems, on first impression, to meet the
definition of a jus cogens. However, there is little consensus as to the
criteria of jus cogens; drafters of the 1969 Vienna Convention were
unable to enumerate them, and some denied that the rule contained in
article 52 is a jus cogens.° 16 While this article does not answer the
question of whether the new rule is a jus cogens, it is clear that the new
rule defines the nature of the consent required to vary rules which are not
jus cogens.
The need for binding and compulsory determination is often cited
by writers analyzing a broad range of international law topics. An
analysis of the procedures appropriate to the rule of imposed treaties is
not provided in this research, but one observation may be offered: when
such an analysis is made, all of international law and society will have
moved toward a more permanent international peace.
D. Additional Suggestions: Further Clarifying and Developing the
Rule
Additional suggestions may be made in two broad categories: first,
further clarifying the existing documents in order to state more precisely
the currently accepted rule; and second, further developing and refining
certain aspects of the rule in order to increase its efficacy in controlling
interstate conflict.
In clarifying the existing rule, there is a need to define "force" in
article 52 of the Vienna Convention as "military force." The prohibi-
tion on states, in articles 52 and 75, as interpreted in light of the 1974
Declaration on Defining Aggression, is apparently coextensive with the
article 51 right of self-defense as stated in the United Nations Charter.
The Charter employs the term "armed attack." Interpreting the prohibi-
tion in article 52 as a prohibition against aggressive military force would
1016. See generally Rao, Jus Cogens and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
14 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 362 (1974). Rao stated that the prohibition of use of force was
suggested as a jus cogens, but it was opposed by two-thirds of the members of the
International Law Commission. Id. at 375 & n.85.
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help to avoid exaggerated definitions of the rule against imposed treaties
by states relying on claims of illegal economic force. However, it would
not necessarily preclude a treaty imposed after the preemptive use of
force by a state which had been threatened with attack.
Ought the principle of state consent be expanded in order to make
the rule against imposed treaties coextensive with the concept of
unequal treaties, as that concept is expressed by some of its supporters?
Such an interpretation would subject many treaties to a possible claim of
invalidation since treaties are often concluded by parties of unequal
strength. Most treaties contain technically unequal or non-identical
rights and obligations. Quite often, these are merely the terms of an
arms-length bargain. Even if they were not, such inequality is a fact of
present international life; there is no practical way of avoiding it. Even
municipal law systems recognize many analogous private contractual
relationships. There is no value in creating a logical and internally
consistent legal system which is precluded from ever applying its rules
of conduct because of the disparity between the given nature of its
subject matter and the rigidity of its demands.
Such an expansion of the rule could subject any treaty to a charge of
being unequal, that is, an allegation that a treaty is invalid merely
because the parties include a stronger state and a less powerful state,
even when the strength of the more powerful state is not a causal factor
in concluding the agreement. Moreover, such an expansion of the rule
would also place the international community in the untenable position
of having to decide a question of defining and applying the ambivalent
and relational concept of force on an issue-by-issue basis. For example,
the international community would have to decide the validity of
economic force used in treaty practice by less-developed countries
against militarily stronger parties. If such use of economic force were
determined to be as unlawful as aggressive military force, presumably
the right of self-defense would allow the developed states military
recourse against lesser-developed states. If the right to use military
force were denied, then the international community might witness a
new gap between the law of war and the law of treaties. The law of
treaties would prohibit both economic and military measures, while the
law of war would not prohibit economic force.
Clarification of the existing rule could be implemented by having
the International Law Commission suggest an appropriate amendment
which would include a specific reference to the prohibition against
treaties concluded under the threat or use of aggressive military force.
Alternatively, the rule might be expressed in a resolution of the General
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Assembly or Security Council. Such an amendment or instrument might
read as follows:
(A) No international agreement shall be valid if a state is
coerced to consent to that agreement by the threat or use of
aggressive military force against that state. 
1017
(B) If such an international agreement is concluded, the
aggrieved state may subsequently freely announce that it: 1)
recognizes some or all of the rights held by individuals during
the treaty's imposition; or 2) recognizes the continued exist-
ence of other effects of the imposed agreement.
Both sections of the above proposed rule codify and crystallize the
existing rule of international law. Section A treats the nature of the
prohibited force, and Section B treats the existing law as to the effect of
the proscribed agreement.
From a problem-solving perspective of controlling interstate con-
flict, it is useful to summarize the functioning of the traditional pre-
Charter rule, the newer post-Charter rule, and the proposed rule. This
can be done by emphasizing two distinct but interrelated aspects or
stages of treaty practice: the conclusion of a treaty, and its subsequent
denunciation.
The traditional rule did not invalidate a treaty because of the use of
any force against a state in the treaty's conclusion. International law did
not permit a denunciation of a treaty for the reason that it was imposed.
The actual consent of states was not required in the creation of binding
international agreements.
The traditional rule did not tend to restrict the use of imposed
treaties as a pretext for renewed hostilities. Rather, the traditional rule
1017. Whether or not the Secretary-General has or should have the authority to deny
registration of an imposed treaty is not decided here. No such authority existed under the
Covenant. II LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 78 (1930). See generally Middlebush, Non-
Recognition as a Sanction of International Law, 27 PROCED. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 40, 48
n.36 (1933). In 1930, Peru proposed that article 18 of the Covenant be amended so that the
League Secretariat would not be permitted to register "any treaty of peace imposed by
force as a consequence of a war." The proposed amendment was not adopted. It read as
follows:
The Secretariat of the League of Nations may not register any treaty of
peace imposed by force as a consequence of a war undertaken in violation of the
Pact of Paris. The League of Nations shall consider null and void any stipula-
tions which it may contain ....
II LEAGUE OF NATIONS OFF. J. 78 (1930). Some drafters of the Covenant also suggested a
similar proposal. Memo of Sir Robert Borden, March 13, 1919, 1 D. MILLER, THE
DRAFTING OF THE COVENANT 354, 360 (1938). Most thought the League had no right to
refuse to register imposed treaties. See F. WILSON, THE ORIGINS OF THE LEAGUE
COVENANT-DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF ITS DRAFTING 75 (1928), citing, Minutes of the
Commission on the League of Nations 70. See generally Lu, Registration of Treaties, 7
CHINA L. REV. 11 (1934).
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tended to be used as a legal justification for sacrificing smaller and less
powerful states in the name of world peace and pacta sunt servanda.
The existing rule invalidates a treaty because of the threat or use of
military force against a state during the conclusion of the treaty.
However, the effect of an invalidly imposed treaty is not clear. There is
also confusion as to whether the existing rule includes treaties brought
about by economic force, as well as other forms of unequal treaties.
Further, the Security Council appears to have authority to impose a
treaty in situations not strictly limited to acts of aggression. Finally,
states are required to register all denunciations, including those based
upon the new rule.
The newer rule, in conjunction with the present lack of third-party
procedures, likewise does not discourage the use of imposed treaties as a
pretext for renewed hostilities. Treaties imposed by military force are
illegal. However, there is a great probability that some states may claim
a broader rule to exist, thus putting additional stress on the existing
fabric of international law and relations.
The proposed rule clarifies the existing substantive rule. It provides
that the threat or use of military force, but not economic or political
pressure, in the conclusion of treaties, vitiates such treaties. It excludes
as a rule of law the broader doctrine of unequal treaties. Thus the
proposed rule attempts to avoid the tension with which the existing rule
needlessly strains the international legal system. Moreover, the pro-
posed rule provides a legal guarantee.
The aforementioned suggestions are intended to provide additional
legal guarantees in order to protect all states, but especially smaller and
less powerful states, by establishing beyond question that the Munich
Treaty of 1938 is not a juridically acceptable model for states acting
individually or collectively to control interstate conflict. 101 8 An exag-
gerated view of pacta sunt servanda, which postulates blind adherence
for the sake of some higher good, is not acceptable. Treaties need to
become more viable politically in order to serve as an instrument ending
hostilities and precluding the treaties' use as a basis for a new military
conflict. If the rules relating to imposed treaties were made clearer, there
might be less likelihood of such treaties being enacted. Clearly formu-
lated rules would foster a treaty-making process with a far better
probability of maintaining peaceful relations.
Moreover, in establishing a clarified rule on imposed treaties, only
1018. Wroblewski, Axiology: Dilemma Between Legal Positivism and NaturalLaw, 18
OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR OFFESTEICHES RECHT 23 (1968). Wroblewski is critical
of the revival of the natural law approach.
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a relatively minor political decision would be required to create a
substantially more viable regime. Such a system would not guarantee a
peace, but it would certainly further it.
E. Concluding Remarks
An effort has been made in this study to analyze as much evidence
as possible regarding imposed treaties, but it would be an exaggeration
to claim that all the evidence has been evaluated. However, the most
significant data have been identified and analyzed. It is clear that the
rules regulating imposed treaties are open to controversy and confusion.
This research has attempted to analyze the evidence and to make it more
understandable.
In light of the above comments and of the preceding analysis of
doctrine, state practice, international legislation and jurisprudence, this
study has ventured to offer several conclusions and suggestions. It has
concluded that there exists a rule of treaty law best termed the rule
against imposed treaties. This rule exists, but it is not free of con-
troversy. Political decisions are needed to clarify the legal status of the
rule and to develop it further. Such development would increase its
usefulness in peacefully controlling interstate conflict. It respectfully is
suggested here that the authors of this future development should assess
proposals such as those outlined here, in order to improve the existing
rule and to foster peaceful relations among states.
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